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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to establish a model of psychotherapy that is based on 
experience, but which takes social 
first sets up a theoretical model of 
structure into account. To do this it 
psychotherapy. Thereafter the model is 
used to analyse four protocols as a way of examining its effectiveness. The 
analysis of the protocols provides the basis for corning to certain 
conclusions about the nature of psychotherapy. The theoretical phase first 
examines the area traditionally known as etiology, but here the approach is 
from a broadly exb'i:ential perspective. Thus this section starts by 
proposing a view of human nature, and then it goes on to say how this 
narure comes to be disrupted. The influence of the broader social context 
upon human existence is a1ro considered here. Secondly, there is an 
attempt to understand how psychotherapy works. Drawing on existential and 
cuJtural anthropological material, various themes of psychotherapy are 
examined, and these are then placed within their social context. Finally, 
t..'1e theoretical phase brings together the themes emerging from the two 
foregoing sections and integrates them into a single model of "etiology" 
and "=e". In the fo1Jowing chapter, the adequacy of this model is 
examined by using it to analyse four protocols written by subjects on their 
experience of therapy. In the final chapter various conclusions are drawn. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is yet another contribution to the already vast body of literature 
on the subj=ct of psychotherapy. It is, therefore, quite justifiable to ask 
why it is necessary to undertake this piece of work. The answer is that 
this thesis attempts to look at psychotherapy in an unconventional way. It 
is an attempt to blend the insights of existential-phenomenological 
psychology and critical theory in the hope that this approach provides a 
model of psychotherapy which is able to overcome some of the problems of 
conventional psychotherapy thecry and research. Fully to answer the 
question of why another piece of research on psychotherapy couJd be 
necessary thus requires an examinaticn of what the problems associated with 
traditional approaches to psychotherapy are. 
There are two levels at which one can look at the problems of traditicnal 
approaches to psychotherapy. The first concerns the ground out of which 
these approaches emerge, the natural scientific method as applied to 
psychology. Secondly, and more specifically, one can look at the 
outworkings of this method in the particu1ar area of psychotherapy. 
1.1 General Problems of the Natural Scientific Aporoach to Psychology 
Psychology came to be established at the time when natural scientific 
methodology was at its zenith. This approach to studying the human 
phenomenon thus seemed to be the most obvious choice of methodology. In 
this section the adequacy of this choice is questioned. 
De Boer (1983) is concerned with establishing a critical psychology. For 
him, one of the impcrtant aspects of being critical is to examine the 
foundaticns on which the discipline is based. In doing this one can come to 
see that the natural scientific pcstulates that are taken for .granted in the 
dig:ipline are in fact only one way of looking at reality, and thus one can 
see that there is more to reality than is assumed by the pcstulates. De 
Boer's critical enquiry, then, addresses the question of what .the postulates 
exclude. He points to four main areas of human existence that cannot be 
studied within a natural scientific framework. 
The way people experience their lives cannot be accomodated within the 
natural scientific methodology as it is based on reducticnism. It is 
necessary to reduce complex meanings to operaticnalised definiticns in order 
to make them mearurable. Thus experience generally, and more specifically 
the experience of meaningfulness, finds no place within the natural 
scientific approach. 
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Natural SCLence IS als:J based on causal explanation. When applied to 
Psychology causality implies that certain behaviours will necessarily follow 
certain other stimuli. Quite obviously this approach then cannot take 
cognizance of the fact that in our existence we experience ourselves as 
spontaneous, morally autonomous, relatively free beings who are able to 
choose what to do. 
For causal connections to be established, it is necessary for natural 
scientific psychology to establish the existence of external links between 
various events and behaviours. Thus the internal coherence of the pers::m is 
lost and fragmented in the establishment of logically independent units of 
behaviour. 
Why natural science is so keen to establish causal connections is because it 
can then posit various laws of nature. To posit humans as law-governed is 
to deny the uniqueness and individuality of each perron's life. This 
approach leads to an overemphasis on normality, the statistical average, 
which in turn denigrates any deviance from the status quo. 
These problems are the necessary consequence of using the natural scientific 
model as an approach to the study of human existence. Following De Boer, 
one can say that this approach is not inherently wrong. It does provide a 
valid way of studying those things that are causally operative. However, it 
must be accepted that, for the most part, this approach is inappropriate to 
the study of human existence in its wholeness and entirety. The problem is 
that Positivism ontalogises these notions and claims them as the only 
reality. In doing this it rules out the possibility of any other approaches to 
the study of human life, and 9:) limits the s:::ope of the discipline of 
psychology. This means that all that psychology is able to study are those 
aspects of existence that are amenable to natural scientific study. Thus we 
can perhaps agree with Heather (1976) that "to call this collection of 
irrelevance, triviality and downrirght silliness a science is preposterous" 
(p.10). 
When applied beyond the realm of academia this approach to psychology 
ceases to be merely trivial and assumes an insidious nature. The reification 
and operationalisation inherent in the method feed directly into the 
mechanised, technocratic word-view of industrial concerns which care little 
for the value of human life. The emphasis on normality can be used to 
engineer consent for an unjust status quo by denigrating any deviance from 
the prescribed values. The emphasis on logical independence tends to foster 
-3-
the i.9ilation of the individual, and this, along with the worship of 
normality, means that "phenomena more usefully seen as s:x:ial problems are 
dismissed as evidence of individual maladjustment" (Heather, 1976, p.51). 
Having considered the more general effects of natural scientific thought on 
psychology, it is possible no w to consider the specific situation in 
psychotherapy research. 
1.2 Problems in Psychotherapy Research 
Pervading the voluminous literature on psychotherapy seems to be a sense 
that research in this field is in its infancy. Although Ep;;tein and Vlok 
(1980) reassuringly conclude a paper on the outcome of various types of 
therapy by saying that "we can now say that psychotherapy does account 
for more of the change in treated patients than spontaneous remission or 
placebo effect" (p.1l2), they can offer no answers as to what the relevant 
variables are with regard to achieving this outcome. Similady, Beutler 
(1983), in concluding his book on eclectic psychotherapy maintains that the 
question 'What is therapeutic about psychotherapy?' is still unanswered. 
The directions for future research offered by Beutler point the way towards 
more detailed, careful research. Kiesler (1980), in a paper mapping the 
direction of psychotherapy research in the 1980's, more specifically suggests 
four areas to which attention must be given if the situation is to improve. 
There must be an integration of process and outcome variables; variables 
relating to the non-verbal behaviour of the therapist and the client must be 
examined; "the reciprocal nature of the evolving transactions between 
therapist and client" (p.82) must be analysed; and to make all this detailed 
study possible more specific and ac=ate measures of the many variables 
involved must be developed. Similady, Leder (1980), in search of the non-
specific variables that transcend particular theories, wants 
to search for new paradigms, to develop more complex 
experimental designs, more relevant criteria and 
sensitive and reliable instruments, and to combine 
nomothetic and ideographic studies... (p.132) 
Me1.tzhoff and Kornreich (1970), in closing off their huge study which 
br:ought together almost all of the research done on psychotherapy up to 
that point, come to a very similar conclusion, calling for more detailed 
collection of variables and factors in the search for a more complete 
understarrling of what makes therapy work. 
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Thus it seems that the answer to the prolonged infancy of psychotherapy 
research, as proffered by most writers in the field, is to collect more and 
more data by means of the tried and tested methods of natural scientific 
psychology. Surely this approach is severely limited with regard . to the 
complexity of therapy as it is experienced, and surely pressing on with this 
kind of research can lead only to a proliferation of the trivialities to which 
Heather refers? 
Kruger (1983) maintains that the operationalisation and reductionism inherent 
in the traditional approach to psychotherapy research lead to the actual 
process of therapy being lost. The meanings of the interaction for toth 
client and therapist get fragmented, and the fundamental wholeness of this 
experience can never be regained by any amount of data collection. As an 
example he shows how difficu1t. it is for the obj::ctifying attitude of natural 
science to capture the meaning of a smile within a particular therapy 
situation: 
the meaning of a smile of a therapist can only be 
clarified within the total context of the therapist as a 
person with a history in his relationship to a specific 
client, similarly a person with a history. (p.22) 
The subsequent discussion p:llnts to the need for an approach that is based 
on an attempt to understand the therapy situation rather than explain it. 
There is, however, a further problem. 
at the particular meanings expressed 
Even when one does look intensively 
within the therapeutic dialogue, as 
Latov and Fanschel (1981) have done, one finds that the conversation is 
guided by the theoretical orientation of the therapist. In addition, the 
theoretical orientation of the researcher will also colour the findings. Thus 
it is never possible to isolate purely non-specific variables, or to uncover a-
theoretical meanings. What is rather needed, prior to any research being 
done, is the establishment of a theory that is able to account for the 
effectiveness of all forms of successful psychotherapy, and that is adequate 
to the experience of the client. Further, Slch a theory must not be subj::ct 
to the ideological limitations of the natural scientific method. 
Barton (1974), in conclusion of a phenomenological investigation of the 
therapeutic process, sees the central aspect of psychotherapy as being the 
meaning-transformation that is brought atout by the theory which the 
therapist subscribes to, and which E;/he directly or indirectly teaches to the 
client. On the basis of this he outlines the criteria for a genuinely 
comprehensive theory of therapy: (il it must describe how the therapist is 
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able to act as a meaning transformer in the situation; (ii) it must show how 
this meaning-transformation becomes =nvincing to the therapist and the 
client; (iii) it must fully describe the involvement of both the therapist and 
the client; (iv) it must attempt to discover what the life-wor1d meaning of 
the therapeutic situation is; and (v) it must be open to the =nsensual 
validation of both practitioners and clients. The full implications of these 
criteria will be discussed later, but it is sufficient at this stage to see that 
armed with such a theory, one will be able to undertake research that can 
=nsider the whole of the therapeutic experience. 
The first chapter of this thesis is an attempt to outline such a theory. In 
the following chapter there is an attempt to ground this theory through an 
empirical investigation of the experience of psychotherapy. Before 
proceeding to these chapters, however, it is necessary to introduce the 
overall orientation of this proj2ct. 
1.3 Overall Orientation 
It was mentioned above that this thesis is an attempt to blend the insights 
of existential-fl:1enomenological psychology and critical theory. By 
synthesising these two approaches it is hoped that a model of psychotherapy 
can be found which is both adequate to the experience of the' client, and 
which also takes the social =ntext into account. There follows a brief 
introduction to the way in which each of these will be used in this thesis. 
1.3.1 Existential-Phenomenological Psychology: 
Perhaps the central insight of existential-phenomenology, =ntributed by 
Heidegger, is the notion that a person is Dasein, a Being-in-the-wor1d. This 
implies that people live in a wor1d which is their own particular wor1d of 
meanings relative to their unique history and life direction. This insight 
provides a good starting point for a theory of psychotherapy which aims at 
taking the client's experience of therapy as its starting point. 
Another important notion, also derived from Heidegger, is that human 
existence is proj2ctive, that a perron's life is shaped by the future towards 
which they are moving. This implies that there are a range of possibilities 
available to people in the future, and that what these possibilities are will 
effect the way the perron is living in the present. Such a view is a useful 
=ective to the natural scientific emphasis on norms and causality as it 
upholds the freedom of choice available to people. 
The notion of a projective human existence is not, however, a crass 
humanistic exhortation for one to become what one wants. The freedom 
implicit in this view is never completely ungrounded as it is seen as 
emerging from a context which makes available certain possibilities and 
closes others off. Thus human existence is seen as being delicately poised 
between the future and the past, a paradoxical mixture of freedom and 
determinateness. 
These core existential concepts will provide the basic understanding of 
human existence that will inform this study. Existential-phenomenology is, 
however, inadequate to the task of this thesis as outlined above as it has 
seldom turned its attention to questions of a more critical nature. 
Especially in the field of psychology, there has been very little attempt to 
use the insights of existentialism as a way of investigating the effects of 
social structure on the lives of individuals. How do oppressive social 
structures come to limit the possibilities of individuals? How are these 
structures maintained? How can one go about changing the SJ.pport for 
them? These questions are all relevant to a theory of psychotherapy, and to 
provide a basis for answering them in this study, it is necessary to enlist 
the SJ.pport of critical theory. 
1.3.2 Critical Theory: 
Critical theory was the fruit of the labours of the Frankfurt School to 
merge the ideas of Marx and Freud into a more coherent theory of societal 
processes. By addressing the individual as well as societal levels, they 
were better equipped than the orthodox Marxists to explain why, given the 
requisite economic conditions for revolution, none was forthcoming. The 
most recent proponent of this approach is Habermas. AJthough the scope of 
hi.3 work goes far beyond the concerns of the early Frankfurt School, 
extending most recently into the realm of linguistics and language 
philooophy, at the base of his work is an attempt to use psychoanalytic 
concepts to understand societal processes. 
Habermas posits the notion of systematically distorted communication. 
A=ding to him we are ideologically deceived, but we are 9:) deceived 
tiJat we do not even know that we are deceived. The only way to 
overcome this state of affairs is for us to employ methodical self-reflecticn, 
and the only science which can serve this emancipatory interest is 
psychoanalysis. All other s::ience merely serves the interests of 
manipulative technology. Thus Habermas sees 9:)mecne in an analyst-like 
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position as bringing enlightenment to oppressed people by revealing to them 
their true position in s::x:::iety. Habermas, therefore, uses the methods of 
psychoanalysis which Freud aimed at the individual by applying them to 
sxiety in general as a critique of ideology. 
Central to the Habermasian position is the concept of quasi-causality. Some 
aspects of existence become "ideologically frozen" (quoted in De Boer, 1983, 
p.69) through the operation of systematic distortions, and thus corne to be 
seen as invariant laws. These apparant laws are quasi-causes, laws whose 
applicability can be overcome by enlightenment. This notion is derived from 
psychoanalytic methodology which Habermas sees as overcoming the 
drivenness of neurosis through the enlightenment offered by the analyst's 
interpretations. 
There are, however, problems with this approach. Firstly, we can question 
whether Habermas is justified in his use of psychoanalysis as an analogy for 
sxietal processes. Doing this tends to limit the work of the critical 
endeavour to the sxietal level. thus rendering a critical psychotherapy 
iInpossible. Rather than seeing psychoanalysis as the model for critique of 
ideology, following De Boer (1983) one should see psychoanalysis and critique 
of ideology as paralell. processes, and there should also be room in the 
proj8ct of critical psychology for less 'deep' and searching approaches of 
psychology, social psychology and s::x:::iology. Thus the critical endeavour 
would not follow a particuar model as outlined by Habermas, but would 
rather attempt to pool the findings of all social sciences concerned with 
questioning the social structure within which they operate. 
A second problem is that Habermas' anthropological assumptions are clumsy 
and limiting. His division of human existence into causal, quasi-causal., and 
free behaviours Slggests that these realms are separable and independent, 
and it becomes di.ff:icu1t. to explain interactions between them. If we use 
t..'1e Heideggerian notion of situated freedom as a basis from which to work, 
then this problem is eradicated. In addition, moving beyond the tri-partite 
division which Habermas envisages also allows the broadening of the critical 
endeavour beyond the realm of quasi-causality to the whole of the world of 
possibility. 
On a more practical level. one can ask whether this approach would 
actually work as a means to liberation. Enlightenment is certainly 
necessary, but is it sllfficient? The South African situation would tend to 
Slggest that enlightenment in a situation of deeply entrenched inequality 
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brings little more than anger and resentment to the oppressed, and fear and 
desperation to the oppressors. This points to another failure of Habermas' 
theory: it fails to address the oppressors. Surely true liberation must alm 
seek to overcome the prejtrlices of the dominant power group? 
Thus, in this thesis critical theory will not be used in the specific sense 
intended by Habermas, rut will rather be seen more generally as a concern 
with the ideological implications of the sxio-pclitical context. This 
discussion of Habermas has, however, raised many questions which this study 
will attempt to answer. These questions are basically of two kinds: firstly 
the discussion challenges psychotherapy to contribute its insights to the 
understanding of the broader societal processes in an attempt to bring about 
change in the structures that control people's lives; secondly it challenges 
current psychotherapeutic practice to take societal processes into account. 
In conclusion of these introductory remarks, therefore, we can say that this 
study attempts to use the concepts and insights of critical theory to 
contextualise the understanding of human existence given by existential-
phenomenological psychology. It is hoped that this will give rise to a model 
of psychotherapy that is an adequate description of the client's experience, 
but which will alm allow questioning of the sxial structure within which 
the therapy takes place. If we consider again the question with which this 
introduction opened, " Why another study on psychotherapy?", we should 
perhaps now answer that this is an attempt to provide a view of 
psychotherapy which, although not claiming to be the whole truth, hopefully 
takes into account both the experience of the client, and alm the sxial 
structure within which therapy must take place. 
It now remains only to outline the structure of the remainder of this thesis. 
Chapter 2, the theoretical phase, aims to establish a model of psychotherapy 
that is based on experience, rut which takes sxial structure into account. 
There are three main sections in this chapter. The first, 2.1, examines the 
area traditionally known as etiology, but here the approach is from a 
broadly existential perspective. Thus this section starts by proposing a view 
of human nature, and then it goes on to say how this nature comes to be 
disrupted. The influence of the broader sxial context upon human 
exist:.ence is considered here. . In the second section, 2.2, there is an 
attempt to understand how psychotherapy works. Drawing on existential and 
cultural anthrop::Uogical material, this section examines various themes of 
psychotherapy, and it then proceeds to place these themes within their 
sxial context. The third section, 2.3, brings together the findings from 2.1 
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and 2.2, integrating them into a single model of "etiology" and "=e". In 
the following chapter, Chapter 3, the adequacy of this model is examined by 
using it to analyse four protocols written by sub~cts on their experience of 
therapy. In the final chapter various conclusions are drawn and rome 
suggestions are made. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PHASE 
In the introduction we have seen that before we can research the 
experience of psychotherapy, it is necessary to have a theory of therapy. 
Now the particular theory that a researcher adheres to is a reflection of 
~er various ideological commitments. Thus any research is done within 
the constraints of a particular world-view. The problem is, though, that 
usually this choice of world-view is not made explicit, and the research is 
claimed to be the whole truth. This chapter, on the other hand, is an 
attempt to make explicit the theory that is guiding the research that is 
part of this thesis. The theory advanced here is alro offered as another 
way of seeing the process of psychotherapy, a way that can be, hopefully, 
more fruitful in certain respects than traditional research into 
psychotherapy. 
In keeping with the overall orientation as outlined in the introduction, this 
chapter will be an attempt to (i) arrive at an existential-phenomenological 
understanding of therapy, and then (ill to place this understanding within its 
social context, examining the implications of this for psychotherapy. This 
chapter is divided into three main sections: in 2.1 there is an attempt to 
arrive at an understanding of how the phenomenon of 'psychoJ?athology' 
comes to be; in 2.2 there is an examination of what psychotherapy is and 
should be; in 2.3 these two sections are brought together into a unified 
model of the process of etiology and therapy. 
2.1 WHY THE DIFFERENT EXISTENCE? 
Van den Berg (1974) describes psychopathology as a different existence: the 
patient lives in a different world to the rest of us, a world in which people 
are out to get one, and in which builings lean threateningly over towards 
one. From examining the world of the patient, van den Berg comes to the 
conclusion that the basic theme in all psychopathology is loneliness. In 
attempting to answer why this might be so, he turns conventional notions of 
etiology around and asserts that the world of the patient is the way it is 
because the patient is lonely. An example of this kind of thinking is that 
neurOSlS tends to be correllated with poor relationships with the parents. 
For van den Berg this does not mean that poor parenting causes neurosis. 
On the contrary, for him it means that neurotics tend to see their parents 
as having been bad parents. Thus for him pathology is the way the person 
sees their world now, and that perception from the present situation 
incJ.OOes the person's view of the past, as well as the future. 
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This is all very welL but it is not much help in answering the old question 
'why?'. How is it that people come to see their world in such a different 
way? Surely if psychotherapy is to be at all effective it must have rome 
account of how the pers::m's world comes to be different? And surely in 
coming to such an understanding it is necessary to 1=k at not only the 
formative experiences of that perron's life, but also at the social structures 
that can s=riously effect the way we live our lives? This section of the 
thesis is an attempt to provide an answer to these questions. However, 
before these questions can be satisfactodly answered we must have rome 
view of what human existence is so that, bearing tIllS view in mind, we can 
see how the world of the person comes to be formed. We will then 
consider the formative processes from an existential-phenomenological point 
of view, and finally this understanding will be placed within the rocia1 
context by consideration of more socially oriented theories. 
2.1.1 What is Human Nature? 
Tillich (1968) discusses the many attempts to define human nature. He sees 
two broad types. Firstly there are the deterministic attempts. These 
either see human nature as being determined by particuJar personal 
characteristics, or else by social forces. But, Whatever the merits of using 
deterministic models for scientific study, we have seen, in the introduction, 
that the ontologising of these does an injustice to human experience. Since 
this study is largely concerned with experience, it is necessary to move 
away from any kind of determinism. 
On the other hand there are those who would maintain that there can be no 
such thing as an essence to human existence. Tillich criticises these 
approaches too. There are three broad kinds of argument against there 
being any human essence. Firstly, the nominalists claim that we are all 
unique individuals, and that as such there can be no common or enduring 
essence. To uphold this view, however, the nominalist presupposes many 
universals which can in turn be seen as being ontological claims. The 
historical approach, which claims that all historical circumstances are 
different, and that the people living in those times will be different 
ac=iling to the ooc:io--economic forces moulding them, also presupposes 
many universals which can be seen as being ontologicaL Even the 
existential view that the essence of human existence is its existence makes 
ontological claims. Thus it seems that it is impossible to get away from an 
ontological view of human nature. However, it is important that the view 
arrived at is not deterministic. So we are 1=king for a view of human 
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nature that points to rome kind of essence, but which al9:l alJows of the 
freedom and infinite variety of experienced human existence. 
In looking for such a view we can start with Heidegger's notion of Dasein. 
Human existence is, this term implies, a being-there, a being-in-the-world. 
By using this term, Heidegger emphasises that before anything e.l.re, we are 
in relation to the world in some way. This relationship is not a purely 
spatial one, like that of a table which is in a room. Rather this 
relationship is one of dwelling-in, of touching, of encountering. We do not 
merely 'bump into' our world, but we commune with it in a meaningful way. 
It is important to note that this relationship to the world cannot be chosen 
against; it is always there. What can be chosen is the way in which we 
use this relationship. For example, a biologist sees the world as 
'environment'. To do this, !;/he must first be in relation to the world in a 
veri basic way which can subsequently be used as biological seeing. Thus 
the starting point in Heidegger is that we are, without choice, related to a 
world of things and others, a world which we can choose to relate to in 
different ways. 
Heidegger goes on to give a discussion of what the structure is that is 
underlying this being-in-the-world. There are three elements to this 
structure. Firstly there is BefindJichkeit, or thrownness. This describes 
the idea that we are always thrown into some kind of world not of our 
choosing. Further it implies that we are atbmed to this world in some kind 
of way. Without rome way of seeing, without an attunement, we cannot 
see anything. Secondly there is Verstehen, or understanding. What this 
conveys is that our existence is always lived in terms of future possibilities, 
our lives are always lived beyond where we are now. ]J: is these 
possibilities that draw us towards them, giving life its movement and 
freedom. Thirdly there is Rede, or discourse. Unless there is some kind of 
articulation of attunement, and unless the future possibilities are expressed 
in rome way, these cannot be lived. Thus for Heidegger, Dasein is thrown 
possibility articulated in rome way. 
Refering to Heidegger's later discussicn of Angst, Buber (1979) maintains 
bat 
Heidegger isolates from the wholeness of life the realm 
in which man is related to himself, since he aboolutises 
the temporally conditioned situation of the radically 
solitary man, and wants to derive the essence of human 
existence from the experience of a nightmare (p.20S). 
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Thus Buber criticifEs Heidegger for jX)Siting a closed system which does not 
allow of mutual dialDgue as being essentiaL This criticism of Buber's seems 
to ignore the fact that the experience of Angst brings the perron back to 
their essence and is not itself essential, and the essence which is regained 
is the being-in-the-world which is basically relatedness. 
Tillich (1968) states the insights of Heidegger in a different way. For him, 
human nature is finite freedom, and this formulation takes account of the 
need for a basic structure, while at the same time allowing for the 
possibility of freedom. 
Tillich defines freedom as "the reaction of a centered self to a stimulus in 
such a way that the centre, and not a part or a partial process within the 
whole, determines the reaction" (p.96). This implies that for him freedom is 
commensurate with wholeness in relating, that to be free one must be able 
to relate to the world in terms of all one's possibilities. There are two 
further aspects of freedom that Tillich discusses. Individuality is a 
consequence of freedom, as a mnltiplicity of possibilities can lead to unique, 
individual styles of doing things. Freedom also implies that people are 
dynamic, that they can change from the way that they are. 
In man these two qualities of all life produce both the 
infinite variety of individual expressions, and the 
never-resting trend to go beyond the given toward 
something new - the essential human dissatisfaction 
(p.96). 
Tillich defines finitude as the 'fate' of being within a particular context, 
the fact that we are never entirely free in choosing which of our 
potentialities we are going to live out, as there are always constraints on 
us. He sees there as being an uneasy relationship betweeen these two 
aspects of existence. The promise of freedom constantly makes us try to 
go beyond the limits imposed by our finitude. This striving for freedom 
leads to estrangement from ourselves. This estrangement Tillich sees as 
being the necessary consequence of our essential finite freedom. However, 
estrangement is not itself essential, as Eastern religions would say. Rather, 
i.e can be overcome through a courageous acceptance of our finitude. This 
involves moving beyond self-centered striving to the position where one 
allows the world to form one, where one is deeply and intimately in 
relationship with the world of others and things. Thus in Tillich we see the 
same basic themes emerging as in the discussion of Heidegger: the unchosen, 
the free possibilities, and the need for relationship. 
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R:icoeur's reading of Freud a1m provides interesting insights into the nature 
of human existence. Ricoeur's (1974) starting point is to criticise the 
credulity of Husser1's phenomenology. He maintains that it is impossible to 
lay claim to the whole of consciousness. Rather, we must take seriously 
Freud's distrust of human consciousness. In his reading of Freud, Ricouer 
discovers two different theories about human nature: 
The reading of Freud, then, reveals two distinct realms 
of thought and thus two possible interpretations of 
Freud. One interpretation pertains to the technic~ 
scientific level of abstract explanation, where 
phenomena are seen in the light of instinct and the 
various levels (economics) of explanation. Another 
reading, apparently opposed to the first, philosophises 
about the possible meaning of the phenomena, their 
all-encompassing intentionality (Koenig, 1981, p.ll9). 
Ricoeur maintains that these views are in fact united: they exist together 
as a dialectic. This dialectic is a synthesis of the opposing forces of 
regression and progression, the forces of instinct and the forces of 
p:>ssibility. Thus, for Ricoeur, "Freud links a thematised archeology of the 
unconscious to an unthematised teleology of the process of becoming 
conscious" (Ricoeur, quoted in Koenig, p.136). 
Ricoeur sees this linking of the regressive and the progressive as taking 
place through symbols, as symbols are able to express two apparently 
opp:>sed movements simultaneously. This implies that existence is not a 
given, rut that it must be created through the appropriation and creation of 
symbols that are able to express the opposing realms of experience. And, 
since experience is ever-changing and varied, he sees ccnsciousness as a 
task, as "a movement which continually annihilates its starting p:>int and can 
guarantee itself only at the end" (Ricoeur, 1974, p.ll3). Symbols are thus 
the means by which we form ourselves. These formative proceses lead to 
sp..lf-reflection which is "the appropriation of our effort to exist and our 
desire to be" (Thompson, 1981, p.55). 
So from Ricoeur we have gleaned that human nature ccnsists of two 
apparently opposed forces. The first of these, the regressive, is relative to 
instinct, sexuality, the body etc. The seccnd is relative to the possibilities 
towards which human existence moves. In addition we have seen that it is 
necessary for these two to be articulated through symbols. The structure 
that Ricceur presents is very similar to those of Heidegger and Tillich. 
Pooling the findings from all three writers, we can say that human nature 
has two main components. The first can broadly be called finitude, and it 
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includes the limitations on human aspirations both because of the context 
within which those aspirations have to be realised, and because of the 
limitations which physicality presents. The second can be called freedom. 
This is the realm of the possible, the realm towards which human existence 
strives. Thirdly there is the realm of discourse. This is the means by 
which the two broad movements of human existence can be merged. 
Obviously different languages will be more or less able to express this, and 
this is why Ricoeur points to the symtols as the realm that can most easily 
express the essence of human existence. SymOOls are highly developed and 
specialised forms of discourse which have evolved to express such complex 
phenomena. 
Other writers have also pointed to this kind of structure underlying human 
nature. Thompson (1981) examines the implications of the later work of 
Wittgenstein for the sxi.al sciences. Wittgenstein maintains that there is 
no essence to language. What gives something meaning is its relatedness to 
other things. Thus, for example, there is no essential dog, but only a 
mnltiplicity of dogs which are more or less related to one another. This 
implies that there can be no fixed laws of language, but only general rules 
that speakers mayor may not wish to fallow in expressing their intentions. 
The implication of this is that if we wish to find something like an essence, 
if we wish fully to understand human 
those aspects most basic to existence. 
wittgenstein suggests looking at such 
existence, then we need to look at 
To gain this kind of understanding, 
thing as birth, death and sexuality. 
This kind of experience surely forms the ground of our relatedness, as it is 
things such as these which have to be expressed by humans in each and 
every age. So Thompson's reading of Wittgenstein also points to the 
finitude of existence, to the fact that existence is tied to a context, and 
that within that context there are varicus things that have to be expressed. 
Implicit in this view, though, is the freedom that we have to express our 
basic attributes in different ways. 
Van den Berg also suggests this kind of structure in his work. He has 
called his overall proj=ct. Metabletics, or the study of changes. On reading 
his books on the subj2ct of the changes in human existence, it would seem 
t.'lat he is saying that there is no such thing as human nature. He gives 
many instances of dramatic shifts in way of life, in the perception of the 
human body, and in matter itself during the last millenium. A strikng 
example of such a change is that before the time of Montaigne there was 
!Xl such thing as adolescence. Thereafter, it has changed frcm being a 
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short and insignificant period to being the protracted and stormy series of 
events that it is today. However, it is important to note that his study of 
change is only possible on the basis of wme kind of continuity. Giorgi 
(1968) makes this point clearly: 
If each change represented a wholly different entity, 
then one could speak of differences, but not change. 
Similarly, one can speak of constancy or identity only 
on the basis of change or variation. Thus, there seems 
to be a dialectical relationship between change and 
constancy whereby discussion of one necessarily involves 
reference to the other in order to assess properly the 
meaning of either (p.6). 
In fact Jacobs (1968), in a summary of the metabletic work of van den 
Berg, suggests that there are several basic structures of existence that van 
den Berg is concerned with. Jacobs maintains that metabletics studies the 
relationships between people and: others, s:>ciety, their bodies, death, 
sexuality, childhood, parenting, time, space and God. So we can see the 
work of van den Berg as examining how these basic attributes of human 
existence have been given differing expression over the ages. Thus although 
he does emphasise the freedom of human existence, that is its possibilities 
for changing, he is, nevertheless, implicitly concerned with those things that 
are unchanging, that is, with our finitude. 
By way of bringing this section to a close, and by way of introducing the 
next section, we can see the work of Boss (1979) as being an application of 
this way of understanding human existence within the realm of 
psychopathology. Rather than using the rigid diagnostic categories, which 
are based on superficial manifestations, he classifies pathology according to 
what he considers the basic aspects of human existence. Thus pathology is 
a disturbance of, or a failure to realise fully, these basic attributes. They 
are: tody, space, time, attunement, and freedom. Similar:ly, van den Berg 
classifies pathology according to disturbances in the patient's view of the 
world, their body, others and time. Both of these phenomenological 
accounts of pathology start out from the most basic attributes, and see how 
these are or are not being lived out. 
In conclusion of this section, then, we can say that human nature is 
articuJated finite freedom. Finitude is both relative to the context into 
which we find ourselves thrown, and to our basic human attributes which we 
have to live out in wme way within our context. Freedom consists of the 
many possibilities that we have for expression. For example there are many 
ways in which we can live out our sexuality. ll: is important to note, 
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however, that it must be lived in some way, even if that way is celibacy; 
sexuality cannot simply be ignored. This example, then, rot only points to 
the freedom or possibilities available, and to the finitude of the fact that 
sexuality must be acknowledged, and a1ro to the fact that society, as 
context, is a limit to our possibilities, rut it a1ro emphasises the need for 
some way of articulation. The celibate, unless part of rome system that 
provides a coherent set of symbols with which to deal with sexuality, will 
undoubtedly experience difficulties in upholding ·a celibate life-style. Thus 
in conclusion we can say that finitude and freedom find their realisation 
and their unity in rome kind of articulation which is in actuality a 
committment to a particular path of expression. 
2.1.2 How Does an Existence come to be Different? 
Now that we have rome idea as to what human nature is, we can start to 
see how it is possible for pathology to come about. In keeping with the 
overall orientation as outlined in the introduction, we need to move away 
from the causal. diagnostic accounts of the medical model which is based on 
the principles of natural science. This means that we shouJd see "mental 
illness" as being different ways of living out the possibilities of human 
nature. 
Boss (1979), mentioned at the end of the prev:ious section, sees pathology 
not as rome disease which we have, as the medical model would maintain, 
but rather as romething which we do not have. For him, pathology is a 
cunailment of the possibilities that we have for relating. Thus, pathology 
can be seen as an overemphasis of our finitude with respect to particular 
aspects of our existence. The question remains, however, as to how these 
=tailments arise. 
Boss approaches the area traditionally known as etiology from a 
When trying to understand the motivational, rot a causal, point of 
problems which a patient is having, 
view. 
he asks which boigraphical events are 
motivating the perron to act in the way they are. Thus the past, that is 
our experiences of our parents, our society and particular events, because 
or the impact which it had, continues to motivate us to live our lives in 
;articular ways in the present. 
Binswanger (1958) puts forward a similar notion. According to him we have 
tQ live out certain things (our finitude), and the way that we choose to do 
t.'iis is our history. 
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History is always thematic. The kind of themes which 
a person (or a people) is assigned by destiny or which 
he selects for 'elaboration', and the manner in which he 
varies them, are not only decisive for his history but 
are his history. (p.223) 
Our history, because of the themes of which it is an elaboration, leads us 
to live in particular worlds, worlds which reflect the destiny and choices of 
our biography. pathology arises, for Binswanger, when the themes that are 
elaborated lead to the establishment of conflicting worlds. 
We can perhaps take this notion further by saying that pathology means 
having more than one world in which to dwell. If one has a split world, 
then to cope with this one must =tail the possibilities that are not 
common to both worlds. The case of Ellen West, described by Binswanger, 
shows a person whose worlds were so much in conflict that her entire 
existence had to be annihilated to avoid the torment of conflict. Laing 
(1967) spells out this desperation well: 
•.. when [al perron comes to be regarded as 
schizophrenic, it seems to us that without exception the 
experience and behavicur that gets labelled 
schizophrenic is a special strategy that a person invents 
in order to live in an unliveable situation. In his life 
situation the person has corne to feel that he is in an 
untenable position. He cannot make a move, or make 
no move, without being beset by contradictory and 
paradoxical pressures and demands, pushes and pulls, 
both internally, from himself, and externally, from those 
around him. He is, as it were, in a position of 
checkmate (p.9S). 
This phenomenon is not limited to the world of schizophrenia. In fact, van 
den Berg (1974) sees it as a part of twentieth century existence to live in 
mllltiplicity, repressing into unconsciousness those aspects of our existence 
that are in conflict. He sees this kind of existence as putting people of 
the twentieth century much cJoser to the possibility of pathology than 
people of earlier, more ordered eras. 
The idea that we attempt to avoid the threat of conflict by denying certain 
of our possibilities is expressed clearly by Basescu (1962) who sees 
pathology as an adjustment that attempts to avoid threat by sacrificing 
wholeness: 
••. neurosis is very much an attempted adjustment, and 
therein lies its fault. Neurosis may be seen as the Slm 
total of those aspects of an individual's life-style that 
are determined by the need to preserve the centre of 
his being in the face of threat. Whether it be by 
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means of symptoms, character patterns or defences, or 
psychotic distortions, every one of us 59.crifices a 
greater or lesser part of his potential world of being in 
order at least to preserve the central identity of a self 
(p.151). 
If we look closely at the information we have gathered so far, there seem 
to be two notions of etiology. Firstly there is what can be termed the 
motivational view. This maintains that various incidents and influences lead 
us to choose limited possibilities by persuading us that, broadly, iJ: is painful 
to express more than these limited possibilities. Secondly there is the 
conflictual approach. This sees pathology as the result: of a curtailing of 
possibilities to avoid the conflict of the worlds in which we dwelL The 
conflict is avoided by the perron's denying the possibilities that are called 
out differently by the different worlds. 
These two views can be brought together. Motivations are what lead us to 
form particular worlds in the first place. We all try to please our parents, 
to fulfill social expectations and to avoid situations which have been painful 
before. But in doing 00 we limit our possibilities. These limited 
p::>ssibilities can be seen as a particular world. Limited possibilities on their 
own are, however, not enough to lead to pathology. Pure ignorance of the 
po'Sibilities excluded from our world is, relatively, bliss. It is only when 
this impoverished world is questioned that problems arise. A conflict can 
develop when we are called out to meet a world larger than the one which 
we have inhabited up till then. In Slch a situation we can no longer 
remain blissfu]ly ignorant of the possibilities that are not part of our world. 
This is a relatively simple formulation. Things can become far more 
complex, as in the case of Ellen West. For her the conflict began very 
eady. The motivators in her life led her to form two opposing worlds, each 
or which called to the possibilities that were meant to be absent from the 
other. 
Thus far, then, we can say that a perron is led to dwell in a certain world 
by the formative influences in their life. A conflict can arise when this 
perron is then shown a world other than the world which they have come to 
regard as the only world. This other world might itself be one which the 
perron is motivated to dwell in. There is a further step to be added onto 
this formulation. Once a conflict arises, the perron then is motivated to 
further eliminate possibilities 00 as to avoid the conflict that has arisen. 
The conflict is by-passed by the perron's denying those potentialities that 
are called out differently by the different sides of the conflict. 
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Van den Berg (1975; 1980) describes this process very welL The starting 
point is a neurotic demand which is made of a perron. For him this is 
primarily societal. for example the taboo on sexuality for, particularly, the 
women of the victorian era. This demand can equally well be a neurotic 
demand from the person's parents, or it could also be derivative from an 
unpleasant experience. In any event, this demand places the perron in a 
state of not knowing. The young victorian woman does not know about her 
sexuality at a.ll; the neurotic demand of society that all sexuality be hidden 
means that she is never confronted by this reality, and ro it is excluded 
from her world. This leads to the formation of the unconscious, an 
interperronal realm of unexpressed potentialities. 
Thus, for van den Berg, not knowing ultimately leads to isolation, and in 
extreme cases is pathologicaL All pathology is isolation, as it comes from 
an inability to communicate fully ones potentialities. The irolation only 
a.ri=es, however, when the perron can no longer remain in a position of not 
knowing. Sooner or later there is bound to be something which breaks the 
societal taboo, and ro indicates to the perron that they are ignorant of 
some aspect of existence. Thus as long as the perron can remain ignorant 
of their ignorance, then they are free from conflict. The conflict a.ri=es 
when the perron is shown that they are in fact ignorant. Van den Berg 
gives the example of a young victorian woman approached by a roguish man 
of evil intent (he wanted to kiss her!). SUddenly confronted with her 
sexuality, the woman swoons in a desperate attempt to remain ignorant of 
her ignorance. A more pathological reaction might have been rome 
hysterical paralysis, a very prevalent symptom in Freud's day. 
The above discussion suggests the importance of living in an unrigid way. 
Rather than avoiding conflicts by repressing certain potentialities, we should 
express the fullness of potentialities available to us, and ro be able to meet 
whatever calls us out by having a world that is large enough to cope with 
anything. Kraus (1982) brings this out in discussing manic-depressive 
psychosis. 
structures 
For him, depressive psychosis 
of perronality are challenged. 
comes about when rigidified 
A perron who dogmatically 
structures a rigid perronality is storing up more and more possibilities for 
being called out beyond those structures. Thus, rather than construct a 
rigid perronality, 
••. the individual has to carry out a dialectical 
movement between identity and non-identity. 
Understanding this, the so-called ego-achievements and 
strength are to be formulated anew as the ability to 
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carry out such a dialectical movement between identity 
and non-identity. A prescribed, persistent and stable 
structure would decrease this ability (p.202). 
Turk1e (1981), discussing French anti-psychiatry, points to this this theme in 
the writings of Lacan, and of his followers De Leuze and Guattari. Lacan 
maintains that there is no such thing as an individual. For him, the notion 
of the isolated ego has developed as a result of, and in rupPJrt of, 
capitalist values and interests. Rather than being well-defined 
subj2ctivities, we are decentered, existing as a mllltiplicity of s::>cial 
relations. De Leuze and Guattari take this further, maintaining that what 
we fond1:y call the self is no more than a collection of "desiring machines", 
relations of PJwer and domination. As a consequence, they advocate 
schizophrenisation, a realistic facing up to our fragmented existence. 
The above discussion ~ms to ruggest that any finitude is bad, and leads to 
pathology, and that, therefore, freedom is what must be rought. Let us 
return, however, to our conceptualisation of human nature. On the basis of 
that, the simplistic notion that freedom is the only good comes under 
criticism. ll: fails to take two things into account. Firstly, it ignores the 
fact that freedom must always be lived within a context, and that it is tied 
to expressing certain basic human attributes. Secondly, it fails to note that 
freedom has to be articulated in rome way. 
Romanyshyn (1982) provides a way of including the findirigs of this section 
within the broader view of human nature outlined earlier. For him, 
psychological life is imaginative, this imagination being expresSed through 
metaphors. This way of being he terms reflection. NOw, there are two 
other ways of living that are rot imaginative. These lead to 
unconscicusness in the interperronal realm, that is, they eliminate the 
PJssibility for the expression of certain PJtentialities. These two ways are: 
firstly, literalised existence, in which the metaphors are stale and 
uncreative, preventing anything but the most conventional PJtentialities 
beir.g expressed; and secondly, fantastic existence, in which the metaphors 
are oct based on any reality at an. but rather make of the world whatever 
is desired. Both of these kinds of existence lead away from authentic 
encounter, that is, away from relationships that call on all the possibilities 
o9€r: to the participants, by providing inadequate metaphors to express these 
[.OSSi bili ties. 
fie can perhaps see schizophrenia as an extreme example of the latter. 
The apparent freedom of the ochizophrenic, experienced as a Joss of 
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bouooaries, is, in fact, anything but freedom. Boss (1979) sees schizophrenia 
as the ultimate loss of freedom, as everything encroaches on the perscn and 
dominates them, controlling their thoughts and actions. This e ncroachment 
comes from a lack of any concrete metaphors with which to organise the 
many images and ideas. :It seems, then, paradoxlcaly, that total freedom 
leads to unEreedom, and that freedom can only l::e realised through the 
acceptance of limitations. 
So, if we bring together the work of Kraus (1982) and Romanyshyn (1981), 
we can see that imaginative living entails not only challenging the rigid, but 
alSJ structuring the chaotic. Imaginative living, therefore, involves 
reJancing the apparently opposed. notions of strength and flexibility. We 
must neither l::e "formulated, sprawling on a pin" (T.S. Eliot), nor must we 
try to l::e fantastically ideaL 
This is to say that realising our freedom involves choosing rome particular 
way of living, and being committed to that. As Basescu (1962) points out, 
"man chooses his destiny within the limits of his finiteness and the 
opportunities of his freedom, but choose he must" (p.156). Discussing this 
is, however, to pre-empt discussion of how therapy takes place. We can 
conclude, then, by saying that pathology, which is both motivated and 
, 
concerned with conflicts, is as a result of a perscn's having developed a 
perscnality structure that is either too finite or too free, and which does 
not allow of a concrete realisation of either of these. Before moving on to 
discuss therapy, it is necessary to place this broadly existential view within 
some kind of social context. 
2.1.3 The Social Context of pathology 
In the previous two sections we have come to rome understanding of the 
relationship l::etween human nature and pathology. This section is an 
attempt to place the understaOOing arrived at so far within a broader social 
context. The core question in this section is what the relationship l::etween 
the individual and society is. This question is answered in three ways: (il 
an attempt is made to find a view of this relationship which explains how it 
is possible for society to lead to pathology; (:ii) this understanding is 
broadened by a more specific look at ho w social structure does lead to 
pathology, this ooction looking specifically at the relationship l::etween 
oppression and mental illness; and (iii) an attempt is made to say why it is 
that the social structure is such that this occurs. 
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2.1.3.1 How is it possible for Social Structure to lead to pathology?: 
Wrong (1961), in an article which attempts to correct the overmci.alised 
conception of human nature as espoused by sxiology, starts by showing how 
the notion of internalisation fails to answer the Hobbesian question of how 
humans come to be tractable to oocial controls. For Wrong, the concept of 
internalisation denies the validity of the Hobbesian question which it sets 
out to answer. 
In contrast he espouses a Freudian view which sees instinct teleologically, 
that is, as not being constant over cultures, but differing in its goals 
relative to different oocial structures. So, for Wrong humans are social. but 
never fully oocialised. Socialisation is, then, 
... the 'process of becoming human', of acquiring 
uniquely human attributes from interaction with others. 
Ali men are socialised in ... [this] sense, but this does 
not mean that they have been completely moulded by 
the particular norms and values of their culture. All 
cuJJ::ures, as Freud contended, do violence to man's 
rocialised bodily drives, but this in no sense means that 
men could passibly exist without culture or 
independently of society (p.l92). 
The implication of this is that society is necessary, but not sllfficient, both 
logically, and in terms of what it allows us to express. Society is 
necessary as a context in which to express the aspects of existence which 
we are tied down to having to express, but it also limits the ways that are 
open to us for expressing these. The limiting by society is not causal, it is 
rather in the form of a motivation: by making particular avenues of 
expression painful or unacceptable, people are motivated not to act in those 
ways. 
Ingleby (1981), in a si.m:i.lar vein, after showing how the causal accounts of 
pasitivism deny the fact that people respond to situations in an intentional 
way, examines Ssasz's view of how society comes to affect people's lives: 
Szasz is correct in his insistence that psychiatry is 
concerned with 'problems of living', not with the 
maintainance of oome criterion of health lying outside 
morality and culture; but the conflicts which give rise 
to these 'problems of living' do rot stem from a 
contradiction between the abstractions of 'individual' 
and 'society', but from the tensions between human 
demands and the particular oocial institutions (work, the 
family, education, 'politics') which are rupposed to 
provide for them (p.44). 
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The need that Ingleby points to here, the need to get into the 
part:icuJarities of the situation being studied, suggests that a causal 
approach is not adequate to an understanding of how sxiety affects 
individuals. 
In searching for an adequate interpretative approach, Ingleby criticises the 
approach of Laing and Esterton. For them, Ingleby maintains, Schizophrenia 
arises within the famiJy. Ingleby feels that this ignores the sxiety which 
gives rise to the particular family structure. Ingleby goes on to say that 
even when Laing does consider social strucbrre, he sees the schizophrenic 
response as being goal-directed. The problem here is that Laing's approach 
fails to eay why this form of goal-directed action is 9:) singularly 
ineffective, and it does not aJJow of the kind of systematic distortions that 
Habermas talks about. Ingleby maintains that we need to interpret the 
world of the schizophrenic with more than common sense, as the patient is 
largely unaware of the social pressures that have led them to where they 
are. Following Habermas, he proposes using a Freudian approach to 
elucidate the systematic distortions within which we live. This section, 
however, attempts, rather, to follow the existential understanding outlined in 
the previous section. 
This takes us back to the view of van den Berg touched on earlier. For 
him, pathology is the attempt of a perscn to =ntinue in a state of 
ignorance as to their true position, and as to the limitedness of their woild. 
So, in van den Berg we can see the world of the patient as being 
systematically distorted by socialisation and other influences. This way of 
seeing the world then is defended against anything that tries to suggest 
that there is more to the world than appears. Neurosis can be seen as the 
attempt to escape from this kind of challenge, and psychosis is pcssibly the 
resull: of a sudden swamping of the perscn by all those things that they 
managed to avoid for a long time. In any event, this all implies that when 
a person is attempting to =ntinue not-knowing, their world will be 
structured in such a way as to deny what it is that they are avoiding. 
2.1.3.2 How Sccial Strucbrre leads to Pathology: 
Ire abcve discussion seems to ruggest that the possibility of pathology lies 
in the failure of the sxiety to provide suitable avenues of expression for 
certain possibilities of human existence, which leads the perscn to form an 
i:npover:ished sense of their freedom, and to dwell in an impoverished world 
... hich, if challenged, can lead the perscn to pathology. There is, however, 
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another approach to the quesnon of how the individual is related to ooci.ety. 
This is the view that sees the rociety as being much more direct in what it 
does to a person. Society not only limits pcssibilities, but it actually 
directly decides and/or damages the lives of individuals. 
Cochrane (1983) attempts to bring these two ways of understanding 
together. He starts by discussing the view that ooci.ety directly influences 
the lives of pecple. The key concept in his discussion here is stress, which 
he sees as being a person's perception of threat to their stability and 
security. NOW, stress is the resulJ: of stressors, those things in a person's 
relationships, family background, environment and ooci.ety which threaten 
stability. Quite obviously, the ooci.etal aspect is very important, especially 
for particular groups in particular ooci.eties: in Western capitalist ooci.ety, 
the unemployed and the working class are sub~ to many social pressures 
because of the groups to which they belong. In traditional,. male-dominated 
societies, women are sub~ct to great pressure, especially married women. 
In South Africa black pecple are sub~ct to all kinds of discrimination and 
legitimised violence that is clearly highly stressful. for example migrant 
labour, forced removals, pclice action etc. Thus ooci.ety can be seen as 
being a maj:Jr stressor in the lives of certain groups. 
Cochrane goes on to maintain, however, that ooci.ety does not merely put 
pecple under stress, but it alro limits the ways that some pecple can cope 
with that stress, that is, it limits the possibilities open 
usually those whom it put under stress in the first place. 
to some pecple, 
:n: does this by 
limiting the facilities and resources for coping with stress. Cochrane 
develops a scale relating the type of coping response to the kind of groups 
for whom that response is available. The more the social structure limits 
the possibilities, the more the response is maladaptive. 
At the top of the scale, he sees intrapsychic defence mechanisms, such as 
high self-esteem, which are used to counter the effects of stress, as being 
available mainly to men, those with a high social status, who are employed, 
and are part of the dominant political group. 
Secondly, there are stress opposing experiences, positive experiences which 
can counter-balance the effects of stress. Thes are more available to men, 
D) the educated, those in professional and managerial positions, and those 
.. ho are wealthy. 
Intimate personal relationships can alro be a help in coping with stress. 
This is available to those who are married, and those who are middle-class. 
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Social rupport from informal helping networks, that :is from friends, 
neigbours and relatives, can alro help pople to overcome stress. Women, 
those who are married, and those belonging to voluntary organisations ruch 
-as churches, are those for whom this kind of avenue :is most available. 
The following coping strategies are not as ocx::ially acceptable as the ones 
discussed aready, and so the people opting for these are thus in a worse 
position ocx::ially. 'Minor deviance' ruch as drinking, taking drugs and being 
violent, are ways of coping with stress used mainly by men from the lower 
class 
The development of physical symptoms :is a straLogy used especially by 
women, or by those who are very poor, or are unempJoyed. SimiJady, these 
same groups attempt to get classified as ill. 
Parasuicide, that :is the pretended attempt at suicide, :is a form of coping 
used by women, those who are young (Le. adolescent or young adults), the 
lower class, and those in unstable relationships. 
Adm:issicn to a mental hospital :is often the only option open to those who 
are very poor, who are irolated, not married, homeless or elderly. n::is 
more likely that people falling into these groups are women. Hospitalisation 
serves several purposes. n::is a distraction from the source of the stress. 
It legitimates not coping with the situation. n: provides temporary relief 
from the presrure that the perron :is under, and it legitimates 
pharmaceutical relief from the tension, and so from the stress itself. 
Cochrane's view :is backed up by the study of Yarrow et a1. (1973). In 
their study, they found that the meaning which mental illness had in a 
particular family was different depending on the resources which the family 
had for coping with the deviant penon. This ruggests that the ability to 
cope :is dependent on the resources available to people in their particular 
social situation. 
Thus far two broad themes have emerged from the discussion. Firstly, there 
:is the need to interpret people's experience of the social structure in an 
acausal, interpretative way, ruch that the systematic distortions which 
people are rub:i=ct to are revealed. Secondly, it appears that social 
Structure :is responsible for a good deal of pathology in that it places 
particular people under stress, and in that it limits the possibilities which 
t.'lose people have for coping with their stress. It:is now necessary to bring 
tilese two strands together. 
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If we accept that stress is a threat to stability, and that, inter alia, social 
structure is a stressor, then we can ruggest that the stress ceping 
strategies, as outlined by Cochrane, are ways of attempting to avoid stress, 
or are ways of retaining not-knowing, in the words of van den Berg. If we 
are thinking in terms of avoiding stress, then it can seem better to be 
oppressed and not know about it, and ro be stable; it can seem better to 
live in a rigid, limited world rather than face the uncertainties of freedom. 
Therefore, if people are avoiding the implications of their oppression, it is 
necessary for a psychotherapeutic approach to see through this avoidance, 
thereby helping them to be more free. 
Looking at things in this way offers rome understanding of why oppressed 
people ro often seem to collude in their own oppression. Thus, for example, 
a woman in a dominating, oppressive marriage may rather choose to retain 
the status quo than plunge into the uncertainties that are necessitated if 
she questions her roJe and the structure of her marriage. This view aJ.ro 
allows of the ceunter case where people are ro badly oppressed that they 
experience perpetual uncertainty anyway. For such people, there is no real 
identity to haJd onto, no rigidified structure to give a sense of identity, and 
ro there is aJ.ro no systematic distortion, no cellusion with the system of 
oppression. 
There is another aspect to this whoJe area. This is that which might 
broadly be called education. It is important to see to what extent the 
world which people come to dwell in is the construction of the social forces 
which they are sub~ to. This is important as it can give further 
insight into the way in which the world of oppressed people is impoverished 
by social centrol. 
Kiev (1973), in discussing racism in the United states, shows how domination 
of the formation of the person's world can be extremely oppressive, as it 
denies the person a voice for expressing pretest, and it aJ.ro leads a person 
not to see oppression where this is apparent to others. 
Unequal access to opportunities within the social system 
at different stages may have different effects. A 
negro in a Northern town may not encounter 
discrimination until he enters the occupational system. 
This will have a different effect than early exposure to 
it, say in education; while the [long-term rufferer from 
discrimination] ... may acquire adaptive skills for 
dealing with discrimination, he may aJ.ro incorporate 
negative stereotypes into his sense of identity, with all 
this implies in terms of ruppression and repression of 
the drives towards self-realisation (p.424). 
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This implies that what a pers::m sees as oppressive is itself dependent on 
the extent to which they have been oppressed and denied opportunities. 
From the discussion thus far of the two sides of oppression, that is the 
tendency of oociety to be stressful for certain groups, and the fact that 
oociety limits the possibilities for coping with and for even percieving 
stress, we can say that the recipe for effective domination is as fallows: (i) 
to control the education of the people to be oppressed from as early a 
stage as possible, thus entrenching negative self-perceptions and limiting 
aspirations; and (ill using as little overt violence as possible to enforce this 
system. By doing this, people will come to live in an impoverished world, 
and the lack of violence will make it difficuJi:. to see any other broader 
world. This formulation sounds ominously like Skinner's Walden IT, and in 
spite of all. its dangers, such a situation is, at least, not likely to lead to 
too much pathology. 
But what of pathogenic social structures? On the basis of the above 
discussion, let us consider when pathology is most likely to occur. The 
possibility of pathology, we have seen, is greatest when there is a conflict 
between the world that the person has been motivated to dwell in, and a 
world of laIger possibility. SUch a situation can arise when the extent of 
the control by the dominant group is slipping, and when there is a 
cl.is::repancy between the aspirations of people, and the avenues open for 
their expression. It is in these kinds of situations that people are most 
likely to have their received notions of their place in sxiety challenged, 
and so to experience a conflict of worlds. 
This is not to say, however, that the challenging of sxietal structures is 
wrong. Rather, it implies that for therapy to take place fully, it is 
necessary for the person to fully meet the implications of their sxial. 
[XlSition, however painful that may be. Thus part of therapy can be seen as 
challenging rigidifje? notions as to social role. But we can leave discussion 
of this for the fallowing section (2.2). 
We have spoken a great deal thus far about the influence which sxial. 
st.ructure exerts on people's lives. At this stage we need to get deeper 
i'lto why this is so. 
-29-
2.1.3.3 Why the oocial structures are the way they are: 
The starting p:lli1t in ans w ering this question is the notion of interests. It 
is not hard to see how having a particu1ar sxiety in one way and not in 
another is to the benefit of rome (usually those making all the decisions), 
and to the detriment of others. The maintainance of p:ili.tical power and 
socio-economic priviledge for some involves depriving others in these areas. 
We can take this 
structuralist-Marxist 
notion further. Marris (1982) criticises the 
view which sees sxiety as dichotomised into the 
warring groups of the haves and the have-nets, the owners and the 
exploited workers. He sees this view as being outdated in modern western 
society. There are, rather, a series of "downward distributions of 
uncertainty". What he means by this is that certain groups within sxiety 
gain security by rendering others more uncertain. For example, trade unions 
render the unemployed more uncertain. Reservation of particu1ar jobs for 
men renders women less able to find jobs. Similarly, the powerful colour 
bar in the mining industry in South Africa gives the relatively unskilled 
white worker job-certainty by reducing the possibility for black workers. 
The prerogative of men to be the bread-winner, and the norm of women 
raising children and doing housework, gives men a greater sense of worth at 
.. 
the expense of the women's. ' In South Africa, the whites' uncertainty as to 
their place in the future of the country led to the creation of the 
'oomelands' as a way of gaining security by removing the threat from black 
demands for equality. Those relegated to the 'homelands' are thus exposed 
to the uncertainties of unemployment, inadequate housing, poverty, migrant 
labour, fragmented families and corrupt government, in the interests of the 
security of the threatened whites and the few who mas:ruerade as leaders in 
the 'homelands'. 
We can relate this understanding of Marris to the understanding of human 
nature which we arrived at earlier (2.1.1). Any dominant groups, those who 
try to achieve security at the expense of others, can be seen as trying to 
enlarge their own freedom by encroaching on others' freedom and in 9:l 
doing enlarging the finitude of those in less powerful groups. ArYl, bringing 
b the discussion of the earlier part of this section, we can say that the 
'Nay that this set-up gets entrenched is by the dominant group limiting the 
possibilities of the oppressed, part:icu1arly with respect to self-understanding 
and oocio-p:ili.tical aspirations. By doing this, however, the dominant group 
eliminates the possibility for the oppressed people to express their 
dissatisfaction with the system as it is, and so increases the possibility of 
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uncreative ways of cOJ?lIlg with the stress which they Slb~ people to. 
Some of these possibilities for uncreative resp::mse to the oppressive 
situation are various forms of pathology. Another might be disorganised, 
violent protesting . . 
In conclusion of this section, we can attempt to place this contextualised 
understanding of pathology within the existential view outlined earlier 
(2.1.2). We can say that social structure, in the interests of rome, forces 
others into having a particular world. The people in this situation are 
likely not to complain ro long as they are not able to see any other world. 
If their oppression is ro gross as to be very evident, or if then the total 
control of the way which people see their world is lost by the dominant 
group, or if it is pointed out that possibilities not consistent with the world 
of the oppressed should in fact be authentic possibilities for the oppressed, 
then pathology can come about, as the person is precipated into a state of 
knowing that they do not know, and they then have to attempt to enlarge 
their horizons. The problem is that for particular groups within rociety, 
there are limited possibilities for enlarging possibilities available, and ro the 
way of dealing with the situation becomes one of merely coping, of 
attempting to avoid the threat, often in a self-destructive way. 
2.1.4 Conclusion 
NOW, in conclusion of this overall section (2.1), which set out to discover 
how it is that some people come to live a different existence, we can say 
the following. The precondition for pathology is that a person is dwelling 
in a world of limited possibility. This world is limited because of 
motivations arising from the influence of parents, traumatic events, the 
rocial structure and the educational system. 
pathology only really begins, however, when a person starts to find out that 
their world is limited. Until that time, they are able to maintain a 
consistent, unambiguous world. When this clear, but limited, world starts to 
be challenged, people tend to try and avoid having to change the world in 
which they are secure. This attempted avoidance can be seen as being the 
manifestation of pathology. 
Pathology can also arise in the situation where a person wishes to enlarge 
their world, but is prevented from doing ro by the rocial and other 
constraints within which they live. This kind of pathology should perhaps 
more =ectly be called protest. 
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Seeing things in this way does not ignore the social influence on people's 
well-being, but on the other hand it does not over-rocialise their 
experience. It alm does not heroise all pathology as being the reru1t of 
oppressive social struchrres, while it still leaves this as a possibility. 
Therefore this way of seeing pathology brings together the sxietal and 
existential aspects of the very human phenomenon of different existence. 
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2.2 WHAT m PSYCHOTHERAPY? 
In the previuos s=ction, two important themes emerged relative to the 
'etiology' of pathology. Firstly it s=emed that the precondition for 
pathology is a limitation of possibilities through various incidents and 
influences which motivate the perron to limit the s:::ope of their world. 
Secondly the discussion suggested that the beginning of a realisation of this 
limitation can lead to avoidance (when the perron does not want to change) 
or frustration (when the perron wants to change, but is unable to do ro 
because of constraints). 
There are various implications for therapy that can be drawn from thes= 
broad themes. In general, we can say that therapy should aim at making 
possibilities available to people by helping them to move out into a less 
limited world. More specifically, we can say that therapy should provide a 
way of working through the motivations that led the perron to have a 
limited world, by encouraging the expression of those things which have 
been denied by the motivations of the past and showing how the fear of 
that expression is no longer appropriate. Therapy should alro aim to 
provide new, more appropriate ways of articulating possibilities, and ffiould 
encoUfage people to examine creative ways of overcoming imposed finitudes. 
Where there are no available alternatives, therapy should be engaged in 
actively changing the system that is so severely limiting the possibilities of 
people. 
This section (2.2) attempts to say how and why various approaches to 
therapy are successful when viewed in terms of the framework outlined 
above. In doing this, it dra ws mainly on existential contributiions to the 
understanding of therapy, and deepens this discussion by examining ritual 
and symbols. A key question which emerges from the discussion is with 
regard to interpretation: if it is at all therapeutic, how are we to 
understand its efficacy? This question is discussed within the broader 
context of the discussion of the therapeutic value of symb:il.s and ritual. 
On:::e an understanding of therapy has been gleaned from thes= rources, the 
findings are =mplemented by a brief discussion of the rocietal influences on 
tile course of psythotherapy. 
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2.2.1 Existential Approaches to Psychotherapy 
In an essay examining whether psychoanalysis is technical or not, 
Ricoeur (1974) raises many interesting points about what psychotherapy is. 
We shall. therefore, use this essay as a starting point for the discussion, 
and will go on to elaborate on this by dra wing on other writers. 
In that psychoanalysis attempts to reverse the dream work and the processes 
that lead a perron to develop a neurotic world, it is technicaL It tries to 
do to the person the opposite of what happens in symptom formation. But, 
it is alro non-technical, or anti-technical. in that it is opposed to the 
domination of human consciousness, it wants consciousness and awareness as 
the end product. To achieve this, psychoanalysis works within language, 
attempting to reconstruct meanings Jost through the life experiences of the 
patient. This is clearly not the natural scientific, technical process of 
observing and manipulating variables, but is rather a technique aimed at 
freeing the perron from drivenness and the possibility of manipulation and 
domination. 
Thus the techniques of psychoanalysis aim at achieving consciousness. This 
happens to a large degree through the transference that oc=s in the 
therapy. The therapist responds to the patient unlike the average perron. 
The analyst is "ob~ctive", and challenges the neurotic patterns that the 
perron has buill: up over the years. This is the technique, and it aims not 
at manipulating, but rather at dethroning the narcissistic ego by bringing 
the patient's determinateness to light. The analyst reveals to the patient 
the poverty of the self-image which they have, bringing to light hidden 
desires and motives. 
So, the challenge of the analyst to the patient opens the way for a 
reappraisal of the way in which the patient's "dark" side is used. The 
therapy opens up new ways of using this determinateness. This means, then, 
that the awareness of determinateness is actually an invitation to freedom; 
it is a chance for new rossihiJities. 
Ricoeur goes on to say that, when used freely, desire, and the "dark side" 
generally, are no Jonger used to the detriment of others, because the 
freedom is based on resignation, on giving up the desire for omnipotence 
and instead enduring the imperfections of existence. Thus Ricoeur says 
that: 
••. psychoanalysis would like to be, like Spinoza's 
-34-
Ethics, a re-educatiopn of desire. ll:. is this re-
education which it posits as the prior condition for all 
human reform, whether intellectual, political or sxial 
(p.194). 
From this essay, four structurally related themes emerge: 
(i) In therapy the therapist challenges the patient's narciffiistic, limited 
world; 
(ii) The therapist and patient work through the motivations that led to the 
limited world; 
(iii) This brings an awareness of the determinateness and finitude of 
existence, and a sense of the inevitability of imperfection; and 
(iv) The patient is then able to re-direct the determinateness and finitude in 
more creative ways, thereby freeing others too. Let us now look at each 
of these in more depth. 
2.2.1.1 The Challenge of the Therapist: 
Neurosis, Basescu (1962) maintains, leads to a person seeing others as 
obj=cts to be manipuJated. These ob:i=ctivised others usually respond to the 
neurotic by either ignoring them, giving in to their neurotic demands, or by 
being hostile. All of these responses serve to justify the neurotic's distrust 
of the world, which distrust led the person to obj=ctify the others in the 
first place. Thus the neurotic is involved in a vicious circle. When the 
neurotic comes to therapy, the therapist does not respond in the same way 
as the 'normal' person does. The therapist tries to take the best of each 
of the 'normal' responses, while attempting to get away from the worst 
aspects. What emerges from this is that the therapist does participate in 
the world of the neurotic, is accepting, but is alID criticaL Basescu calls 
this being "fully present", which he says 
•.• means to be sili:i=ctive1y real, consistent in the 
feeling and expressing of one's emotions, focussed on 
the here and now, and open to the possibilities of 
current experience. Such a state of presence makes it 
impossible for the therapist to be treated as an obj=ct, 
and the patient must contend with this fact (p.155). 
Johnson (1971) brings out si.rnilar ideas. For him, the first aim in 
psychotherapy is to destroy all the sxialisations of the person, since he 
sees 9:lCiali sation as estrangement from potentiaL To overcome 
s:xi ali sation, he tries to "engage the client in an existential crisis that will 
precipitate an intrapsychic metamorphosis" (p.8). He is, however, not just 
criticaL The active encounter, which is 00 important for him, must be 
paralleled by trust: "The failure to trust underlies all psychotherapeutic 
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fa.i.lure" (p.32). To establish trust he enters into the world of the client, 
making himse]f available to that perron. This reaching out to the client is 
achieved by c1is:::losing about the relationship and about his own feelings for 
the client, as a way of giving himse]f for the client. 
Van den Berg (1980) alro has an important contribution to make here. He 
sees repression as being a not-knowing which is operative on the 
interperronal leveL The therapist, therefore, has to become the unconscious 
of the patient in an attempt to overcome this not-knowing. The therapist 
does this by gradually confronting the patient with those things which are 
absent from their world. The therapist, through the strength of the 
relationship that is established, is, unlike the people and influences of the 
past which were negative motivators, able to invite the patient "to talk 
himse]f into the knowing of the therapist" (p.4S). In this sense, the 
therapist helps the patient to overcome loneliness, the basic state of 
pathology, which is the result of not-knowing. 
From this discussion, it appears that the therapist has the difficult :pb of 
challenging, while at the same time trying to relate warmly, supportively 
and trustingly. Perhaps this is not as difficult as might initially seem. If the 
therapist reponds caringlY, this will already be challenging many 
preconceptions about how people relate. Fully to care, however, means not 
just going along with the neurotic's world. The therapist has to take a 
stand and be criticaL What is important is that therapist makes it clear 
that q/he is critical of the neurosis and is still accepting of the person who 
extends far beyond the narrow se]f-image of the neurotic. 
2.2.1.2 Working through the Limiting Motivations: 
The challenge which the therapy issues to the neurotic adjustment of the 
client, and the warmth of the relationship, brings the client to work through 
the motivations of the past which led them to establishing the world which 
they arrive at the therapy with. It is in this area that psychoanalysis has 
its particular genius. It takes the perron deep into their past, and, 
according to Habermas (1976), provides a general narrative framework within 
which the person can tell the story of their life, seeing the points along 
the way where particular influences were operative. The therapy, by 
bringing the past into focus, questions the relevance of the neurotic 
adjJstments for the present. 
Basescu (1962) alro expresses this notion. The therapist issues a challenge 
to the client by not responding in the 'average' way, but rather in a more 
real way. 
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If the patient ch(X)ses to contend with the therapist's 
realness he must be committed to change, in a rense 
willing to take a chance by participating in a new and 
unfamiliar world. He then again experiences the failure 
of his neurotic adjustment, but this time with a 
difference, namely, it occurs within the therapeutic 
relationship .... His attempt to construct his world 
with the therapist in the pattern of the past fails, and 
he experiences the feelings of despair which 
characterise the loss of one's world (p.156). 
This leads us into the next stage. 
2.2.1.3 The Despair of Facing Finitude: 
For Johnson (1974), the encounter which destroys the s::>eia1ised limitations 
of the client, opens the person to the inevitability of suffering and 
imperfection. The client can no longer pretend that the world is perfect 
and that they are immortaL 
The clients I consider cured do not rej:llce. They do 
not boast of 'balanced liberation'. They know their 
painful struggle with existence has just begun. They 
now realise they bear a greater anxiety and guilt than 
before they began po-ychotherapy. Yet these ills are 
not pathologicaL They are a reaction to the oboolete 
epoch of s::>eiali53tion by authority. Those ills were 
destroyed as God the father was killed in 
psychotherapy. The sickness with which they are now 
afflicted is inherent in the human condition at this 
stage of evolution. It is not a reaction to the past, 
but a demand of the present in the hope of a future 
(p.8). 
The facing of despair, however, requires the client to make a choice, to 
direct their potentialities to life nonetheless. 
This view of life has strong overtones of the Fugard (1980) play 
Boesman and Lena. In the final lines, Lena, after what must have been the 
worst night of her existence, during which her husband beats and abuses 
her, and kills an old man with whom she was attemptng to share some 
human warmth, somehow manages to declare that "there's daylights left in 
me" (p.293), and continue the struggle that is her life. 
This kind of view, of the inevitability of suffering, seems, however, to be 
op[Xlsed to any critical endeavour. If we merely accept with resignation 
our lot, then anyone can put upon us what they wilL How are we to bring 
together the critical thrust and the notion of resignation? 
We can start by considering the possible audience of a play like 
Boesman and Lena. Certainly it is rot addressed to people like the 
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characters Boesman and Lena, but rather to those who are specifically not 
like them. ll: is surely meant for those who have an inflated idea of their 
own freedom, and inflict that on others, thereby rendering them like 
Boesman and Lena. ll: seems that the play is a call to the too free to 
consider their finitude and face the inevitability of their imperfection. 
Now, Ricoeur's notion of the narcissistic ego needing to be dethroned fits in 
well here. Too much freedom is really a kind of narcissism. But we find 
something curious. We started by seeing the challenge of therapy as a 
challenge to limited possibilities. Now we are talking about a challenge to 
too much freedom. The way of making sense of this is to see that in 
striving to be more free, we actually limit our own possibilities, and those 
of others. We might increase our freedom in some areas, but this alro 
increases our finitude in other aspects. 
If this is so, then the resignation which Ricoeur talks of is not a 
capib.!Jation before authority, but rather an in-tuneness with ones authentic 
finitude and freedom. ll: means accepting one's own finitude, and working 
towards possibilities emergent from that, possibily in opposition to those who 
would have one's finitude other than it is in its authenticity. 
Marcel (1962) describes this kind of in-tuneness as hope. Hope is not a 
crude optimism, which he maintains is an unshared belief aiming at a 
particuJar set of rigid possibilities, but is rather shared, and based on an 
openness to the genuine possibilities within a situation. This means that 
one must genuinely face the worst: 
The truth is that there can strictly speaking be no 
hope except when temptation to despair exists. Hope is 
the act by which this temptation is actively or 
victoriously overcome (p.36). 
Thus hope involves an acceptance of fate, rut alro a non-acceptance. Fate 
does not determine us, it challenges us to move beyond the immaturity of 
the "ego which needs educating and controlling" (p.39), to greater 
possibilities, possibilities which we may have been taught do not exist. 
This view has implications for therapy. To help someone to grow through 
this stage, Marcel maintains, requires a patient confidence in the person's 
ability to grow. This means that one must neither be weak and complacent, 
nor intrusive and manipulative. The relationship must be one of involvement 
and acceptance, but must alro be critical and challenging. This underscores 
what we have found in the previous sections. The following section 
examines how a person comes to hope and to see new possibilities. 
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2.2.1.4 Finding New Creative Possibiljties: 
Barton (1974) examines in great depth the therapies of Freud, Jung and 
RCXjers. On the basis of his study, he concludes that the therapy provides 
a world of new meanings and possihiljties for the client. The client enters 
the world which the therapist creates, and is cajJled into remoulding their 
life in terms of the possibilities which the therapist's world opens up. 
The fact that the therapist has a way to help - an 
orientation or approach that is more or less convincing 
to, and liveable by, beth therapist and patient - is 
therefore essential to the therapeutic process (p.237). 
Often this world-forming and caj;:iling takes place without the therapist 
being aware that this is happening. The therapist thinks that s/he is merely 
doing therapy, employing particular methods and techniques. The example of 
systematic desensitisation, given by Barton, is a case in point. The 
behaviour modifier sees the session as a special way of pairing stimuli and 
responses, so as to cause a change in the behaviour of the patient. 
However, the method of imagining progressively more scary phobia-producing 
situations, while in a state of relaxation, can be seen as making possible a 
world in which one does not have to be afraid of, for example, open spaces. 
The systematic desensitisation makes possible a world of broader 
p:JssibjJities. 
Frankl (1973) is one of the few therapists who is aware of doing this in 
as helping patients to adopt more creative therapy. He sees himself 
attitudes towards their situation, and so to find meaning in their lives. He 
gives the example of a man who was grieving at the loss of his wife, seeing 
his own life as now being without meaning. Frankl suggested to this man 
that he had in fact saved his wife from suffering. This enabled the man to 
see his life as having a meaning: he was in a way sacrificed for his wife. 
In general. Frankl seems to invite people to give to life what they can, 
rather than expecting to receive: 
•.. man should not ask what he may expect from life, 
but should rather understand that life expects something 
from him. Il: may also be put this way: in the last 
resort, man should not ask 'what is the meaning of my 
life?', but should realise that he himself is being 
questioned. Life is putting its problems to him, and it 
is up to him to respond to these questions by being 
responsible; he can only answer to life by answering 
for his life (p.l3). 
The idea being expressed here, that therapy is a world which invites the 
creation of new meaning, is one which draws together the previous three 
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themes as welL The world created by the therapist, to the extent that it 
is not impoverished, is a challenge to the person dwelling in a limited 
world. In that the therapist is accepting, the world that &'he creates 
should be a mn-jLrlgementaL warm dwelling place. In that the world 
offered by the therapist teaches the patient to see the world in a certain 
way and to pay attention to certain life-themes, it provides a way of 
working through and reconstructing the past. Also, in that the world of the 
therapist is a challenging one, and in that it questions the life history of 
the perron, it leads to a facing of emptiness and despair, which can then be 
redirected through the creative possibilities which are opened up. 
At this stage, however, we cannot answer very clearly how it is that the 
world of therapy brings about this transformation of meaning. As a starting 
point, we can examine the related areas of ribJ.al. symbols and 
interpretation. 
2.2.2 Ritual. Symbols and Interpretation. 
At this stage we have a rough outline of what psychotherapy is. We have 
seen that there are four related themes, and that these themes can be 
summed up as being a world of new possibilities that brings a person to 
' letting go of their old, limited world, and accepting the hope which the new 
world of therapy offers as a way out of despair. This section is an 
attempt to deepen this understanding. 
The ribJ.al process can in many ways be seen as para1elJing the process of 
psychotherapy. It is, therefore, to ritual that we turn first. From the 
di..s:cussion of ribJ.al. it emerges that symbols are a central aspect in the 
transformation of meaning. Symbols are thus the next topic. The discussion 
of the therapeutic value of symbols leads into an examination of the role of 
interpretation in psychotherapy. 
2.2.2.1 The RibJ.al Process: 
Ritual is interesting in the study of psychotherapy as it can be seen as 
fulfilling a similar SJCietal function. RibJ.al is a rource of renewal for 
individuals, in enabling them to live through certain life changes which 
would otherwise be very traumatic. What is interesting, however, from the 
poL"lt of view of a more critical. or rociall.y aware psychotherapy, is that 
ribJ.al is not only aimed at the individual. but also at the broader 
community, as a rource of renewaL Thus the discussion of ribJ.al here can 
accomplish two things: firstly it can deepen our understanding of the 
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process of psychotherapy, and secondly it can provide a way of seemg how 
to integrate individual and oocietal renewaL 
Drawing on van Gennep's (1908) analysis of rites of passage, Turner (1978) 
describes the three stages of the ritual process. The first stage, that of 
separation, "detaches the ritual rubj:cts from their old place in s:x:iety" 
(p.249). There is a severance of all ties with one's old status and roles, 
this being symbolired, for example, in the burning of one's old garments. 
There is a lot of death imagery associated with this stage, this representing 
the death of the old self. 
The second stage is that of liminality, an in-between stage of :is::Uation from 
'normal' oociety. In Xhosa initiation rites, this otherness is symbolised by 
the wearing of white cJay on the face and body. White, in Xhosa culture, 
is a symbol for things and people who are alien to the everyday world. 
The liminal stage is often accompanied by the development of communitas, a 
kind of negative mirroring of social structure, if there are several ritual 
subj:cts. In this stage, all values are reversed, and social protest is 
vehemently expressed. It is this expression of protest that leads Turner to 
say that this stage "is the fans et origo of all structures, and at the same 
time their critique" (p.249). .'For Turner, the ritual process is a recognition 
by s:x:iety that its structures need renewal by protest, thus it provides the 
avenue of liminality for the expression of this protest. 
In the liminal stage there is also a great emphasis on the spiritual, and 
liminal people are seen as being in contact with powerful forces of renewaL 
This spiritual power counterbalances the relative secular powerlesoneso 
experienced by ritual subj:cts who exist in a kind of vacuum, having neither 
their old role nor their new one. The spiritual emphasis is accompanied by 
a great deal of symbolic material. and the subj:cts are immersed in a 
wealth of mythic and archetypal imagery. 
The third stage is a stage of reintegration. The person is brought back 
into the social structure, but now in a new role and status, having new 
outward symbols of this change, for example new garments. Thus what the 
tlilid stage does for the ritual subj:cts is that it "installs them, inwardly 
transformed, and outwardly changed, in a new place in s:x:iety" (p.249). 
Joseph Campbell (1956), working on the interpretation of myths, found the 
same structure as that posited by Turner. Myths are, for Campbell. a kind 
of ritual,. bringing both individual and s:x:ietal renewal through the figure of 
the hero, who 
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has been able to battle past his pe=nal and local 
historical limitations to the generally valid, normally 
human. Such a one's visions ... come from the primary 
springs of human life .••• Hence they are eloquent, not 
of the present, disintegrating society and psyche, but of 
the unquenched rource through which society is re-bom. 
The hero died as mcdern man, but as eternal man •.• 
has been re-bom (Campbell, quoted in Priebe, 1976, p. 
102). 
The story in the myth takes the listeners through the process of death and 
re-birth followed by the hero. 
This structure, of separation, liminality and reintegration is very prevalent 
in literature. Jl: is very clear in Joseph Conrad's novel Heart of Darkness. 
Mar:1ow, the narrator, decides to give up being a sea-sailor for a while, and 
goes to Belgium to find a :pb as the captain of a steam boat on the Congo 
river. He experiences his successful :pb interview as an initiation into 
darkness, a darkness which, at the symbolic level. is the darkness of the 
human heart: 
•.• I am not used to such ceremonies, and there was 
something ominous in the atmosphere. Jl: was just as 
though I had been let into rome conspiracy... (p.1S) 
This initiation takes place in Brussels, described as the "sepulchral city" 
(p.14). Thus the initiation of Mar:1ow into the darkness is a separation from 
what he is used to, and it is associated with death imagery. 
Mar:1ow then travels to the Congo, and begins his :pumey up the Congo 
river to the heart of darkness, where he meets Mr Kurtz, the epitome of 
European civility and humanitarianism who has turned into an almost 
demonic force of ev.il. The :pumey is liminaL It seems to take place in a 
strange twilight world of archetypal imagery: 
Going up that river was like travelling back to the 
earliest beginnings of the wor:ld, when vegetation rioted 
on the earth and the big trees were kings. An empty 
stream, a great silence, an impenetrable forest (p.4B). 
After meeting with, and facing up to the horror of Kurtz, of the heart of 
darkness, Marlow attempts to return to the society which he left behind, 
but finds that it is unable to bear the truth of the horror. In a sense, 
Marlow remains liminal. uneasily telling his story, much like the Ancient 
Mariner, in an attempt to become reintegrated. Jl: seems, though, that 
society is not too keen to hear the dissenting voice of Marlow who has 
seen the depth of the darkness that the human heart, and more especi.aJly 
the colonial. ivary-seeking, s:rcalled humanitarian, heart, is capable of. 
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Laing (1967) a1s::J points to this structure of death (s=paration), purney back 
(liminality), and re-birth (reintegration), only he sees it in the schizophrenic 
process. He quotes Bateson (1961) as saying, in an interview with Laing in 
which he (Bateson) described his own experience of schizophrenia: 
Once begun, a schizophrenic episode wouJd appear to 
have as definite a course as an initiation ceremony - a 
death and re-birth - into which the novice may have 
been precipitated by his family life or adventitious 
circumstances... (p. 97). 
Laing sees four stages in the schizophrenic experience. Firstly there is a 
breakdown of the barrier between the inner and the outer, there is a 
movement into the inner world, a very different wor:l..d to the world of 
everyday experience: 
The process of entering into the other world from this 
world, and returning to this world from the other 
world, is as natural as death and giving birth or being 
born. But in our present world, that is both so terrified 
and unconscious of the other world, it is not surprising 
that When 'reality', the fabric of the world, l::ursts, and 
a person enters the other world, he is completely lost 
and terrified, and meets only incomprehension in others 
(p.l03). 
The second stage is an initial defence against the other wor:l..d, rut this is 
overcome, and is experienced as a death of the self. After this death, 
there is a time of going back in time, of making contact with the 
archetypal roots of human experience. Finally there is a reb.rrn, are-birth, 
a reintegration into the 'normal' world. For Laing, what is needed in 
dealing with schizophrenia is 
an initiation ceremonial through which the person 
will be guided with full societal encouragement and 
sanction into the inner space and time, by people who 
have been there and back again (p.l06). 
John Perry (1984) in fact attempted something very similar to what Laing is 
suggesting here. He found that there is a definite process to acute 
schizophrenia, and that this is halted by medication. He s=t up a place 
where people, supported and assisted by volunteers who had been through 
the schizophrenic experience, couJd work through this process. He found 
that within about forty days (a good mythical number!> the person was 
through the schizophrenic episode, and that thereafter the person was able 
to undergo conventional psychotherapy. 
There is the implication in Laing's work that the way society is presently 
structured makes it very di.fficuJt: for schizophrenics to be reintegrated into 
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the society. The necessary ceremonial is lacking, but this is itself the 
expression of a deeper malaise in society. Society has rigidified into a 
certain pattern, and this set-up does not like to be challenged. 
Schizophrenia is a kind of challenge to the status quo, and as such it is 
hushed up by medication, hospitalisation and labelling as a sickness. 
In this discussion we have seen that rituals have a very definite structure, 
and further we have seen that this structure is also present in myths, 
literature and the schizophrenic experience. If we now compare the 
structure of ritual with the structure of psychotherapy arrived at in the 
previous section, we can see that there are great similarities. Therapy 
challenges the old ways of a person's existence, and separates them from 
this, bringing about a kind of death of the old self. In this way therapy 
is::llates the person, and brings them before themselves in an existential 
vacuum where the experience of despair is reached. Finally, therapy invites 
and offers new ways of relating and of expressing potentialities. 
Having seen this para1ell. we can now go on to find out what it is about all 
of these things, ritual, myth, literature and therapy, that is able to bring 
about the transformation which is suggested by their common structure. 
2.2.2.2 SymboJs: 
For Turner (1978), the transformative power of ritual is located in the 
symboJs which guide and constitute the ritual process. Especially in the 
liminal phase, there is a rich variety of symbols available to subjects for 
expressing the conflicting ideas and emotions which they are experiencing 
during their transformation. These symbols have two poles, the ideological 
and the sensory. The former expresses the current jural and moral values 
of the sxiety. The latter expresses gross emotions, and is related to 
physicality and universality. 
The unity of these two poles in one symbolic object 
gives the dominant symbol its transforming power. For 
it brings the ethical, jural norms of society into close 
contact with strong emotional stirn uli •.•. Norms and 
values become saturated with emotion, while gross and 
basic emotions become ennobled through contact with 
societal values (p.247). 
This idea of symboJs uniting opposites is an idea which emerges very cleady 
from the work of Jung. For him, symbols allow a person to bring together 
the opposite sides of their personality. The persona, that part of ourselves 
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which we like to think that we are, is balanced by the shadow, those aspcts 
which we try to conceal and deny. In pathology, the shadow comes and 
overwhelms the person. It is the work of therapy to find a symOOl which 
alJows the person to live comfortably, expressing both sides of their 
personality. Once this uniting symOOl has been found, it performs the 
transcendent function, that is, it brings about a dynamic interaction between 
the conscious and unconscious aspects of existence, thereby eliminating the 
possibility of any one-sidedness in personality structure. 
This Jungian view is remarkably close to Ricoeur's reading of Freud. 
Ricoeur sees Freud as dealing with two essentially opposite forces, which 
can only be brought together through the work of symOOls. The 
psychoanalytic s=ssions provide the patients with symOOls which 
simultaneously express the regressive (the bodily, the "dark", the agressive, 
instinctual etc.) and the progressive (the EPiriblaJ.. the teleologicaJ.. the 
rational etc.). By this means patients become aware of their lower nature, 
of their irrationality, and come to see their id as what it is, and so learn 
to live without needing to repress the dark side. 
Ricoeur does not fall into the trap that Habermas (1976) does. Habermas, 
who quite rightly sees the work of psychoanalysis as the , re-symOOlising of 
lost aspects of existence, sees instinct as only being a drive when 
repressed. Habermas sees instinct as being in actuality thwarted 
potentiality, and maintains that only as such can instinct acquire the form 
of a drive. Through re-symbolisation, the process of bringing the instinct 
into language, a drive comes to be more teleo1ogicaJ.. a conscious movement 
towards realisation of a particular potentiality. 
Tre problem with this view is that it tends to negate the crucial insight of 
psychoanalysis that humans are not the masters of their own fate, that we 
are not, even potentially, pure consciousness. On the contrary, Ricoeur 
maintains, we are essentially the mixture of regressive and progressive 
forces. The best that we can hope for, then, is to be aware of our 
regression at the same time as our progressicn, and to see the two as an 
essential part of each other. Ricoeur takes this to be the meaning of 
Freud's controversial statement "Where id was, let ego be!". 
For Ricoeur, the symbols operate through the interpretation of the analyst. 
Tre analyst provides a s=t of symOOls whereby the patient can re-symOOlis= 
their existence. The Jungian therapist can also be seen as doing this. In 
interpreting the life of the patient as a set of symOOls (archetypes, persona, 
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shadow, anima etc.), the analyst provides a way for the patient to see their 
life. Better to understand this, we need to examine the question of 
interpretation: What is interpretation, and how does it transform people's 
lives? 
Barton describes the ":ideal interpretation" as 
... one which the patient is ro close to grasping that it 
comes to him as a sudden shock of recognition; it 
makes real. rational and affective s:nse at the same 
moment. The patient can see that it connects whole 
realms of experience and feeling which he had hitherto 
regarded as more or less separate and distinct. The 
interpretation not only makes s:nse, but rings true to 
the patient's experience (p.34) 
One can s:e this as some kind of almost mystical-magical happening, brought 
about by barely-understood processes, the kind of thing which Freud's 
followers surely dream of! On the other hand, we can s:e this as a very 
well-timed and expertly carried out presentation of a particuJar symbol to a 
perron. Seen in the latter way, much of the mystification and lore of 
psychoanalysis falls away. What, then, is interpretation? 
We can begin to answer this by 1=king at the work of Burney (1984). In 
c:l.ixussing sandplay, one of the techniques he uses in poychotherapy, he 
maintains that if a perron has made a model in the sand, using rome of the 
many figurines that he makes available to them, then an interpretation is 
unnecessary, except, perhaps, as a way of saying "I am with you" to the 
perron. For him, the interpretation is unnecessary as the perron has 
already done the work of expressing various thoughts and feelings by means 
of the model. 
If we 1=k at what is happening here, then the apparent contradiction 
between Barton, who is ecstatic about the possibilities of interpretation, and 
Burney, who sees it merely as a useful adjunct, can be resolved. Burney, in 
sandplay, presents his clients with a sand-box, and invites them to choos: 
figurines, with which to people the model. from a vast collection of 4000 
which he has collected from all over the world. SUrely by doing this 
Burney 15 offering his clients a wealth of symbols, and a plastic medium 
;;ithin which to work with thes:. Urrler these circumstances it is not 
surprising that people are able to symbolise all manner of things which are 
worrying them, and it is aloo not au:prising that interpretation is 
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unnecessary, as the patient has, in effect, in the act of choosing and 
modelling already done the work which occurs in interpretation, namely re-
symlxl1isation. 
In Barton's ideal interpretation there is a similar process occuring, but in 
this case there is not a vast range of figures to choose from . The analyst 
offers the patient the particular symlxl1 which is the core of the 
interpretation, and, j£ it is ideal. this symlxllises the very conflict which the 
patient is working on at that time. Thus the main dllference is that 
whereas Burney merely has to be supportive in a general way, provide the 
symlxl1s in the form of the figurines, and encourage the patient to use this 
as a method of expression, the psychoanalyst has to be much more ac=ate 
in that s,ihe has to be very much in tune with what it is that the perron is 
working on. 
So what we find here is that therapy takes place by means of symbols, 
whether the concrete physical symbols of sandplay, or the abstract verbal 
ones of psychoanalytic interpretation. This is oomething Ixlme out by 
Murray (1975) when he p::>ints to the importance of language in 
psychotherapy. The symbols and metaphors of language enable the client to 
see their world in a dllferent way. This re-metaphorising of existence does 
not even have to take place purely through verbal language, but can also 
oc= through the body language of a person, for example in the way they 
walk. Getting people to see their way of metaphorising their existence is 
the first step in therapy, and then there follows the attempt to encourage 
the person to change the metaphor. 
Now interpretation, or indeed therapy, is not an aseptic process of changing 
syml:x:Jls. It is important that this takes place within a relationship. As 
Burney says, it is important for him to tell the client that he is there and 
is supportative, and that he is providing a safe place within which the re-
syml:x:J1isation can take place. Without this space, there is not the 
possibility of taking the risk of seeing the world other than the way that it 
seems. Basescu (1962) expresses this well: 
... intF>...rpretations, even j£ they are inc=ect, as a good 
many probably are, can be reassuring by alleviating 
guili: and anxiety, and by offering hope for the future. 
No matter what the ~ content of the 
interpretation, the therapist is in effect telling the 
patient not to judge himself too harshly. He is saying 
that the patient's peroonality has been influenced by his 
experiences with others, and that he has been acted on 
by forces beyond his control. Furthermore, in realising 
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that the pre.oent has developed out of the past, the 
patient can experience himseJf in the time dimension, 
and anticipate a future in which he can realise &>me of 
his aspirations (p.152). 
We can perhaps close off this discussion of interpretation by reference to 
Heidegger. For him, interpretation is a teleological way of seeing, a way 
of seeing based on the notion of existence being a project, a working 
towards possibilities. Thus, for Heidegger interpretation is a way of looking 
at possibilities. It is important to note that these possibilities are always 
thrown possibilities, they only exist in relation to the peroon's facticity, 
that is, their bodiliness, their past and their context. Thus, interpretation 
connects the past with possibilities in the future. We can see language (or 
symtcls) as the way in which these two aspects of existence are realjsed in 
the present, as it is language (in the broadest sense) which allows us to 
relate to others and to the world. 
In conclusion, then, we can say that the ritual process parallels the process 
of psychotherapy, and that these roth are effective in transforming the 
lives of people in that they present powerful symtcls which allow the 
people to connect up otherwise separate aspects of existence. The work of 
interpretation, and of psychotherapy, is the work of using symtcls to open 
possibilities consistent with a peroon's past, &>mething which people have to 
be encouraged to do within the security of the therapeutic relationship. 
One important difference between the process of ritual" and that of 
psychotherapy, is that the former allows of the expression of protest against 
the status quo, and it directs this protest in creative ways for the renewal 
of &>ciety. The following section is an attempt to place the process of 
psychotherapy in a social context so as to see how it is possible for it to 
contribute not only to individual, but also to societal healing. 
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2.2.3 The Social Context of Psychotherapy 
When we attempt to place the process of psychotherapy within the broader 
social context, there are two ways of approaching this. The first: is to see 
how the process of psychotherapy can be enhanced by taking societal 
concerns into account. We might term this the practice of psychotherapy 
as liberation. The second approach is to see how the insights of 
psychotherapy can be used within broader movements working for sodal 
change. 
2.2.3.1 A Psychotherapy of Liberation: 
A first consideration in attempting to set up a psychotherapy of liberation 
is the availability of current therapy. At present very few people are able 
to avail themselves of therapy, this being limited to the wealthy who can 
afford the prices charged by private practitioners, and to those who are in 
hospitals. Many others can benefit, though. So we must try to see how 
therapy can be made more available. 
Two possible ways of doing this might be: (il through groups, established 
through informal networks ruch as churches, the Women's Movement, 
community organisations etc., these groups being co-ordinated, but not 
necessarily run, by a psychotherapist; (ill within therapeutic communities, 
that is by groups of people living together for the purposes of their own 
growth as well as that of the broader community in which they are 
situated. Basically what is needed is a sharing of professional skills through 
the therapist seeing ~er role as trainer, rather than as healer (however, 
there should always be recours: to a therapist for those who are very 
dismrbed, or who need specific direction with particuJar problems). If a 
therapist starts to see ~er role in this way, the pb of the therapist will 
become more of an attempt to see how best, given the particular context, 
to facilitate the process of psychotherapy. 
Let us now consider how a psychotherapy of liberation would use the 
structure of therapy which we have arrived at thus far. 
The starting point in therapy, as we have seen, is a challenge to rigidified 
structures of existence. In a sense, the person who comes to therapy has 
already been challenged to a certain extent, otherwire they would be happy 
in their ignorance. The need for therapy ruggests an uncertainty 
underneath the certainty which is actually a neurotic avoidance of the 
challenge. Thus it is the aim of therapy to focus the impact of the 
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challenge, and to bring it into full awareness, encouraging the perron to 
face this rather than avoid it. If we are talking of a liberation 
psychotherapy, this means that the therapist must bring to light the perron's 
attempt to hang onto rigidified sxial roles, and their desire to fulfill 
societal expectations. Thus therapy must further challenge the vague 
unease that brought the person into therapy in the first place. Obviously 
this must take place within a warm and encouraging environment. To be 
challenging in this way, therapy will involve looking at the perron's 
attitudes to, and feelings about, sex roles, people of other races and 
classes, and, at a deeper level. it will try to question the perron's belief in 
taken-for-granted capitalist values such as ownership and autonomy. 
Marcel (1962) provides an interesting existential rationale for the 
questioning of the capitalist ethic. He contrasts the creativity of Being, 
with the rigidity of Having. In the former "having as Slch is transcended 
and etherealised within the creative act: the duality of possessor and 
possessed is lost in a living reality "(p.18D). Having, on the other hand, 
involves an alienation of part of the self. In attempting to own something, 
we lose the part of ourselves that is used to hold onto the possession, as 
this part is 00 longer free for a variety of possibilities. Marcel sees 
fanaticism and ideol.ogism as being extreme forms of this alienation. In both 
cases there is tyrannisation in order to hold onto a belief. The creative 
perron, that is, the person who attempts to be rather than have, on the 
other hand, 
... is continually on guard against this fossilising of his 
thought. He lives in a continual state of creativity, 
and the whole of his thought is continually being called 
into question from one minute to the next (p.181). 
Living in this way means that autonomy is impossible, as autonomy is at 
base a failure to enter into the whole, to be available to others. 
NO'." the above seems to be mainly addressed to the oppressors. The 
oppressed, however, also need to be challenged. often the resistances of 
the oppressed are even greater than those of the oppressors, as the 
oppressed are avoiding not only the loss of an identity, albeit an 
imp:lVerlshed one, that is implied by taking the challenge seriously, but they 
are also defending against the fact that giving in to the challenge means 
accepting that one really is being taken for a ride. No-one likes to admit 
tha~ they are a loser. So therapy must also aim to challenge the rigidities 
of the oppressed, helping them to see how they have come to be in the 
-50-
losing posi.tion through no fault of their own. This, however, brings us to 
the stage of working through. 
The first thing to note here is that, from the above, it seems very 
important to e.stablish with the perron in therapy the way in which they 
have been determined by oociety and other forces. This removal of 
responsibility can help the person to move beyond the limitations that they 
find themselves in, no longer feeling that they have to defend these 
rigidities. This is a very long and involved process, and it is possibly in 
doing this that most of the time in therapy is spent. As this stage is so 
involved, because it needs a consideration of all the influences that have 
brought the person to where they are, it cannot ever be a simple one-off 
event. There is, rather, a dialectical movement between a challenge and 
the working through relative to that particular aspect of existence. Thus 
there is a continual deepening and broadening of the challenge and the way 
in which it is worked through. 
Russell (1974) discusses the stages in the dialectic of women's liberation 
(she takes these stages from Reuther). This model is an example of the 
need for moving to deeper levels of challenge and working through, and it 
also corresponds with the structure of therapy 1ts outlined earlier. Thus the 
first two stages discussed by Russell will be used as an exemplification of 
the challenge/working through dialectic, and then the next two stages will 
be examined as giving pointers for the last two stages in the structure of 
psychotherapy. 
The first stage that Russell discusses is that of the Happy Slave. Here a 
woman is content to live in the expected role of mother, secretary, servant 
or sex symbol. Russsell maintains that these women are so content as to 
be fearful and defensive when faced with other views on the subj=ct of sex 
roles. These women see "'women's lib' as a threat" (p.llS). To me this 
suggests that such women are not as happy as might seem to be the case. 
The defensiveness suggests a dissatisfaction and uneasiness with the 
expected roles, but this wariness is being avoided in the attempt to remain 
blissfully in bondage. In any event, if a person has come to therapy, it is 
likely that they are not happy with themselves in general" and a large part 
of this might be an unhappiness with the role expectations that they are 
attempting to live up to. 
The next stage is termed "emulating the oppressor": 
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In this stage a person focusses attention away from her 
or his own group in order to devote all the energy 
possible to excellence of performance in order to 'get 
ahead' (p.1l9). 
This, however, is really "liberation based on self-hatred", and is to say that 
all people should be like the "respected white, western male" (p.1l9). It is 
important to challenge this toc, bringing people to ree their own 
potenti a1 i ti es and to face their particuJar facticity. 
These two stages, which in themselves include many different levels of 
challenge, bring us to the next stage in the structure of psychotherapy. 
For RusrelJ. this is the stage of rage, and it seems to correspond well with 
the stage of isolation and despair in therapy. 
In this stage there is anger and despair at the impossihi1ity of change. This 
despair is often destructive, and RusrelJ. likens the rage experienced by 
women to the rage expressed in ghetto riots. In women, 
.•. the rage is acted out in violent outbursts, anguished 
crying, or frightened withdrawal as they see the world 
into which they have been encuJturated crumbling about 
them (p.1l9). 
At this ~ge the psychotherapeutic involvement must take the form of 
support and care. It is important, however, that this is not a tranquilising 
kind of support. It must be a support that does not take the perron out of 
their hell through a pseudo-togetherness, a fals= community spirit that is 
merely a different kind of rigidity. If we are thinking about groups (e.g. 
women's groups), the group must be tolerant enough to allow the individuals 
within the group to work through the issues at stake in their particu1ar 
ways. There can be no pat answers to despair. This means that the 
support that is given must take the person out of their hell by providing a 
variety of possibilities that the perron can choose amongst. This brings us 
to the final stage in the process of psychotherapy, and in the dialectic of 
liberation. 
In the final stage, the group or the therapist provides open-€l1ded 
possibilities that can help to foster a new awareness of identity and an 
ability to act. In this stage, there is a discovery of a sense of community, 
and an opening of possibJities out of a re-owned past. This all rounds very 
pleasant, but what does it actually mean? 
It seems to imply that there is a need for rome community involvement in 
particu1ar activities, yet these activities must not be at all rigid. This 
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seems to ruggest the need for, on the one hand, SJme definite ideological 
committment, as these activities cannot be directionless, and on the other 
hand, the flexibility to allow the perSJn to choose the depth of their 
involvement. To bring this about, it is important that the ideological 
committment of the therapist or the group be made explicit, and that it be 
made clear that the perSJn is free to choose whether or not to be a part 
of this. We can extend this to cover the overall practice of psychotherapy 
by saying that it is necessary for the therapist to take a stand, and that 
further it is extremely important for the therapist to make explicit what 
hiWher stand is. As Barton (1974) points out, all therapy is done within an 
ideological framework, it is just that the urual therapist 
••. cannot understand himself as transformer, selector, 
emphasiser, indoctrinator of ideology, teacher of theory, 
convinced expressive articulator of a view of reality, 
life and values .•• (p.245). 
By making this explicit, the person is left free to choose, and so is not 
moved from one kind of rigidity into another. 
It now remains for us to see how psychotherapy can be involved in working 
for a more just and democratic society. 
2.2.3.2 Psychotherapy and the Struggle for Liberation: 
The question which this section attempts to answer is that regarding how 
psychotherapy can become involved in changing the structures of society. 
The way outlined above is the first and most obvious way that this can be 
done. By liberating enough individuals, psychotherapy might manage to make 
a dent in the overall structures. The problem with this is that this is in a 
way preaching to the converted, or at least to the alrnost-converted. As 
we noted above, only those who are experiencing some unhappiness with 
their role and the expectations of society, even if they are trying to avoid 
this unhappiness, are likely to find their way into therapy. This leaves, 
then, the many who really are blissfully ignorant, all those who manage to 
live unquestionaingly in the position of being oppressed, or worse, all those 
who occupy an oppressive position with firm conviction. How are we to 
reach these people? 
The first idea that comes to mind is that what is necessary is large-sca1e 
challenging of rigidified ideas about social structure and roles, this 
challenge being aimed at both oppressors and oppressed. Quite apart from 
the practical problems associated with implementing this kind of idea, we 
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can hyp:>thesise, on the basis of our understanding of the structure of 
psychotherapy, that this will only bring about an avoidance in some or other 
guise. The challenge will be largely resisted, and unless this resistance 
reaches pathological proportions, it will never be overcome. Even if such a 
challenge is able to meet with any success among the oppressed, it will 
meet with very little success among the oppressors, that is assuming that 
they ever get to hear it in what is quite likely to be a country numbed by 
propaganda and censorship. Let us consider each of these kinds of 
challenge, that aimed at the oppressed and that aiming to 'convert' the 
oppressors. 
If we consider the challenge to the oppressed, assuming that this does not 
fall on deaf ears, we have seen that it is not enough merely to challenge 
people's rigidities, but that there need to be organised programmes of action 
with which people can choose to become involved. without this, a possible 
result: of the gaining of awareness (by which Habermas sets so much store) 
is merely anger and frustration. With regaro to the nature of the 
involvements which should be available for people to choose, we can return 
to Marris (1982) who maintains that if a programme is to be successful.. it 
must attempt to: (il involve as many groups of disaffected people as 
possible; and (ill centre on a particu1ar l=alised issue, and , not be too 
sweepingly idealistic and future orientated. A South African example of 
this was the uniting of all kinds of groups to oppose the elections for the 
new tricameral parliament. 
If we consider the challenge to the oppressors, the situation is far more 
complex. The task of overcoming prejlrlice is very difficult in that the 
more vehemently it is pursued, the less likely it is to succeed, since 
militant opposition serves to justify the hoJding on which underlies injustice. 
On the other hand, non-militancy often allows the perpetration of violence 
and injustice, and is exploited because it can be merely weakness or an 
acquiescence with the status quo. This implies that one is not challenging 
a rationally held belief, but one that is complex and difficult to approach. 
Yinger and Simpson (1973) point to some of the complexities in this 
situation: 
Education and re-education must be guided by the fact 
that prejlrlice is frequently 'used' by the person; it is 
functional (not necessarily effective, be it noted). R 
will be 'unlearned' only when entanglements with the 
total personality are l=sened by the nature of the 
learning situation, by the reduction of tension and the 
elimination of any threats to one's ego. At the very 
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least, when one gives up a prejudice one admits an 
error - and most of US are reluctant to do this (p.l30). 
The answer to the question of how to approach the prejudiced person is one 
which can perhaps never be found, especially in a country like South Africa 
where prejudice is the dominant world-view (Yinger and Simpron write 
mainly about the situation in the USA where the dominant world-view is at 
least tokenly opposed to prejudice; this means that most of their techniques 
for reducing prejudice are largely irrelevant to the South African situation). 
It seems that the answer lies in being challenging without being threatening, 
in being non-threatening without being weak. This is possibly the meaning 
of Gandhian non-violent resistance. The problem, though, as Gandhi and the 
Congress Party found out, is that this kind of action requires a great deal 
of discipline, organisation and sacrifice, and this is too much to expect in a 
situation of severe oppression. People who are justifiably angry and who 
have already been deprived of many possibilities are not likely to want to 
sacrifice the little that they do have. However, these ideals should guide 
any programmes of action that are devised, the amount of sacrifice needed 
from supporters being kept to a minimum. In addition, when materials, 
aimed at the upholders of the status quo, are being devised, there should be 
an attempt to take the insecurity of the oppre=r into account, possibly by 
emphasising the positive possibilities of change rather than harping on the 
negative effects of rigidity. 
Thus far we have seen how psychotherapeutic insights can be useful in 
attempting to challenge rigid and impoverished world-views. This, however, 
is not enough. In l=king at Ricoeur we see that there needs to be a re-
symlxilisation if therapy is to take place. So we can say that political 
action is inadequate if it is only challenging. It alro needs to channel 
people in a part:icuJar direction. The new potentialities which the challenge 
awakens have to be given a means for expression. 
with regard to the challenging of the oppressed, this principle can be seen 
at work negatively in recent events in South Africa. The Government's way 
of dealing with the growing questioning of, and protest: against, its policies 
seems to be one of denying the re-symlxilisation of awakened potentialities. 
Police violence on the one hand, and the arrest and harrassment of 
opposition leaders on the other hand, combine to foster dirorganised and 
violent protest. Thus by preventing the re-symlxilisation of the 
potentialities of many people by making constructive opposition impossible, 
the government is attempting to pass off the !:pecific demands of its 
opponents as mere mob violence, thereby justifying its increased repression. 
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If we consider the position of the oppressors, however, this resort to 
increased repression is understandable, as the current protest is a . very 
direct challenge to what the government see as being the only possible 
oolution to the problems which South Africa is facing. The current wave of 
protest can be reen as backing up the overall idea that the bicameral 
parliament, community councils and homelands are not an adequate solutiDn 
to the demands of the maj:rity of South Africans. In saying this, the 
protest is taking from the oppressors their only symbolisation of the future, 
and hence can be expected to be met with extreme meas.rres. The obvious 
thing here, in terms of the themes of therapy that we have considered, is 
for the oposition to make possible a future for the oppressors in its view of 
the future. Thus the protest and challenging must not only re-symbolise the 
future for the oppressed, but al= for the oppressive minority. 
At this stage we have an understanding of the four themes which make up 
the structure of therapy, and we have seen how this structure is related to 
the structure of ritual, the importance of symbols in both being the crucial 
point. We have, further, attempted to contextualise this understanding by 
considering how psychotherapy can take social structure into account, and 
how psychotherapeutic insights can be used in the process of changing 
society. It is now necessary to bring together the findings of the two main 
sections of this chapter (2.1 and 2.2) by combining them into a model of the 
procesoes of pathology and therapy. 
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2.3 A MODEL OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 
When one reads romething like Binswanger's (1958) deep and involved case 
~ry of Ellen West, any attempts to outline a theory of 'pathogenesis' 
and a theory of therapy seem superfic:ial and futile. The whole of Ellen 
West's life seemed to be a build-up towards her eventual suicide, and it 
would seem that any attempts to capture the experiences of her life, or 
anyone's for that matter, are bound to fail. 
We must remember, though, that this model is not an attempt to say exactly 
how a perron's life will be, and how their psychotherapy will be. It is, 
rather, an extrapolation from the understanding of human nature which was 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter. It will be remembered that the 
criteria employed in coming to that understanding were as folJows: (i.) the 
view of human nature could not be a deterministic one, as it needed to 
include the possibility of free choice; (ill it did, however, need to be 
ontological. that is, concerned with the most: basic aspects of human 
existence. This model of pathogenesis and therapy alro attempts to fulfill 
these criteria. Thus, what it attempts to do is to provide an ontological 
structure within which the many variations and possibilities of individuals 
and their particular psychotherapies can be expressed and understood. 
In addition to those rources discussed in 2.1 and 2.2, there are three other 
rources which have been important in setting up this model. 
The first: of these is my own (de Lisle, 1983) research on the experience of 
community. The findings of this research, which were dialogued with 
literature on this subj=ct, including works on ritual and symbolism, led me 
to develop a six stage model which expressed the structure of the 
experience of community. Mindful of van den Berg's (1974) suggestion that 
pathology is loneliness, it struck me that the experience of community, of 
being in relationship to others more fully, is, possibly, one of the main 
things which therapy should, and does, aim for (in fact Russell [1974] has 
the experience of community as an important part of the fourth stage of 
her dialectic of liberation). In addition, it struck me that this model could 
provide a useful way of summarising the various themes that have emerged 
thus far in this study. 
The structure of the experience of community involves an alternation 
between events, on 
with those events. 
the one hand, and the experiences which corresp:md 
It appears that certain kinds of events provide the 
context for certain kinds of experiences. The stages are as follows: 
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Table (:i): The Structure of the Experience of Community 
I;Call -----:')) II:Naivity --?? III:Challenge 
Event/situation Experience of being Some event :iss..les 
calls for some 'in', but ignorant challenge to the 
kind of com- of the full impli- naive committment. 
mittment. cations. 
VI:Community ~<"---- V:Reintegration ":<'--- IV:Iro1ation 
Experience of An event, high in Feeling 'out', ex-
community; feel- syml:xil.ism (e.g. cluded, isolated; 
ing of no longer rituaD, which being faced with one's 
being an isolated brings the person fundamental loneliness 
individuaL reck into the group. 
IE we consider what we have found thus far, we can see that the area of 
'etiology' accords roughly with the first three stages, and that therapy is 
equivalent to stages ill to VL 
Expressing etiology in these terms, we can say that many events and 
influences motivate us to form a naive world view, a world view which 
excludes many possibilities. The context in which we are brought up is a 
world which calls us only to realise our potentialities to a limited extent. 
Thus, through the motivations which we follow, we are committed to an 
impoverished world. This limited world is bound to be challenged at some 
stage, at which point there is the possibility of a therapeutic gain if we 
face the devastation of losing our naive world view. The problems arise, 
however, When one attempts to avoid the implications of the challenge by 
various means, for example neurotic symptoms. This avoidance is a powerful 
aspect of the experience of therapy, so that it is necessary to include it as 
another possible stage after stage m. 
IE we express therapy in terms of this structure, we can see the therapist 
as refining and focussing the challenge which the person is attempting to 
avoid, and als:> as encouraging the person to go on and face the isolation. 
Resistance can, therefore, be seen as being an attempt by the patient to 
avoid being faced by the therapist with the challenge of stage m. and we 
cal1 see the first part of the work of therapy as being the attempt to bring 
the person reck from avoidance to facing the challenge. By helping the 
person to face and let go of their limited world, the therapist plunges the 
pe..--ron into a time of feeling out of relationship with the world, as the 
pe..--ron at this stage has no world. The next task of the therapist is, then, 
to provide the symbols which will help the person to become re-integrated 
inro the community, to come back into relationship to the world. To do 
this, the therapist must provide concrete projects which the person can get 
involved in. 
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What is important in using this model as a way of understanding the overall 
process of psychotherapy, is that etiology and the specific approach of the 
therapy are brought within the same model. There is no longer the 
givenness of the various diagnostic labels. Rather, people are seen as being 
their history with all the unique events that motivate them to be where 
they are. This model als::> emphasises that there is a process that must be 
worked through. It. suggests that one must face up to a certain amount of 
suffering for growth to be possible. while this view does not glorify 
suffering, it is opposed to those kinds of therapy which use drugs or 
behavior modification to make resistances more effective. 
The next important source is Rank (discussed in eoan, 1977). A central 
theme in Rank's work is the tension between security and creativity. This 
tension is expressed symbolically by the opposed images of the womb and of 
birth. For Rank, it is essential to live in terms of creativity, which 
involves separation and requires a continual death and re-birth of the 
personality structure. On the basis of this understanding, Rank says that 
there are three types of personality. There are those who are normaL 
These people keep close to the average, are dependent, and do not break . 
with the current norms and values. There are als::> those who are neurotic. 
These people are seeking independence, but have nothing with which to 
replace the norms of the current system that they have rej2cted. The third 
kind he calls creative. These people have undergone a re-birth into a new 
life-style, and are able to exist independently of the current norms. 
These three personality types can be seen as different stages of growth, 
and they correspond to the stages of my model of the experience of 
community. In the model, there are three event/experience pairs. The first 
of these pairs can be rummed up as being normal. the second pair as 
neurotic, and the third as creative. 
The third important source is Heidegger. Heidegger's overall proj2ct in 
Being and Time is to find the meaning of Being. To do this, he looks at 
what the Being of Dasein, of human existence, is. His insights here are of 
great value for psychology. Heidegger starts by analysing the everyday 
Dasein, the Dasein which is part of Das Man, the average. This averageness 
Heidegger terms fallenness, and he sees the fallen existence of Dasein as 
beL"", lost in the world, as living the possiblities that are chosen for it by 
the =wd. This average existence numbs the person by absolving them 
from the existential guilt of not living all possibilities. This kind of 
existence is basically selfish as it is not concerned with authentic, caring 
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relating to the world. But, as Heidegger notes, the tranquilising effect that 
the crowd has on Dasein is not entirely 9.1ccessfuJ. Sooner or later the 
fallenness becomes apparent. When it does, Dasein can attempt to avoid 
this by a deeper immersion in the ways of the crowd or through a flight 
from the implications of this reality, rut eventually there has to be rome 
coming to terms with authenticity. 
This reckoning happens through the experience of Angst. In this experience, 
the perron is thrown back on themselves, and is forced to face both their 
finitude, and the cavernously great freedom which beckons them. In this 
experience there is a feeling of unheirnlichkeit, an uneasiness, a feeling of 
no longer being at horne in the world. This uneasiness is in contrast to the 
anaesthetised sensibilities of the fallen existence of the crowd. This 
uneasiness is the realisation that the dwelling-in, which is Dasein's usual 
way of being in the world, is severely limited, and that there is a whole 
strange world which appears to be incomprehensible. 
The facing of Angst opens the way for projecting a new way of being in 
the world. The person begins to live in terms of authentic possibilities. 
This does not mean that a perron must try to live all their possibilities, but 
rather that they must choose the ones which they live, and must not merely 
, 
fallow what is dictated by the crOWd. The facing of Angst allows the 
reapropriation of those pcssibilities which are closest to what each perron 
in essence is. There is, therefore, a sense in which the facing of Angst, 
and the 9.1bsequent comrnittment to a chosen direction, is a kind of return 
to what is most oneself. T.S. Eliot expresses this idea in the closing 
section of Four Quartets: 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
So, Heidegger provides three key terms for understanding the processes of 
etiology and >sychotherapy: Fal1enness, which corresponds to Rank's 
normality; Angst, which corresponds to neurosis; and Authenticity, which 
=espcnds to creativity. 
We are now ready to integrate the findings of the previous sections (2.1 
and 2.2) into the model which has been outlined above. Table (ill below 
provides a 9.1mmary of the argument thus far. 
Table (ii) 
PHASE I 
FALLENNESS/NJRMMJTY 
I I 
THE STRUC'IURE OF PSYCOO'lliERAPY 
PHASE II 
AN3ST/NEUROSIS 
I 
STJliiE - 4 fa) 
Avoidance 
STN>E2 
PHASE III 
AUTHENI'ICITY/CREATIVITY 
I I 
I STN>E 1 lliti vations Not-Knowin lisation STN>E 6 I Reintegration 
Societal and 
parental 
values and 
expectations, 
and particular 
experiences 
IIOtivate people 
to see the 
\\Orld in a 
particular way; 
people c:one to 
dwell in a 
\\Orld that is, 
in soue 
respects, too 
limited. 
This is the stagE 
of blissful 
ignorance. As 
long as the 
aspects of the 
world which have 
been excluded 
are not called 
on, the person 
will experience 
no difficulties. 
sarething comes 
up that does not 
fit into the 
limited world of 
the person: they 
can no longer be 
unknowing . This 
challenge can be 
coincidental, or 
can be part of a 
carefully planned 
p::llitical 
strategy, or it 
can be a part of 
therapy. For a 
challenge to be 
successful, it 
IIUlSt state the 
challenge in such 
a way that it 
does not lead to 
avoidance. 
This is a 
resistance to thE 
import of the 
challenge, and it 
it is an attempt 
to remain bliss-
fully ignorant. 
This is the stag~ 
of facing the 
fact that one 's 
world is limited . 
There is despair 
at the impossi-
bility of change . 
The world, in thE 
absence of any 
authentic way of 
relating to it, 
seems meaninglesE 
and it is very 
difficult to 
relate to others. 
This is a time 0 
great isolation. 
Therapy, ritual, 
myths etc. give 
symbols by means 
of which the 
person can start 
to make sense of 
the many aspects 
of their new and 
enlarged world. 
This can happen 
at the fairly 
abstract level of 
'talk therapy', 
or by means of 
very concrete 
symbols such as 
those provided 
in sandplay. 
The person feels 
able once again 
to relate to the 
\\Orld and to 
others. There is 
a living towards 
possiblities, anc 
the person is 
able to be cexn-
mitted to a 
particular 
project. 
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Conclusion 
To conclude this section we can examine how the theory outlined above has 
met up with the criteria which Barten (1974) maintains a theory of therapy 
should be able tc fulfill if it is tc be comprehensive, and see how it has 
attempted tc be aware of social structure. 
We have seen that the transformation of meaning that is central to any 
therapy takes place through the use of syml:xJls. The therapist provides the 
client with the syml:xJls that are able tc express the different sides of 
conflicts that seem unresolveable, and that are able to bring into 
communication lost aspects of the perron's possible existence. We have 
seen that this is convincing to the therapist as in as much as the syml:xJls 
that the therapist provides for the client form part of the world that the 
therapist hirnlherself dwells in. This world-view can become convincing to 
the client if the syml:xJls which it presents are expressive of their present 
situation. Thus we can say that I:xJth the client and the therapist are 
involved in a common search for syml:xJls, chosen from within a set that 
expresses the world-view of the therapist, and that these syml:xJls must be 
able to express the present life-experience of the client. Thus I:xJth are 
very deeply involved in the therapy. For this search for syml:xJls tc be 
successful. the relationship between the therapist and client must be SJ.ch 
that the rigidities of the client are challenged, but it must also be able to 
support and encourage the client. Thus the discussion in this chapter is 
able to answer the first three criteria which Barten sets out. 
In addition, there has been an attempt to make this theory cognizant of the 
social structure within which therapy operates. We have seen that social 
structure is very important in guiding the development of the worlds which 
people live in, and we have noted further that therapy can be employed 
lx>th in overcoming the limitations arising from this oppression, on the 
individual and community levels, and that therapy can be directed at those 
who uphold oppressive structures. 
Banan's fourth and fifth criteria need tc be investigated by empirical 
research. To this end, the following chapter is an attempt to use the 
model arrived at in this chapter tc understand descriptions of the 
experience of therapy given by people who were in therapy. This will 
hopefully bring the theory into contact with the life-world meaning of 
therapy, and it will provide a way of giving rome empirical justification for 
the theory outlined above. 
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CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH PHASE 
The previous chapter ended by proposing a theory of psychotherapy that 
takes into account the whole life of the client. It was maintained that this 
model fuJflls the criteria outlined by Barton (1974), except in that this 
model still needs to be experientialy grounded by research into the meaning 
of therapy in a client's life. At this stage in this thesis, therefore, it is 
necessary to provide an empirical justification for the model outlined in the 
previous chapter. There are many ccnsiderations which it is important to 
take account of in undertaking empirical research into the experience of 
psychotherapy, and these will be considered first in this chapter. 
Thereafter the method of analysis employed in this study will be described, 
and then the findings will be presented. 
3.1 Considerations 
The basis on which this proj=ct is founded means that attention must be 
given to rome ccnsiderations. On the one hand there are those broad 
ccnsiderations which are relative to the fundamental tenets on which this 
entire thesis is based, and on the other hand there are the ccnsiderations of 
a more practical and specific nature which arise from these broad 
ccnsiderations. 
3.1.1 Broad ccnsiderations: 
This chapter is attempting to provide a justification for the model arrived 
at in the previous section. NOW, ideally we woWd want to find empirical 
validation for the theory arrived at above. To do this woWd require the 
research and the theorising to take place independently. The researcher 
woWd then show that the empirical "facts" and the theory are in actuality 
the same, thereby obtaining obj=ctive "proof" for the theory. However, to 
try to achieve this kind of "obj=ctivity" in the human sciences, especially 
when one is looking for the meaning of a particu]ar phenomenon, is rurely 
naive. Any attempt to research human phenomena must be based on rome 
fairly extensive preconceptions. Thus it woWd seem that a far more 
rea=nable approach woWd be to make those preccnceptions explicit, rather 
than pretend that they do not exist. 
What this research attempts, then, is to show that the model outlined in 
chapter 2 is a possible method for understanding the experiences of clients 
in therapy. Thus it will not be claimed that this is the only way that the 
data can be understood, or that this is the most =ect way of 
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understanding the protcx::ols, but only that this is one way of understanding 
which makes it pDffiib1e to see the experiences des::ri.bed by the subj:cts in 
terms of the ideas outlined in the previous two chapters. Therefore, in 
general terms, this research is guided by a Concern for experiential 
accuracy, and by an attempt to make it possible to take ooci.al structure 
into account. 
Let us now consider the specific out workings of these considerations. 
3.1.2 Specific considerations: 
Kruger (1983) points to the need for a researcher of therapy to be a third 
perron outside of the therapeutic relationship. This is necessary so as to 
overcome the particular hiafES of both the therapist and the client. Since 
a guiding principle of this project is the attempt to understand the 
experiential meaning of therapy in the client's life, the third perron's role 
is defined as being that of the analyst of prot=ols written by the clients 
themselves about their experiences of therapy. Doing this has two 
advantages. Fll:st:ly, it means that the starting point for the research is the 
lived experience of the client, and, secondly, it means that the research is 
not based on the researcher's clinical understanding, which understanding is 
bas9d more on therapeutic technique than on understanding and meaning. (Jl: 
should be noted here that my training in psychology has not been a t:raini.n:J 
towards the practicalities of doing therapy). 
There are, however, problems associated with this approach. How is one to 
approach rubjects? At what stage in their therapy is it appropriate and 
possible to do research? Eppel (1980) overcame these problems by doing his 
research in a retrospective way. This, he maintains, is less harmful to the 
clients, as they have by this stage already worked through the issues at 
stake. In addition, it is more accurate, as it gives a more holistic view, a 
view which is not caught up in the specific details of each s:ssi.on, but 
which is rather indicative of the overall meaning of the therapy. Finally, 
he also found that this was the only way in which therapists would agree to 
let him speak to their clients. If the clients were still in therapy, the 
therapists were rather defensive about the therapy. Eppe.l sums up by 
saying: 
What is crucial for the client retrospectively is not 
what actually happens in the sessions, but the way she 
lives her life after the sessions, and therapy's residual 
nature which acts as a Epringboard for her whole life 
(p.191). 
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Thus retrospective data is more able to give insight into the overall 
meaning of therapy in a client's life. 
These considerations have implications for the choice of subjoct.s. Not only 
must the 9..Ibj=ct.s be faidy articulate in recounting their experiences of 
therapy, but they must, in the first place, be prepared to do 00. This 
means that they must feel ''finished'' as far as their therapy is concerned. 
For my first three subjo>cts, I have used protocols given in a book by 
Beutler (1983). He uses these protocols to back up his theory of eclectic 
psychotherapy. Beutler asked his 9..Ibj=ct.s 
to describe a little of their own history as it applied 
to their seeking treatment, and to detail as much as 
possible the things they found helpful. ineffective, or 
even harmful in the course of their treatment. Each 
patient was selected because he or she had received a 
variety of treatments varying in effectiveness (p.156). 
Using these subjo>cts has the advantage of not necessitating any more of the 
inevitable self-exposure and possible pain involved in writing a protocol of 
this kind. There is aloo the added interest of the possibility of dialogue 
with the view arrived at by Beutler. The problem with these subj=ct.s, 
however, is that there can be no interaction with these people. There is 
no way in which I can "check" my interpretation with the clients 
themselves. I have, therefore, a fourth 9..Ibjo>ct whom I approached myself. 
For this subjo>ct the method of analysis is far more searching, as it involves 
not only the analysis of his protocol. but aloo a follow-up session in which 
the proposed analysis is subjo>cted to the s::rutiny of the client. This 
folJow-up aloo allows the client a chance to amplify on the things expressed 
in the protocol. 
At this stage we are able to consider the specific method of protocol 
analysis. 
3.1.3 The method of protocol analysis: 
The method employed in analysing the protocols is a derivative of the 
method developed by researchers at Duquesne University. A good example 
of the Duquesne method of research is that of De Koning (1979) on the 
phenomenon of smpicion. In contrast to the Duquesne method, however, the 
approach in this study does not attempt to be atheoreticaL The Duquesne 
School tries to "let the data speak for itself", rut as I pointed out above, 
this is a rather tall oroer, and it inevitably relies on oome kind of pre-
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understanding. More specifically, we can see this pre-understanding at work 
in at least two of the stages of protocol analysis as propounded by the 
Duquesne SchooL Firstly, by transforming the "natural" meaning unit into 
what it means, the researcher is making an interpretation of the data. 
Secondly, in grouping what are =nsidered si.milar themes, the researcher is 
once again involved in making an interpretative judgement. Thus the 
Duquesne method is not a purely descriptive approach, but requires 
interpretation. 
Where the present method differs from the Duquesne approach is in the fact 
t.'1at this method makes these interpretative jumps in terms of the model 
outlined above. The particular method folJowed is very si.miJar, except that 
the meaning units are understood and grouped in terms of the model 
outlined in chapter 2. The particular method is thus as folJows: 
(i) Read over the entire protocol to get a sense of the whole; 
(ill Divide this into meaning units; 
(iii) Place each meaning unit into one (or more) of the seven stages of the 
structure of psychotherapy; and 
(iv) Integrate the meaning units of each of the seven stages into a 
description of the meaning of that stage for the client, and then express 
t.'1e entire experience in these terms, noting the re13.tionships between the 
various stages. 
By worKing in this way this research, although starting from the client's 
experience, cannot accurately be described as phenomenological. as the 
a~mpt to let the data itself suggest the structure of the phenomenon 
ulxler investigation has been abandoned. However, it must be remembered 
bat the aim of this empirical research is not to discover the structure of 
berapy, but rather to show that the structure arrived at in chapter 2 is a 
possible way of understanding psychotherapy. Therefore this 
p-:-'enomenologically-inspired method is adequate for the purposes of this 
s:udy. 
'C:-'e findings arrived at by this method are given below. 
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3.2 Findings 
In this section the structure of psychotherapy for each of the Slbjects is 
given. For the fust three Slbj:cts there is alm a brief discussion of the 
relationship between Beutler's (1983) conclusions and those arrived at by my 
method. The protocols the mselves, divided into numbered meaning units, are 
given in the appendix. 
3.2.1 SUBJECT 1: LYNNE: Grouping of meaning units according to the 
modeL 
Phase I: Normality (Motivatio~ Not-Knowing) 
A first point to note here is that we know very little about Lynne's early 
years. We do see, however, that her first twenty years are lived very 
much in terms of a sxial expectations, and she sees herself as being little 
more than her sxial role. She seems to define herself in terms of the 
Slperficial rocietal notions of Slccess (e.g. "beauty contest winner"), and 
this oveDde ntification with her role we can assume led her to develop a 
very limited sense of self (meaning unit 1). 
Phase IT: Neurosis 
Stage 3: Challenge: 
Lynne describes the "e motional upheaval" she experienced at a time when 
there were many coinciding stressors in her life. The death of a much 
loved grandparent, separation from her roy-friend, the problems in her 
parents' marriage, and a change of her town of residence all happened at 
the same time (4). It seems that the extent of these was ro great that the 
world in which she was happily dwelling up till this time was seriously 
questioned, and it was no longer able to Slpport her superficial notions of 
identity. In addition, her parents were unable at this time to support her 
in the way which she wanted (17,18). 
Her symptoms provide a clear symlxllisation of this. Lynne experiences fear, 
tension, and weakness in the face of a world that seems far larger than the 
one which she was used to. There is a feeling of lack of support, 
graphically expressed in her felling of having "rubbery knees" (2,4). 
In retrospect, however, she acknowledges that challenge is necessary if one 
is to continue growing (35). 
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Stage 4(a): A voidance 
In a sense, however, the symptoms that Lynne showed al90 expreffi an 
attempt to avoid the implications of the challenge that her 'normal' worJrl 
received. The symptoms make it impossible for her to move out into the 
worJrl at all, and so her worJrl becomes even more reduced, and can no 
longer be challenged by the things that are excluded by her early 
motivations (2,3,4). The symptoms even make it impossible for her to seek 
help (3,20,23). One couJrl couJrl say, therefore, that her agoraphobia is her 
inability to be in the larger worJrl which she is challenged to meet. 
The first therapists that 
that She was 
she COIb--ulted did not help her to face the 
avoiding. By prescribing tranquil:isers these challenge 
therapists merely increased her ability to avoid the challenge. The drugs 
numbed her sensitivity to the call of the worJrl (5,8,9). We can perhaps say 
that, to the extent that at the time of writing Lynne still needed hypnotism 
and a bottle of tranquil:isers to feel in control (36), She had not yet fully 
learned to face the world. 
Stage 4(b): Despair 
Finally, the drugs couJrl help her no longer. This led her to stop taking 
them, and to face the full impact of her 'illnem', giving the symptoms free 
rein (10). Her symptoms at this stage exprem a deep despair at the 
situation which she finds herself in. She is very much afraid of the worJrl, 
and this fear is exactly what makes it impossible for her to find any way 
out of the situation. Not only does She feel that others do not understand 
her (20,23), and that they do not really care (7,19), but there is a deeper 
sense in which she does not understand herself. It seems as if her fear of 
the world, and her perplexity about herself, are parallel themes 
(4,7,9,11,19,20); one couJrl even say that the vastnem of the threatening 
world calls out to a self that she does not know, and so leaves her fearful 
and perplexed. 
In such a world any failure to care is likely to be deeply felt, and her first 
t:herapists served to justify her distrust of the world by their lack of care 
(7,11,19). 
Lynne's parents' proposed divorce seems to have been experienced by her as 
the loss of the last support that she had, and so she couJrl even 
contemplate suicide (22). 
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The despair experienced by Lynne is clearly expressed in her symptoms. 
Her depression and anxiety express beth the impossibility of change, and the 
fear that makes that change imossible. 
Phase III: creativity 
We have seen the first two worlds in which Lynne dwelt. The first, 
superficial and societally constituted, gave way to the agoraphobic world of 
incapacity, lack of understanding and inability to find help. The third world 
is the world of creativity, of overcoming the neurotic world expressed 
through the agoraphobia. How was it possible for this change to take 
place? 
Stage 5: Re-symbclisation 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Lynne's recovery was her decision to 
get well (12). Her sense of responsibility for herself (6), and her desire to 
get well (24) provided the basis for all the other aspects of resymbclisation, 
as these, ultimately, amount to a decision to avoid a larger world no longer. 
Lynne worked out much of her '=e' herself. By setting up rules, goals, 
tasks etc. she ,' provided herself with specific, easily-achieved avenues of 
expression by which she could start reaching out to the world. These 
formed the basis for her seeing the world as an approachable place 
(12,31,37,41). By performing these tasKs, she managed to gain a sense of 
physical mastery (6,15,16,28). This helped her to overcome the idea that 
the world was beyond her controL Getting a pb also helped her in this 
way, and it brought her back into relationship with others (21). 
Writing a purnal and poetry gave her a way of working with her emotional 
life. It provided her with a way of expressing and symbclising her feelings 
(13,39). 
Lynne describes rapport as being of central importance to her (20,33,42,44). 
This came from her friend through most of her experience of agoraphobia, 
and later it came also from her final therapist, Larry. This rapport led her 
to a sense of self--acceptance way beyond the narrow role-based view of her 
identity that characterised her first: twenty years (1,27). At the time of 
writing the protocoL she is able to laugh at herself in a way that suggests 
a S2CUri.ty in her new identity (14). 
Hypnosis she describes as also having been very important to her growth. 
Now that she can hypnotise herself, she is able to be out in the threatening 
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world, and yet be relaxed (26). Thus, the hypnotism has made possible a 
larger world for her. She does, however, retain the possibility of avoiding 
this larger world by carrying a bottle of tranquilisers with her: these could 
help her to avoid a crisis situation (36). 
Lynne has al= found that talking to herS2lf allows her to express more 
sides of herS2lf than she would otherwise take account of (38). In a similar 
vein, her therapist encourages her to experiment with different possibilities 
of ho w to be in a pa.rticu1ar situation. This enlarges the possibilities for 
expression that she has available (29,30). 
All of the above, as well as research and study by her and her therapist, 
have enabled her to start to understand herS2lf (6,20,32,34). She can now 
feel that there is a pattern to her life, and she can reach out and embrace 
all of herS2lf (35). This process of resymbolisation has not all been easy 
and successfuL It has al= been painful. and oometimes unsuccessful (25). 
However, Lynne now realises that there is a need not to rigidify, and she 
acknowledges that she has to keep on challenging herS2lf (35,46). 
Stage 6: Reintegration 
As a result. of her experiences Lynne now has a sense of accomplishment: 
she feels that her identity has been achieved by her (even though with 
help), rather than received from her sxial role (1). She is now able to 
come to an honest awareness of who she is, and is able to 1=k at herS2lf 
in terms of the kinds of relationship which she is engaged in (1). In 
contrast to the apparent extravert identity which she had for her first 
twenty years (1), she now des::ribes herS2lf as being "a quiet, home-body 
type" (43). 
DiaJogue with Beutler 
Beutler's commentary on Lynne's protocol reflects a very different approach 
to the one which has been followed above. He points to a core conflict in 
her life, discusses her coping style, and shows how the techniques used in 
therapy catered for the needs of this particular case. 
The core conflictual theme which Beutler points to is the conflict between 
approach and avoidance. On the one hand there is her dependence on 
others for support, and yet she is afraid to approach too close in case she 
is let down. Although there is a fair deree of overlap between this view 
and that arrived at in the above analysis, it does seem that Beutler's 
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perception of the core conflict does not penetrate the motive for the 
aviodance snfficiem:ly. Athough he does say that she is fearful of the 
world becuase she has learned that it can let her down, this does not seem 
to be snfficient motivation for her to cut off all contact with the world. 
This radical avoidance makes more sense if we see it as being the only 
possible way of hokling onto a tenuous identity which is being challenged. 
Beutler also describes her characteristic coping style 
not very high in reactance. This means that she 
as externalising, 
tends to regard 
and 
her 
problems as being problems in the world, and that she tends to accept what 
she is told. These categories help Beutler in choosing therapy techniques. 
The problem with these categories, however, is that there is little attempt 
to try to understand why Lynne might be like this. In fact, these ways of 
seeing people tend to accept that the perron 'just is' like this or that, and 
then there is no challenging of the perron to move beyond these ways of 
living. 
we can perhaps say that Lynne tends to externalise problems because that 
is where her identity lies, in the social roles and expectations that she has 
been brought up to strive after. This is also why she has low reactance: 
she has to be what society tells her to be. Given these two aspects of 
Lynne's life, it is not surprising that it is the worJd that challenges her to 
enlarge her sense of identity, as this is where she has looked up to this 
time for her sense of identity. It is also not surprising that this brings 
about a crisis in Lynne, and forces her to reduce her world to a size that 
no longer challenges her sense of identity. 
Beutler's discussion of the techniques used in Lynne's therapy is very 
interesting. It is a very technical discussion, and this technical interest 
forms a very closed system. There is no attempt to relate the techniques 
used to Lynne's experiences. The techniques are merely described as 
causing certain changes. This discussion only makes sense in terms of the 
theories of Cognitive Behaviorism, and therefore does not ever say what any 
of these techniques may have meant to Lynne. A short quote illustrates 
this approach: 
Hypnotic induction combined suggestillns for self-image 
enhancement with systematic desensitisation procedures 
designed to facilitate anxiety reduction. In this case, 
the initial concern was with symptom reduction and 
then with perceptual change (Beutler, 1983, p.l71). 
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3.2.2 SUBJECT 2: BILL: Grouping of meaning units according to the model. 
Phase I! Normality 
stage 1: Motivations 
Once again, as with Lynne, we do not know very much about Bill's 
bacJcground. He describes himself as coming from the Deep South, and this 
connotes a conservative, rigid kind of upbringing (3). In contrast to the 
connot:ations of the deep south, we see that he had parents who were unlike 
the socially accepted roles for married couples: his mother was dominant, 
and his father passive (4). We cannot really say what motivations may have 
arisen within this context, but we can piece together the kind of world 
which Bill came to live in. 
stage 2: Not-knowing 
It seems that the world in which Bill grew up did not offer him very much 
sense of self-worth. This led him to see only limited pcssibilities in the 
world (19,20). He alro grew up to see himself as "ugly and uninteresting" 
(6), and boring (16,24). It alro seems that he was only able to see the 
world in very intellectual terms, he seeing it as something to be mastered 
intellectually (37). Thus we can say that the world in which Bill grew up 
was such that he grew up ignorant of his own worth, unable to relate to 
the world in any other way than by intellectual mastery. This kind of 
world excluded any pcssibility of entering into worthwhile interpersonal 
relationships. 
Phase II! Neurosis 
Stage 3: Challenges 
This very limited and gloomy world seems to have been challenged very 
particularly when Bill went to college. This anxiety at the new world 
presented by college is seen in his "suicide attempts" before going into 
therapy (15). Although going to college seems to have been a crisis for 
BilL there is a sense in which his whole life has been a challenge of the 
world which he was brought up to see. His extremes of mood can be seen 
as an expression of his need to live in a world that is more than 
intellectual (7). In addition the un-normal gender-roles of his parents would 
have been most likely challenged by those of his peers' parents' 
relationships. 
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After fending off the challenge posed by the world of college, Bill faced an 
even more crippling challenge later in his life. The two areas of his life 
from which he seemed to be drawing a 32nse of s=lf-worth collapsed within 
a short space of time. His business went bankrupt, and he and his wife 
gJ.ve up struggling to make their marriage worK (9--12). This led him to see 
hims=lf as a total failure, unable to relate to his wife, and unable to 
master the business world (38). We can see these two events as removing 
the last remaining supports from what was already a limited identity. This 
makes his depression and very low 32nse of s=lf-worth understandable 
(19,20). 
The challenges mentioned above can be seen as negative challenges, and one 
can suggest that possibily these challenges had the impact that they did 
because of the limited resources which Bill had for dealing with these 
situations. 
There are, however, also positive challenges in Bill's story. The last two 
therapists whom Bill saw challenged him, but in a less damaging and 
threatening way. The gentle man (31), by not being too firm, was trusted 
by Bill, and so was gradually able to start pointing to =ntradictions in 
Bill's life (39), inviting him to explore other directions for living his life 
(36). The "challenging and responsive woman", possibly because she was a 
woman (40), and also because she was unlike other therapists in that she 
treated Bill as a peer (44,49), was able to challenge him to "deeper and 
deeper insights" (42), helping him to un=ver areas of his life that he had 
hidden up till then (42,45). 
It is interesting to note that, for the challenge to be 9..lccessful., the 
therapist had to first be within the world of the client to a certain extent 
before it was possible to introduce challenges. We can, further, possibly 
see the two therapists (the gentle man, and the challenging woman) as being 
partly representative of his parents. This similarity to Bill's parents gave 
these therapist's a way into Bill's world. Once trusted and accepted, they 
could begin to challenge that world. 
Stage 4(a): A voidance 
There are many ways in which Bill tried to avoid the various challenges 
facing him. His withdrawal and isolation (5) seem to be an attempt to 
avoid the challenge that friends and the broader world inevitably posed to 
him. Bill's adventurousness and wandering he himself sees as being a kind 
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of escape (8), an avoidance of the challenge of others. His extremes of 
mood can l:e seen as both an attempt to escape (through his 'manic' stages), 
and also as a realisation of the uJtimate im pcssibility of this desire to 
escape (in his 'depressive' stages). 
We can see a further avoidance as being prescribed by the psychiatrist Ivho, 
when faced with Bill and his wife's crumbling marriage, couJd only offer 
tranquili.sers and suggest that she fulBll the stereotyped sex-role of a good 
wife (25). 
Bill's need for intellectual mastery can l:e seen as a further avoidance of 
the core issues of his life that needed facing (37,49). By making an 
intellectual game of the challenges to his identity (43), Bill was able to 
keep them within the scope of his limited world. 
We can also see an avoidance in his worry about changing therapists from 
the gentle man to the woman (40). His worry is pcssibly an expression of 
his wish not to l:e challenged any further than he had l:een up till then. 
This view is supported by the fact that the therapy with the new therapist 
"drifted" for a while as Bill avoided facing certain issues (41). 
Stage 4(b): Despair 
Bill's symptoms (depressicn, suicidal thoughts, s.ricide attempt [7,15,19], and 
his own boredom [16]) show him to l:e in a world of little or no hope, a 
world of limited choice and pcssibility (19,20). This sense of despair arises 
in the situation where his adolescent, limited world is questioned by his 
going to college (18), and later when the only remaining sources of meaning 
for hiin (his work and his marriage) both collapsed (12,28). 
But there is also a less dramatic way in which Bill is despairing. In 
general he realises that his life is limited in the choices available, and that 
his self-concept is inadequate (20), The depth of his despair is, perhaps, 
realised when he takes stock of his life, and symbolises it as a "gigantic 
mass of tangled rope" needing rome kind of untangling, while he has a 
"feeling of near hopelessness" at the impcssibility of the task. For Bill 
change seems to l:e impcssible. 
The therapy which Bill experienced as being effective can also l:e seen as 
adding to the despair. The therapists pcinted to the contradictions in his 
life (39) and brought to light painful experiences (43), thereby helping him 
to see the extent to which he had limited his existence. 
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Phase ill: Creativity 
Stage 5: R e-sy m balisation 
In the depths of his despair, Bill took an honest look at himself, and 
symtol.is=d his life as a tangled rope that needed to be untangled. This 
symtoJisation was the start of his recovery, as it marks the beginning of his 
finding some kind of pattern in his life. As part of this re-symtoJisation 
we can perhaps include his time of being a middle-aged hippie, as well as 
his second marriage. All of these seem to be expressions of a desire to 
move out of limited world, which attitude is necessary for him to be able 
to use what his therapists have to offer. 
It seems that it was important to Bill that the gentle therapist could offer 
him "a path" which he could follow (25), something which he feels he lacked 
up till then (23,34,51). Apart from this, most of the effective action of 
therapy seems to have been the offering of insights, by toth therapists, 
which insights challenged and encouraged him to accept more and more of 
himself (34,35). It seems that these therapists achieved this by first gaining 
his confidence (38), and then gradually explDrjng more and more of what 
was missing from his wodd. 
As a result of this encouragement to move out from the rigidities of his 
life, Bill was able to become far more confident and self-accepting (38,47). 
In t.'le end he came to realise that the therapy could not put right all the 
\Vrongs of his life, and that, in any event, there was a pattern to his life 
in s:;>ite of the apparent chaos, and that that is what he uniquely is. He 
Simixl]ises t1Us final understanding by saying that his life is like macrame; 
it is inextricably knotted, but is nevertheless formed in a pattern, and can 
be seen as being beautiful (48). 
His relationship with these last two therapists was ill marked contrast with 
t.'1at which he had with his previous therapists. He sees his early therapists 
as having been unsuccessful because they were tared (16,18,24), 
condescending (49), uncaringinly detached (50), unable to give him a clear 
direction or an understanding of himself (23,25,34,51), and he feels that they 
;r,er:ly gave him platitudes (21,26) or "mumbo-jumto" (52). 
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Stage 6: Reintegration 
The experiences which accompanied Bill's re--symlxilisation of his life are 
very different: to those which he experienced in his life before the 
successful therapy. He no" is no longer extreme, but tries to be balanced 
in his approach (14,46). Bill is alro far more confident now (38,46,47), and 
is much more self-accepting, even of his weaknesses (48). His life is no 
longer hemmed in by desperation, but is open now to other possibilities (46). 
This all manifests itself in an improvement in his relationships with his wife 
and children, and als:> with his friends and acquaintances. He even finds 
that he is able once again to involve himself in business successfully. Thus 
we can see that ~ through his therapy, was able to reintegrate himself 
into his society once again through developing a world of broader scope and 
possibility. 
Dialogue with Beutler 
Beutler diagnoses Bill. as being highly reactant, and als:> highly extemalising, 
but sees Bill as als:> internalising many of his problems. The core conflict 
with which Bill. is coping is the conflict between separation and nurturance. 
Although this formulation may be an adequate formulation of how Bill stands 
towards the world, it is not very helpful in allowing us to see how the 
wor:ld is for him, and how his world came to be like that. 
Beutler's diagnosis of Bill. as with his understanding of Lynne, relies on a 
notion of people as merely being reactant or not, and extemalising or not. 
From looking at what therapy meant to both of these people, we can see 
that the situation is far more complex than this. They developed certain 
ways of seeing the wor:ld because there were certain motivations which led 
them to see the world that way. Thus, fully to understand the therapy of 
these people, it is necessaq to move beyond mere ascription of labels, to 
seeing how their world is meaningfuL Beutler's failure to capture the 
meaning of therapy for Bill is shown clearly in the fallowing quote in which 
he sums up Bill's therapy 
In short, the therapeutic process was one of reducing 
external behaviours through behavioural and perceptual 
control procedures and then developing emotional 
awareness through reflection, refrarning, and belief 
validation. The concentration of activities was initially 
directed at current patterns in which ambivalent 
internal drives were in evidence (e.g. his marriage) and 
later progressed to explorations of transference-parental 
links (p.18l). 
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3.2.3 SUBJECT 3: JANET: Grouping of meaning units according to the 
modeL 
Phase I: Normality 
Stage 1: Motivations 
Unlitce the two previous subj=cts, Janet gives a good deal of information 
about her background. The world in which she grew up seems to have been 
a rather austere one. Her father was a minister/teacher (1) and inflicted 
an exteremely dominating presence on the home (6). Her mother fulfilled 
the complementary side of this stereotype, being a very submissive perron 
(il). Her mother had to rerort to manipulation to get what she wanted or 
to have any say at all (11). The austerity was largely brought about by 
two kinds of impoverishment in Janet's home. Firstly, it was as if the 
family were financially impoverished, even though the y were comfortably 
off, as her parents were not at all free with their money (3). Secondly, 
the family was not expressive of emotions in any way (9). These two kinds 
of irnoverishment led her to see her parents as not giving her enough 
support (59), and she found that the only way she could gain support was 
through being ill (19). Thus ~t seems that she gre w up in a world where 
she was very aware of her dependence, emotionally and financially, on her 
parents, but in which she alro felt inadequately provided for (19,21). 
Possibly because she grew up almost as an only child (2), she was not able 
to see any other way of relating. 
Because her parents did not provide sufficiently for her emotional and 
financial needs, Janet grew up unable to feel 'in' with her peers, and ro 
she tended to be s:ilitary (4) . This irolation was heightened by her father's 
emphasis on rationality (5). In trying to please her father, and ro win his 
Jove , she tried to be very rational and sensible (10). Her apparent failure 
to please her father only made her re-double her efforts, and this great 
emphasis on the intellectual took her further away from her peers, on whom 
s.'1e looked down snobbishly (4). 
Stage 2: Not-knowing 
As we have seen above, Janet grew up in a world devoid of freely given 
support, a world in which there was no warmth of emotion, and alro no 
generosity. The world in which she dwelt led her to know nothing other 
tiJan "snobbishness" (4), being "smart" (5), unemotional (9) and dispassionately 
rational (8). In such a world, manipulation is the only way of getting what 
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one needs (7,12,19). Thus Janet grew up not knowing what real 
relationships involve, una'Hare of her parents attempts to care for her 
(59,68). 
Phase IT: Neurosis 
Stage 3: Challenges 
The apparent stability of this world of Janet's became increasingly 
questioned by the extreme exploitation to which she was subj=cted after the 
start of her mother's illness. The situations that arose led her to harbour 
so much anger (15) that the ways which were available to her in her world 
for dealing with this I"ere quite inadequate to the task. possibly because 
of her mother's being an invalid, that is someone who must be treated very 
gently and carefully, she could not even try to use her mounting anger in 
any way against her mother, so she turned it in on herself, and started to 
develop anxiety attacks (17), and depression (16). 
These symptoms are an expression of the Catch-22 situation in which she 
found herself (67). Increasingly she came to find not only that she did have 
emotions, but also that these emotions were not acceptable (her anger at 
her parents). On the other hand, she was still in need of her parents 
support, emotional and financial (19,21). Janet's symptoms expressed her 
anxiety about her emotions, and also her inability to change the situation. 
The challenge which Janet's world received, as outlined above, can be seen 
as the core of her problems. However, there are many subsequent 
challenges that she experienced, some of them negative and others positive. 
Her experiences with her first therapist are an instance of a negative 
challenge. The results of the personality test that this psychiatrist 
presented to Janet undermined the last remaining supports of her tenuous 
identity, thereby taking from her the little seJf-confidence that she had. 
Although it was possibly necessary for her to confront the issues that the 
test brought to light, it seems that at this stage she was too insecure to be 
able to risk letting go of those aspects of herseJf, and the test certainly 
was not the best possible way of gradually working towards a confrontation 
of the issues at stake (43). 
Janet's successful therapy can be seen as being a positive challenge. The 
dreams, within the context of Gestalt therapy, confronted her with feelings 
and thoughts with which she then had to come to terms (57,62). 
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Transactional Analysis (TA) chalJenged her to review and redirect her ways 
of relating to others (66-71). The Bioenergetics chalJenged her to change 
her bodily way of being (73). In general, we can see that as 5CX)n as her 
therapist stopped 'pushing' her, she felt that the therapy ceased to be 
useful (74). 
Finally, we can say that when Janet was raped, this situation was a very 
extreme kind of challenge, as it subj=cted her to feelings of fear, 
helplessness, anxiety and rage, all of which combined to leave her once 
again experiencing self-doubt. It is interesting to note, however, that 
whereas the initial challenges that she faced were too much for her to cope 
with, she was able to deal with this challenge, even given its extreme 
nature, in a very creative way by drawing on the resources which she had 
developed in the interim. 
Stage 4(a): Avoidance 
Initially Janet attempted to avoid the implications of the challenges to her 
wor:kl. Her depression and anxiety not only expressed the untenability of 
her situation, but they al9:> made her unable to confront her parents: these 
symptoms blinded her to her great anger (16). In addition, her 
embarassment at having these symptoms made her. even less likely to 
confront the situation (17,18). This avoidance is quite understandable, 
however, as we have seen that she was unable to be independent of her 
parents, even though she would have liked to be (19,21). Much later she 
carne to see this conflict as being quite basic to her life (66,67), and was 
able to face it and work with it creatively. 
In talking to her minister Janet once again avoided the issue by 
"previewing" Whatever she said, thereby making sure that nothing would get 
baCK to her father (22). 
In marrying at the age of 19, Janet seemed to be trying to resolve the 
situation in which she was trapped. In marriage, she had an acceptable way 
of leaving the horne, that is, without having to say that she wanted to 
leave, and al9:> she ensured that she would be supported and cared for by a 
husband who could provide for her emotional and financial needs (23). This 
attempt at re.soluticn was still an avoidance, as she tried to move beyond 
the situation without confronting the core issue, her anger at her parents. 
As it turned out, the marriage was not able to provide the support which 
me required of it, and 00, after divorcing her husband after a year's 
marriage, she was left without any support at alL 
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Janet's insistence on remaining irrleperdent after her divorce reElects a 
further avoidance (29,71). In striving to be irrlependent she was still trying 
to avoid the confrontation with her parents. Her anxiety and depression at 
this time (30) seem to express her failure to move beyond the past. Her 
eXceSSLVe drinking also seems to have been an attempt to avoid the issues 
at stak.e: by numbing her, the alcohol made it possible for her to forget 
these issues (32,38). Her series of brief physical relationships (34), which 
she saw as being a compromise of herself (34), seem, nonetheless, to have 
been the only way that she could find some kind of support (36). 
There is also a Jot of avoidance in her first therapy. At this stage, she 
experienced a deep distrust of therapy, and she feared any change that it 
could bring. This fear and avoidance of change is expressed as a fear of 
"going crazy" (39,42,60). Avoiding change at this stage was, possibly, 
necessary to a certain extent otherwise she might have committed suicide, 
so deep was her depression and so limited her resources for dealing with 
her situation (40). The psychiatrist did not seem to be at all encouraging 
of change. On the contrary, he prescribed a hypnotic sedative (43) which 
stopped Janet from having or remembering dreams (44). By cutting off her 
dreams, the drug was eliminating one possible source of challnge and 
, 
renewal that was not too threatening (57-62). In general, this initial 
therapy was boring, and presented no solutions, and did not help her to 
achieve any kind of self-understanding (45,51). She feels that in leaving 
this therapy, she was not avoiding issues, as there was no challenge for her 
to avoid (43). 
There is one further instance of avoidance in Janet's protocoL After some 
time in her successful therapy, she began to get close to the leader of the 
therapy group. As a result of this, the therapist no Jonger challenged her 
as much, and also this situation meant that she no Jonger saw herself as 
equal with the group, something which prevented her from working with her 
"snobbishness" (74). 
It is interesting to note that having worked through the fundamental issues 
irl her life, Janet was able to face the implications of her being raped and 
oot attempt to avoid the working through. By j:ri.ning a group, and by 
actively trying to work things through with her husband and others, she was 
able to use the situation in a creative way, not merely denying it 
(77-81,85). 
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Stage 4(b): Despair 
There is much despair in Janet's story. There is her initial despair at ever 
being able to leave the parental situation in which she found herself, which 
despair was expressed through her anxiety and depression (16,17). There is 
alm her deeper despair when her attempt to resolve the situation through 
marri3.ge failed (19), and she experienced herself as having no support at all 
(24). This despair is expressed through the deep depression which she 
experienced for two years (28). The depression incapacitated her, and this 
meant that she was unable to hold a :'Pb and was very i=lated (31,32); .this 
in turn led her to live a kind of life that only increased her sense of 
failure by making her feel guilty and worthless (33). There is alm despair 
in her first therapy. The psychiatrist seemed to threaten her so much that 
the change that was necessary seemed impossible to her (39). 
After being raped, Janet once again experienced the despair of extreme 
self-doubt (81). However, this time she was able to overcome the despair 
fairly soon. 
Phase III: creativity 
Stage 5: R e-sy m l:x:ilisation 
Perhaps the most important thing for Janet in re-symbolising her world was 
the realisation that she could survive (47), that ultimately it was up to her 
to provide the Slpport for herself. Having realised this, she was in a 
position to make use of the avenues which her husband-tD-be could open for 
her through the therapy centre he was attending. By trying to get into 
t..'1erapy at the centre, she was already starting to see some hope beyond 
t."e despair (48,49). Another necessary part of her therapy was her stopping 
all medication. The drugs which she had been taking had prevented her 
from facing things (50). A further important aspect of her growth at this 
time was her husband's constant encouragement and challenges. All of 
t."ese facilitated a change of the world in which Janet was living. Her 
change in woill at this time is dramatically shown in her changing her :'Pb 
and also returning to school (52). 
L'1 her time at the therapy centre Janet encountered three kinds of therapy. 
The first, Gestalt, she considers to have been the most useful and important 
(56). The Gestalt concepts were like the "handles on a lifeboat" to her, as 
they provided her with a way of understanding what was happening in her 
life. She describes the language of Gestalt as being like "a language spoken 
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by 'strangers in a strange land'. 
fascinated" her (56). 
A land that toth frightened and 
A lot of the work which Janet did in therapy seems to have been done with 
dreams. Ge:o.--talt therapy firstly helped her to accept her dreams, and then 
it also helped her, through the dream analysis, to 
herself that had been denied up to that time. 
accept and own parts of 
The dreams lured her 
"forward in an exploration that was s=ldom what I expected, often 
unpleasant, but never unsatisfying" (57). The dreams seemed to her to link 
the present with the past, showing her how her current conflicts had 
emerged from her past (58). The work with dreams also encouraged her not 
to hold onto herself, but rather to sacrifice her limited self s:J as to move 
into a world in which feelings could be expressed and conflicts worked 
through. Thus Gestalt therapy work with dreams helped Janet to develop a 
broader sense of self (60,61). 
The group work of the Gestalt approach also helped her in that it convinced 
her that her hidden feelings were not too shameful to express (62). 
Through the groups she was able to move beyond the many "oughts" which 
had governed and limited her life, and was able to be more spontaneous 
(63). In general. the Gestalt therapy helped her to accept the child in her 
(65). 
The second approach which she met up with was Transactional Analysis. 
Whereas the Gestalt therapy helped her to accept feelings, TA helped her 
to express these feelings more creatively and appropriately. TA provided 
Janet with a way of reviewing and changing her relationships with others 
(64), and particularly her relationship with her father (6S-71). The TA 
model allowed her to see her relationship with her parents in a new light. 
She came to see that her parents had supported her and cared for her, but 
that the problem had come in the communicating of that care. It. had been 
comunicated in such a way that she was unable to see it (68). This new 
way of seeing the relationship made for a dramatic change in her way of 
relating to them. 
The third kind of therapy \~hich Janet used was Bioenergetics. This 
encouraged her to be more expressive todily, especially with respect to 
anger, and it helped her to have confidence in her appearance. The 
breathing techniques enabled her to feel 'centred', stable and at peace. 
However, all of the benefits of Bioenergetics, and of TA, presupposed the 
changes that were possible through Gestalt therapy (75). 
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Following her rape, Janet was once again able to accept herself and was 
able to cope with what had happened to her (84), even being able to see it 
in a positive light (85), by the support of her fellow-workers, who helped 
her to regain her self-esteem (86), amd by being a member of a group 
within which she =u1d express all the deep feelings which she was 
experiencing (85). 
Stage 6: Reintegration 
Janet's reintegration is seen in various things. Firstly, she is able, finally, 
to identify her feelings, trust them and express them in appropriate ways 
which still aJJow her to express her point of view (75). Secondly, her 
ability to cope is seen in her moving towns without undue worry (76). It is 
alm seen in her committment to a creative relationship with her husband 
(76). The fact that she was able to work through the implications of her 
rape alm shows her ability to face and work through issues in a way which 
she was not able to before her therapy. 
A very good =nclusion to this discussion of Janet's protocol is a quote 
from the protocol itself: 
Looking back over the time I have spent in therapy, 
the best analogy I can think of to describe my 
experiences is that of a chick trying to break out of 
his egg. I reached the point where my "egg" was 
cramped instead of cozy, stifling instead of secure. My 
therapists gave me the tools to break the shelL the 
encouragement to 1=k around in my brand new, scary, 
enormous world, and the often-repeated statement that 
I had done it myself. 
I did a lot of chirping and ran around exploring my new 
environment. After a while, however, I made the 
inevitable and discouraging discovery that all I had 
been "born" into was a larger "egg". And the whole 
process of change started over again. I was anxious, 
tried to shore up my defences, convincing myself that 
what I had found in my new way of living was really 
all there was, all I needed. But the feeling that there 
was more persisted, and the frustration and curiosity in 
me built to the point where 11=ked for new tools and 
chipped away at my new "shell". I don't know how 
many times I went through this during my years of 
therapy, but I am finally at the point of accepting the 
limits of the "egg" I live in, and the changes have 
become modifications instead of "breaking out" 
experiences (88-95). 
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Dialogue with Beutler 
If we consider Beutler's discussion of Janet's protocol we see similar 
problems to his discussions of the two previous subjects. Although he points 
to a core conflict of separation versus attechment, he never attempts to 
see how this develDped, and how it is a way of living out the situation in 
which Janet found herself. Beutler seems at most to suggest that Janet's 
conflict was a learned habit that was exerting some kind of causal influence 
on her life. This attitude is seen in his reference to responses. He never 
attempts to see how Janet is acting within certain circumstances and in 
terms of the rerources available to her, but rather sees her as determined 
by the environment in which she lives. 
In addition one can trace an almost judgemental attitude in Beutler's 
discussion. This attitude is that which does not take Janet's world 
seriously, and which enlists technological mystification in the place of real 
understanding. The following quote from Beutler illustrates this point: 
..• the effort to stay distant from her parents, coupled 
with her obvious longings suggest that her avoidance 
was an apparent counterphobic response to ungratified 
attachment and dependency needs (p.197). 
In this quote there is no attempt to understand the world which makes 
Janet adopt the coping strategies which she does, and in the place of an 
understanding, there is merely an almost tautologous naming of the obvious 
components of Janet's core conflict. The discussion of the process of 
therapy continues in a similar vein: 
••. therapist directed emotional escalation and awareness 
procedures seem to have been satisfactorily followed by 
a cognitive and perceptual change methodology in the 
form of Transactional Analysis (p.201). 
This shows a failure to understand the meaning of the therapy for the 
client. The discussion does not attempt to relate the therapy method used 
to the client's experience of the therapy, but rather looks at the therapy in 
terms of a cognitive behavioural model which leaves no place for 
experience. 
This concludes the discussion of the protocols given in Beutler's book. The 
following subject is a subject whom I approached for a protocol. Under 
each heading my initial analysis is given, followed by amplification given by 
the subject in the folloW-Up interview. 
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3.2.4 SUBJECT 4: DENIS: Grouping of meaning "units according to the modeL 
Pllase l! Normality 
Stage 1: Motivations 
In his early life, Denis was taught very specific ways of expressing emotions 
(11). He was taught that there are "right" and "wrong" ways of expressing 
oneself (13). His life experiences were such that he was strongly motivated 
to live out these particular injunctions. In the follow-up he described how 
he actively built up a shell during his early years. This began, he said, 
when he was 5t years old. His parents were quarrelling, and his mother 
decided to leave. He remembers clinging onto her, pleading with her not to 
leave. She, preoccupied, could not hear this plea. From then on he 
increasingly cut himself off from the world in which he was living. Later 
problems with his father only furthered this initial retreat into his shell. 
Before this particuJar incident, he felt that "the world was fine". 
Stage 2: Not-Knowing 
Because of the kind of experiences which Denis was denied, he grew up not 
knowing the full richness of life. He was, consequently, before entering 
therapy, very unflexible bodily (this is evidenced in his inability to type [5]), 
and was unable to cry because of the physical pain that this entailed (7). 
What emotion he did express was stilted and not genuine (9,11). He 
describes himself as being "tight, uncertain, stiff, constricted - the robot 
man" (15). In the follow-up he expressed this by saying that in order to 
shut off to his mother, he also shut off many other things, important 
aspects of his life. 
phase TI: Neurosis 
Stage 3: Challenges 
Ie seems that increasingly the adequacy of this rigid lifestyle for meeting 
:.'1e fullness of life was challenged by life happenings themselves. It seems 
:.'1a:: more and more Denis was unable to meet life in this inflexible way. 
An example of this would be his wanting and needing to cry, but being 
".mahle to do SO (7). These challenges seem to have come up gradually, and 
i~ seems that Denis experienced a growing sense of dissatisfaction with this 
'Norld. 
L-1 :he follow-up, Denis described how this dissatisfaction came to a head 
"Nhen he was faced with the necessity of changing if he was to be able to 
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practise in his cho92n profession, and if he was to be able to take part in 
life a t all. This crisis can be 92en as the culmination of the gradual 
challenging that had been going on up to this time. 
Stage 4(a): A voidance 
In the same way that the challenges to Denis were gradual. so too was his 
avoidance of the92. This meant that his avoidance was more an 
unawareness of the fullness of life and a reluctance to consider changes 
(ie. rigidity) (5,7,9,11). It seems that eventually, however, he came to 
realise that the life he was living was an avoidance of his full 
potentialities, and he came to 92e that his life was "a death within with a 
painted shell outside" (22). 
Stage 4(b): Despair 
This fraud of a life could now no Jonger satisfy him, and he then moved 
into a time of despair during which he reali92d the extent of his emptiness. 
He describes his life at this stage as being "a black hole of endless night 
with no stars by which I could chart my way out" (22). In the fallow-up it 
transpired that this time of despair was the time when, having rea1j92d the 
extent to which his life was limited, and having decided that he had to 
. change if he was to be able to continue living, he feared that there was no 
way III which he could make the necessary changes in his life. 
paradoxically, however, it seems that this despair opened the way for a 
very creative therapy. 
Pha92 III: Creativity 
Stage 5: Re-symbolisation 
The therapy that Denis received enabled him to see himself in a new way, a 
way that enabled him to be who he was "before things went wrong" (18). 
The changes that took place were very gradual (1), but he felt all the time 
that he was returning to a way of living which he had Jost (4,18). More 
particularly, the therapy helped him to see emotions as acceptable, and also 
as many-sided. He was thus able to live his life in a much more free and 
flexible way (12). Although he 92eS therapy as being an ongoing task 
(14,19,23), Denis sees that his therapy provided him with the possibility of 
living his life in a different way to the way in which he was living prior to 
therapy (16,17,19). The therapy provided him with a ba92 from which to 
start exploring new ways of living (25). 
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In the folio w-up, Denis p:llilted to the relationship with the therapist as 
being the central means by which therapy was successfuL The Eecurity of 
the relationship allowed him to risk expressing what he had previously 
considered unsafe to express, and it allowed him to go back, with the 
therapb-t.'s support, to examine the motivations that led him to narrow down 
his world 00 much. 
Stage 6: Reintegration 
Fallowing his therapy, Denis is able to be involved with his world in a new 
and exciting way. In fact, he maintains that others have probably noticed 
the changes in him more than he has himself (2). This points to the fact 
that Denis is now much more ill relationship with his world than before. 
This is alro s=en in his new-found zest for living (21,23,24). More 
specifically, he is much more flexible b:xilly (6), is able to cry more freely 
(8), and is able to be open and flexible in the expression of emotions (9). 
He is now able "to risk, to dare to reach out, to be me - in the faith that 
even though the outcome is not guaranteed, it will work out" (20). 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
The overall aim of the empirical phase of this thesis was to examine the 
adequacy of the model arrived at in chapter 2. From the analysis of the 
protocols, it would appear that this framework is sufficient for analysing 
clients' retrospective experience of therapy. The model provided a useful 
way of grouping and understanding the meanings expressed by the subjects, 
a way which Subject 4, in the follDw-up interview, said was an adequate 
rendering of his experince. 
Although this empirical research started out with a particular model as the 
means of analysis, and as such could not accurately be termed 
"p..'1enomenological", there is a high degree of phenomenological accuracy to 
the findings. If we compare these findings to those of Eppel (1980) , who 
used a "j?JI"e" phenomenological research method, it transpires that there are 
many commonalities. 
Eppel describes therapy as an invitation into a life-long process of Ie-
owning possibilities. This process begins with the pain and confusion of 
se1f-confrontation. There is a fear of new freedoms, and a desire for some 
kind of definiteness. Gradually there comes the realisation that there can 
be no real fixity, and that there is a need to continually work to keep 
oneself open to possibilities. The therapist is experienced by the client, 
according to Eppel, as opening ways for the client to realise possibilities. 
The therapist does not force choices, but rather leads the client to making 
choices by providing a warm and supportive relationship. 
What Eppel describes seems to correspond to stages 4(a), 4(b), 5 and 6 of 
my model. The client moves from attempted avoidance, to confrontation 
and despair, to re-;;ymbolisation and reintegration through the therapeutic 
relationship. Eppel never discusses the aspect of why the client is in 
therapy at an. but implicit in his essential description is the idea that 
certain of the client's possibilities for relating to the world have become 
limited. In order to demonstrate further the phenomenological accuracy of 
my model. let us consider in more detail the points of intersection of these 
two descriptions. 
Stage 4(a) as we have seen is the stage of the client's attempting to avoid 
the challenges which a world of unlimited possibilities poses to a limited 
world-view, and 4(b) is the stage of despair at the realisation of this 
limitedness. Eppel describes similar experiences which his subject had, this 
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description seeming to capture the client's transition from avoidance to 
despair. 
Initially the client experiences the pain of self-
confrontation and tile ccnfusion as to the direction of 
therapy. While there is a longing for growth, there is 
als::J a desperate fear of growth -the fear of unfamiliar 
freedom and openness of being and the desire to remain 
within the familiar but encapsulated security of her 
unhappiness or reduced work! openness. Thus the 
confusion as to what to do in therapy and how to do it 
and the avoidance or denial of those areas of her life 
that she cannot face. But at the time, the client is 
not fully a'vare of her avoidance of her life situation 
(pp.191-192). 
The avoidance is als::J seen in the refusal of the client to take responsibility 
for her own life. She initially hopes that the therapy can give her 
something definite on which to base her life, but gradually comes to realise 
that "the answers lie within herself, that life is unpredictable and that she 
has to learn to live with the security of insecurity" (p.192). 
The stage of re-symbolisation, stage 5, is the stage whereby the client is 
enabled to di.sccver a way of living which is more inclusive of p::lssibilities. 
Eppel describes therapy as "the medium through which [the client] unfolds 
the meaning structures of her existence and gets to know herself" (p.190). 
Eppel al.s:l p::lints to the importance of the relationship between therapist 
and client as the means by which this takes place. 
In the struggle towaros the development of courage to 
confront all p::lssibilities of her existence, the 
relationship with the therapist is experienced by the 
client as cruciaL within the safe enccunter of this 
relationship, the client experiences the therapist as 
providing the framework within which she can explore 
her life (p.192). 
Thus the relationship with the therapist not only gives 9.1pport, but it al.s:l 
9.1ggests some directions in which the client can start to move. 
The final stage, that of reintegration, ccrresponds to what Eppel describes 
as the client "learning to confront all that 'speaks' to her in the work!" 
(p.190). He goes on to say that this is 
a vital stimulating phase in her life's jJumey 
towards the discovery and experiencing of herself as a 
whole being, experiencing herself in and through her 
body, living and relating authenticaly to her work! 
(p.190). 
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Thus we can say that this approach is adequate for accurately representing 
the experiences of clients in therapy. This covers the first aim of this 
study, namely to present a model of therapy that is based on the experience 
of clients in therapy. 
The aim of this part:icuJar chapter is mainly to clarify the relationship of 
this phenomenologically accurate, but Jargely non-p:ilitical data to the more 
overtly p:ilitical intentions of critical psychology. This is an attempt to 
show how the model can also be shown to take the sxial context into 
account, and thus relates to the second broad aim of the thesis as a whole. 
However, it is necessary first to consider rome interesting points that 
emerged in the analysis of the protocols. 
4.1 Some L"lteresting points: 
This research raises several llteresting points that give some insights into 
the practice of psychotherapy. 
A first point to note is that there seems to be a need for some kind of 
decision by the client before r~mbolisation and reintegration can take 
place successfuJly. The protocol given by Bill is a good example of this. 
Before his therapy could finally be successfuL Bill had to realise that he 
had failed in trying to live his life according to a part:icuJar pattern, and 
that it needed considerable re-working if he was ever to be happy. This 
implies that r~ml::olisation can only take place if the client in rome sense 
realises a need for a change, and is prepared to go through the pain and 
suffering entailed in making that change. This seems to ruggest that the 
therapist can only: (i) provide a secure relationship within which the client 
can face the challenges; (ill re-state the challenges in a way which might 
make them seem less threatening to the client; I::oth of these approaches by 
the merapist would facilitate the client's making a decision; or (iii) if the 
client has already corne to a decision, then the therapist can offer a way 
of living that opens up previously c1osed-off possibilities. 
If \;·e see therapy in this way, then it means that me role of the therapist 
is that of facilitator rather than healer. The responsibility for the change 
is t..'1e client's, only the means by which that change takes place being 
provided by the therapist. So we can see therapy, then, as the providing of 
;;ays by which people wishing to re-organise their lives can syml::olise and 
live out those changes. 
This realisation that the burden of therapy is not the therapist's allows us 
t::l see "spontaneous remission" as a less damning phenomenon than Eysenck 
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and others op[lOsed to the therapeutic endeavour would hold it to be. 
S[lOntaneous re mission is merely what happens when peo[ll.e, having decided 
to change their lives, have available to them other ways than therapy by 
which they can themselves r~-ymtolise their lives. Thus S[lOntanecus 
remission, rather than showing that therapy is useless and unnecessary, 
shows that therapy is one way amongst many in which peo[ll.e are able to 
re-syml::olise their lives, and so reintegrate themselves more successfully into 
their society. 
The implication of this is that therapy is not rome causally operative 
process which either does or does not work. Further, it implies that there 
can never be a single "right" way of doing therapy. Rather, the implication 
is that therapy can take place by a number of ways, and that the relative 
effectiveness of these will always depend on the particular client who is 
seeking therapy, and on the way in which the client's life engages with that 
of the therapist. 
This raises another interesting point. It might be argued that the protocols 
used here do not reflect the client's self-understanding so much as that 
·"hich the therapb-t foisted on the unsuspecting client. In other words, it 
might be argued that the protocols are merely fust person case histories, as 
biased as the therapist's view of what was happening in the client's life. 
This argument can be answered by refering to a point made above. If it is 
accepted that therapy is ultimately 1:.'1e client's responsibility, and if it is 
accepted that the therapist facilitates change by offering a new way for 
the client to see him/herseli, then it can be seen that it is inevitable that 
6e therapist's :)ligon will "contaminate" the client's self-understanding. 
This is, then, not something to be avoided, as this is the very stuff of 
t:herapy. This is the point that Barton (1974) is making when he says that 
The fact that the therapist has a way to help - an 
orientation that is more or less convincing to, and 
liveable by, both therapist and patient - is therefore 
essential to the therapeutic process (p.237). 
So ""hat is important is to understand how the therapist's understanding is 
able to help the client come to a new self-understanding and self-
=xpression. 
A further interesting observation that emerges from the analysis of the 
;;rotocols is that the process of therapy is not a straightforward one. 
Although the broad themes represented by the seven stages of the model 
'"ere found to be roughly sequential, this sequence takes place on many 
-91-
different levels at the same time. This IS because the therapist tries to 
deal with more than one aspect: of the client's life at anyone time, and 
the different aspects are differently developed. Thus while one aspect 
(probably that for which the client seeks treatment) is being re-symbolised, 
another might onJ:j be at the ,mnt of being challenged. Since human 
existence is an integrated whole, it might be more accurate to suggest that 
the re-symbolisation of one aspect might in fact necessitate a challenge to 
another aspect. This would explain the feeling, cogently expressed by a 
friend, that "you go into therapy for one problem, and then discover that 
you've got a whole lot more!". 
An example of this differential development can be s=en in Lynne's 
protocoL It seems that although she has overcome much of her avoidance 
of the world, facing the consequent despair and then re-symbolising her life, 
she is still ill at ease with the whole area of intimacy and sexuality. She 
is very reticent about her relationship with her "very good friend", and is, 
presumably, also somewhat reticent in the relationship itself. This 
avoidance could be challenged in further therapy, and she could be 
encouraged to face the emergent issues, thereby allowing a re-symbolisation 
of this aspect of her existence as welL 
There is another aspect of the model that the protocols ' show to be very 
complex. This is the relationship between the challenges, avoidance and 
despair. For rome it seems that the therapy helps the client to overcome 
avoidance by re-stating the challenges in a more acceptable way. The 
despair then fo1lows this. For others it seems that the therapy only starts 
when the clients have reached a stage of despair on their own and have 
overcome their avoidance already. What is important to note here is that 
the model does not pescribe when therapy should take place. Thus, therapy 
can start at almost any stage, as long as the therapist bears in mind what 
it is that the client needs at each stage. So, if the client is still avoiding 
the issues, then therapy needs to explore the challenges and show the client 
that these challenges are not as devastating as is imagined. If the client is 
de~g, then the therapy needs to provide the client with a concrete 
way of living that opens up new possibilities. 
In general, we can say that the points that this research raises cast doubt 
on the traditional therapist-centered way of Eeeing therapy, and show the 
importance of looking at the meaning of therapy to the client. This 
research points to the importance of the therapist adopting the role of 
facilitator, rather than healer. The therapist facilitates a re-symbolisation 
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by representing new ways in which clients can live their lives. This re-
syml::olisation takes [llace sequentially according to the structure of therapy 
given in the model al::ove, but different aspects of a client's existence might 
be at different stages of the model. 
It is now possible to consider these findings in relation to the critical 
emphasis outlined above. 
4.2 The Relationship between "Pure" and Critical Therapy: 
The question now arises of how these findings can &lpport a critical 
psychotherapy. The &lbjects used in this study seemed to emerge from 
therapy largely uncritical of their social context. Although Lynne (&lbject 
1) was able to question her overly socialised self-concept, and although 
Janet (&lbject 3) was able to move away from rigid gender-roles, these can 
hardly be seen as maPr political triumphs. For Denis (&lbject 4), nothing of 
a political nature ,vas raised by therapy, and on the negative side, we can 
perhaps even see Bill's therapy as merely enabling him to give up being a 
hippie S) that he can once more take part effectivelY in supporting a 
fundamentally exploitative capitalist system. How do these findings, then, 
support a model for a critical psychotherapy? 
A first point to note in this regard is that all therapy is in S)me way 
politicaL This can be demonstrated fairly easily. Even by trying to be 
neucral by keeping to "pure psychotherapy", one is implicitly supporting the 
status quo. Bishop Desmond Tutu (1985) points to a similar phenomenon. 
His critics claim that he mixes religion and politics. To this he replies 
that, were he to start &lpporting government policy, he would cease to be 
accused of making this mix. His implication here is that religion and 
politics are already inextricably mixed. In a similar way, therapy and 
politics are alro inevitaby linked. Halleck (1971), addressing psychiatrists, 
expresses this idea clearly: 
There is a strange and unfortunate tendency among 
psychiatrists to believe that professional activities 
designed to change the status quo are political. and 
activities tending to strenghten the status quo are 
medical or neutraL This kind of thinking is illogicaL 
By reinforcing the position of those who hold power, 
the psychiatrist is committing a political act whether 
he intends it or rot (p.36). 
Halleck goes on to criticise the views of Wertham, Laing and Szasz who, he 
says, only talk about the politically harmful effects of unsolicited 
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psychotherapy. He maintains that all psychotherapy, even voluntary therapy, 
or r;>articuJarly voluntary therapy, can be jJolitically damaging. For Halleck, 
psychotherapy starts with the therapist taking some stand, whether that 
stand is the so-ca1Jed "neutral" one, or a more jJoliticised one. 
Thus, what Halleck maintains is that all psychotherapy is political, whether 
it knows it or not. What this means is that the therapb't must make 
hi.dher jJolitical stand clear from the start of therapy. This allows the 
client to choose whether or not to follow the path offered by the therapist. 
Without making liliVher values explicit, the therapist is open to being 
criticised for being an indoctrinator of liliVher clients. 
There is a problem with this notion of the client choosing whether or not 
to go along with the therapist's values. People in a desperate state will, 
possibly, go along with anything that is offered them. 
place the onus of avoiding indoctrination on the client? 
be countered by maintaining that, although this approach 
Is it fair, then, to 
This argument can 
might be unfair, it 
is, however, still better than pretending objectivity while actually upholding 
a certain set of values. The problem with "objectivity" is that it attempts 
to justify being judgemental by reference to the "truth". A view which, on 
the other hand, takes a specific stand, is less judgemental, as it based on 
the notion that there is no one correct answer to any problem. At least a 
therapist who takes a stand has considered the implications of what is 
happening in the therapy. In any event, what is certain is that there can 
never be a value-free psychotherapy. The best compromise, therefore, seems 
to be to make the values being upheld explicit. 
What does this mean in practice? It means that as part of therapy the 
therapist will challenge the socio-political rigidities of the client. This 
might involve questioning sexist or racist prejudices, or alternatively it 
could entail the challenging of people to move beyond the limited and 
negative self-concepts imposed on them by sexist or racist societies. This 
socio-jJolitical challenging will, however, be in addition to the challenging of 
other rigidities which occurs in conventional psychotherapy, and, as with 
conventional therapy, this challenging will be geared to the r;>articuJar life-
situation of the client. 
If we return now to the question which prompted this discussion, namely 
tJlat of how the findings are able to support a model for a critical 
psychotherapy, we can say that these findings are supportive in a negative 
way. By applying the model to the protocols, we can point to the fai.1ure 
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of the various therapies described in the protocols to address the question 
of the clients' relationships to their roci.al context. Thus we can say that 
the findings do point to the political nature of psychotherapy in that they 
point to the implicit 9J.pport given by the various therapists for the status 
quo. 
This di.scu5sion leads to the conclusion that if a model of - therapy is to be 
accurate, then it cannot have liberation as a necessary component. From 
the data we can see that therapy does not necessarily liberate in a s0cio-
political way, or in any specific way, for that matter. Rather, a model of 
therapy must hold out liberation as a possibility that either is or is not 
realised with respect to various aspects of a client's life. Thus, for 
therapy to liberate in a socio-p;:Jlitical way, there needs to be an explicit 
working towards that goal by the therapist and the client. 
De Boer (1983) expresses this idea when he critici,.,s Habermas for 
ontologising liberation in his discussion of PSYchoanalysis. For Habermas, all 
psychoanalytic therapy is necessarily liberating, as it gives the patient 
autonomy and the freedom to choose. Saying this, however, assumes that 
total emancipation is possible, that one can be quite free of any point of 
vie Iv. It also assumes that this goal of autonomy is sllfficient in itself as a 
basis for ethical decisions. As De Boer points out, however, Psychoanalysis 
cannot hope to be value-free, and it cannot generate its own set of values. 
Quite clearly there can be both good and bad forms of autonomy. 
Therefore, De Boer maintains, it is necessary for the individual therapist to 
adopt a point of view. In formulating a point of view, De Boer continues, 
.•. all we can do is trust in the dowsing-rod of 
conscience, which is at the same time an antenna for 
utopia and a metaphysical desire. conscience, 
unfortunately, all too often is viewed as a moral yard-
stick for bourgecis morality. But, as con-science it is 
really shared knowledge; it is the most passive and 
therefore the most original capacity of man, the most 
receptive one and therefore the most creative one. 
There the Good is "seen", where our self-€vidence and 
calculations generally don't expect to find it, or where 
they hide it ideologically (p.180). 
The implication of this is that being critical involves approaching the client 
in a spirit of openness. It involves working with the client in terms of the 
possibilities that &'he could realise if it were not for certain b1=ks to 
growth. What this study has tried to show is that an important source of 
blocks to growth is the roci.al context in which pecp1e find themselves. 
Thus it is at this point that the two streams of thought undedying this 
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study, namely Existential-Phenomenol.cgy, and Critical Theory, come 
together. Being critical involves adopting the attitude of exi.stential-
phenome nol.cgy, what De Boer calls con-science, and being fully open to the 
client's possibilities, as existential-phenomenology would have it, involves 
taking the social context into account. 
In conclusion, then, we can say that this study has formulated a model of 
psychotherapy which both preserves the exi.stential-phenomenol.cgical attempt 
to view the client in terms of h:iE/her possibilities, and also makes possible 
the taking of a critical stand with respect to the power of the sxio-
political context in influencing how a client's possibilities are lived out. 
Thus this study has provided a general framework \~ithin which a 
phenomenol.cgically-based critical psychotherapy is possible. The ultimate 
value of this model can only be ascertained through its app1lcaticn and 
impJ.ementaticn by therapists and clients, and by their contributicn to 
subsequent research. 
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APPENDIX: PROTOCOLS IN FULL 
Subj::ct 1: Lynne 
(1) My name is Lynne Ellen, stanley, and I was rom 31 years ago. In the 
first 20 years of my life, I was a Brownie, a Girl Scout, and a rorority 
member. I was a beauty contest winner, an honor roll student, and a 
campus officer. I am a daughter, a sister, a lover, and a friend. I am talL 
selfish, slender, happy, generous, sad, and agoraphobic. 
(2) Agoraphobia is a fear of travelling any distance from the safety of 
home and a fear of crowded places. That is the definition, but that does 
not describe what being agoraphobic is. 
At my worst, I had trouble getting up the courage to walk out the door of 
my house. I can remember when a walk to the corner (about eight houses 
from mine) was an ordeal, and a walk around the block was not only 
impossible but unthinkable. Just thinring about those feats produces 
tension, tears, shaking, knots in my stomach. In the doing, I experience all 
those things plus rubbery legs and a feeling that I can't breathe. Rather 
than subj::ct my body and my mind to all those feelings, I prefer to stay 
home. 
I have not traveled more than 20 miles from my home in the past ten years. 
The last football game I attended in a stadium was over five years ago. 
The last time I rode in an elevator was three ago. The last time I was 
downtown (eight miles and 20 minutes by freeway) was nine years ago. 
The last time I flew in a plane was 12 years ago, and the last time I rode 
in a bus was over 13 years ago. You name it, I haven't done it in the last 
ten years. 
(3) I read once that by admitting you had an emotional problem you had 
licked 50 % of the problem. If that is the case, I have been 50 % =ed 
from the very first. Admitting I had a problem was relatively easy in 
comparison to getting help for my particuJar affliction. 
My problem is not unique. I understand that it is quite common. I have 
read that there are two million agoraphobics in the united states alone and 
many more world-wide. The reason no one knows arout us is that we stay 
home - we're afraid to go out. We are ashamed and embarrassed about our 
problem because it is ro difficult to explain and to understand. 
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(4) In my senior year of college, I experienced an emotional upheaval which 
left me ten pounds lighter, continually tearful. and fearful of travelling any 
distance at alL I know now that what I had was a severe anxiety attack, 
coming several months after my grandmother died, my boyfriend entered the 
Army, my parent's marriage collapsed, and my family transferred to another 
city. I didn't know then what an anxiety attack was, and it scared me. 
(5) Neither my parents nor I had any idea what had happened, but we 
agreed that I was ill.. The family physician diagnosed my trouble as 
mononucleosis and prescribed bed rest and Librium. I felt that there was 
something else wrong, but he never said anything about an emotional 
problem. 
None of the medical doctors I have seen have been impressed with my 
diagnosis for why I was afraid of mental state. 
everything. 
Each doctor had one 
I was tested for sugar diabetes, hypoglycemia, thyroid 
imbalance, smallpox, heart irregularities, inner-ear imbalances, polio. When 
the test results came back and there was nothing physically wrong with me, 
then the physician dismissed me. Of the seven physicians I have seen, only 
one referred me to a psychiatrist. I received diagnoses like: "You worry 
to much." ''It's a phase you're going through." "Everyone has to do things 
they don't like to do." Who was I to question a DOCTOR? I was only 21 
years ald, just out of college. 
I would take a new prescription for tranquilizers or sedatives and be sent 
on my way. I seemed to be the only one who thought that a 21-year-old 
woman who needed to take four Valium a day to function was a little 
strange. 
(6) It was several years before I realized that I know my own body and 
mind better than anyone else, that it is my business to be an informed 
patient and to question and to try to understand why a particular treatment 
or test is being used. 
(7) After two years of coping with fear of everything, I contacted a 
psychiatrist myself. I think I looked in the yellow pages of the phone book. 
Unfortunately, the man I chose turned out to be weirder than I thought I 
was. In his waiting room, he had a group of humanoid figures in purple, 
orange, white, yellow, and blue. These figures were grouped in a circle 
staring down at an egg in the center of the circle. That should have given 
me a clue of some kind. 
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The decoration of any room reflects the perronality of its owner. Of you 
oouJd s=e my living room right now, you wouJd probably laugh.) This 
psychiatrist's waiting room was paneled in dark wood and not well lit. My 
mind was a1= dark and not well illuminated. Was his mind a1=? And who 
were those egg figures? I oouldn't ide ntify with them. CouJd Identify 
with the man who allowed them in his waiting room? 
The only session with the "egg-figures psychiatrist" I remember was about 
my handwriting which is very large. I understood him to say that I might 
change my personality and thus my life if I oouJd make my handwriting 
smaller. I sure tried for a week and all I got was a cramp in my hand and 
no great changes in my life. Meanwhile, I trudged five flights of stairs 
once a week to his office because I was afraid to ride the elevator. I 
don't know if I tolrl him that or not, but I did tell his receptionist, a 
chubby, bespeckled, grandmotherly sort who did me more good than he did. 
She served me warmth and affection. She s=emed to care. I never felt he 
did. 
The doctor and I never achieved anything resembling rapport and I decided 
for the money , I couJd do without him and his egg people. I still didn't 
know what was wrong with me. 
(8) In the course of consuJting for a very bad cold, I tolrl him I had 
developed a fear of rain and was very depressed. 
"Oh!" Dr. M. exclaimed, my ex-wife was just like you!" 
Anyway, he gave me a prescription for sinequan and tolrl me it took the 
place of electro-shock therapy. His verbal prescription was to make no big 
decisions for the next two weeks. within two weeks, I had put on ten 
pounds, stopped shaking as much as I had been, gave up my apartment and 
moved back horne with my mother. 
(9) Within the year, I felt that I needed some professional counselling again, 
and Dr M. recommended Dr T, a calm, soft-spoken psychiatrist. 
I talked to Dr. T. and he listened for one hour a week for a whole year. 
He prescribed tranquilizers which I took religiously. I remember telling him 
that I understood how the thing was supposed to work: I talked, he listened, 
and somewhere in there I was to come to some conclusions about myself and 
my life and with new understanding make the necessary changes. However, 
I didn't s=em to be doing that; none of what I was saying and feeling was 
making much sense to me; no pattern was apparent to me. I felt I needed 
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some guidance, a more directional approach. I do rememter his response, 
but notlUng changed. 
(10) I was not getting better or even different. I was getting worse. The 
tranquilizers - Librium, valium, Sinequan - which had enabled me to function 
enough to teach school for four years, to live by myself ill an apartment 
for a year, and to attempt something of a social life were no longer 
effective. Eventually, the five mg. of Valium that I was taking four times 
a day did nothing but dissolve me into tears. So, Dr. T.changed my 
tranquilizers to Mel.JariL 
I took a pill in the morning and fainted. I took a pill after lunch and 
fainted. I called the pharmacist who suggested that I not take any more 
and call my doctor. Dr T. suggested that instead of continuing with the 
Mellaril I shou1d start taking eight Valium a day. I was in a very poor 
mental and physical condition, but I had enough presence of mind to say, 
"Dr. T, I am 24 years old. If I have to take eight tranquilizers a day to 
function, then I won't function!" 
I stopped taking any medication, and I stopped going. I took a leave of 
absence from my teaching positon and took to bed where I remained for 
several weeks, afraid to leave it to do more than go to the bathroom. At 
night, I couldn't sleep and wouJd cry until the early hours of the mornings 
when I fell asleep through sheer exhaustion. In the mornings when I opened 
my eyes, my whole txxiy wouJd tense, my stomach wouJd contract. Tears 
formed in my eyes and I wouJd lie there afraid, pulling the covers over my 
head. I lived in fear this way for the better part of two months. 
(11) I talked to Dr. T. on the phone once more during this time - I couldn't 
travel to his office now. He said that I had quit my :pb so that I wouldn't 
have any money to pay him so that I wouJdn't be able to see him any more 
and then I wouldn't have to talk about sex. That mayor may not have 
been the case with my subconscious, but sex was the furthest thing from my 
mind. And I still didn't know what was wrong with me. 
(12) One morning, although I still woke up tense and afraid, I decided I did 
not want to spend the rest of my life in my nightown in my bed in my 
room in my mother's house. I knew that even if I were afraid to go out of 
the house, I ought to be able to do something in the house. So that 
morning I made myself some rules. I moved my television out of my 
bedroom and into the den. I told myself that I couJd watch as much 
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television (the plug-in drug) as I wanted but not in my bedroom where I 
would be tempted to stay in ted. I told myself that I would get up every 
morning, wash my face, brush my teeth, get dresred, and eat breakfast. 
Those were simple enough rules, and I had oome activities to occupy my 
mind the first moments of the day. Whatever else happened during the day, 
I had accomplished those few tasks, and that made me feel good. 
As time passed, I created other rules for myself and began to set small 
goals. Some were more difficu]J: than others for me to achive, but I kept 
trying. I tried to read oomething inspiring or uplifting every day which led 
me to some fine books. 
(13) I tried to keep a :pumal of my feelings and thoughts which led to my 
writing oome poetry which I had never done before. (14) I still amuse my 
friends and relatives with my verse. 
(15) I also figured that if I couldn't quite get my emotions in shape, I could 
get my body in shape. I started doing four simple exercises every evening 
before I went to bed. I began to sleep better and I began to look better 
and to develop some stamina. Once I felt better physically, I volunteered 
to keep the house clean and cook the evening meals for Mother and me. 
(16) Once I began to feel comfortable in the house, I set my sights and 
goals outside the house. A small task was the beginning: walk to the 
corner of the street and back. I took it literally and figuratively in small 
steps. Not only did I make it to the comer, but working at it the same 
way, I made it round the block! 
My dearest friend gave me a bicycle for Christmas and I rode it every day. 
I mean, I rode it ~ day in all kinds of weather - sun, rain, and once 
even in sleet! I rode it over the neighbourhood and worked towards and 
accomplished a bicycle trip to the store. 
Then, I found the courage to drive my car again and told myself that I 
would drive to a store every day and get out and go inside. I didn't have 
to buy anything; I just had to make myself go inside and I did. 
The hardest continuous thing I did was go grocery shopping. I chose a 
small grocery store and I elected to go on Thursjays. Every Thur!rlay, I 
would wake up with tears in my eyes, knowing that this was the day I made 
the trip to the grocery store. I would pace around the house and cry, 
trying to get up the courage to go out the door, get in the car, and drive 
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down the street to the store. I would not give up on myself and eventually 
I would make the move out the door and into the car. I would cry all the 
way to the store. Once inside, I would stop crying, but while I was 
shopping, I would get scared and want to rush out of the store and race 
home. I never did, though. I just kept telling myself to keep shopping, 
slowly and steadily. I was always very pleased with myself when I returned 
home with the groceries, and I was always exhausted. I went through the 
same routine many, many weeKS before I started taking grocery shopping as 
a matter of course. 
(17) Families sometimes do not understand an emotional illnes and mine is no 
exception. (18) My parent's marriage was falling apart when I arrived home 
from college in the throes of emotional trauma, and I was overlooked. If 
either of my folks had taken me in tow and found the help I needed then, I 
wouldn't be writing all of this nQ'.V. I am bitter about the lack of support 
from them, but as my mother so often told me, they did what they thought 
was best at the time. 
(19) Mother, at least put me in touch with her lawyer who in addition to 
handling mes,,--y divorce cases and working with alcoholics, did psychological 
counselling. It was a strange arrangement from the beginning. 
Because I was relatively homebound, Dr. (of what I don't know) G. said he 
would come out to the house. He came by or called on an irregular basis. 
I never knew when to expect him. More often than not, he wouk! arrive in 
the middle of the day when I was alone, on his way to some place else, or 
he wouk! call me at 10:30 at night to talk to me. He loaded me down with 
mimeographed sheets listing his rules for living and told me to read and 
study them. He refused to set any fees for his counselling. 
I ro desperately wanted help that I went along with this unorthodox method 
of treatment. I figured that my strange affliction required strange 
treatment. It made me uneasy for him to arrive without prior notice when I 
was alone, and it made uneasy when he hugged me before he left. He 
encouraged me to lean on him, to trust him. He explained that because he 
wasn't charging me for his services, he couldn't come out on a regular basis 
and I couJdn't get in touch with him. I thought I needed to see romeone 
more regularly, and I was getting suspicious of his treatment methods, 
which I told him. He was surprised at my suspiciDns and suggested that I 
was reading something into his good intentions that wasn't there. I went 
along with the arrangement for a while longer, but as badly as I wanted 
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and needed help, I was uncomfortable in his presence. I eventually decided 
that he was interested in more than the state of my mental health, and I 
put an erd to his visits. I still did not know what was wrong with me. 
After Dr. G, I s:>ught help through the Jewish Family Service, a united 
Fund Agency. The Service at first refused to allow me the priviledge of 
their counselling service because I was not Jewish. Whe n I told the voice 
on the phone that my father's mother was Jewish (true), I was informed 
that the board would meet and determine whether that Jewish relationship 
would suffice or not. It seems that it did because they did take me on. 
At the Jewish Family Service, I met with a social worker once a weeK. -
-The charge for the service was determined by my income. I think I paid 
$8.00 a session. J., the s:>cial worker, was younger than I and was a very 
kind, caring person. The meetings were good practice for us both: he was 
just making practical application of recent schooling and I was beginning to 
learn more about myself. When I became afraid to travel to his office, he 
politely explained that part of the cure was coming to get it. Never mind 
the fact that fear of travelling from my home was a chronic problem for 
me. So, I quit going to see him. I never heam from him again. I still 
didn't know what was wrong with me. 
(21) I had been at home, unempolyed, for the better part of the year when 
a friend offered me a jJb at a neighborhood swimming pool working in the 
concession stand for $LOO an hour. With a B.A. in English, some graduate 
hours in English Grammar, and four years of teaching experience, I was 
overqualified and improperly trained for the jJb, but I had to start 
somewhere. By the end of the rummer, I had been promoted to assistant 
manager of the pool and received a raise in salary to $L25 an hour! That 
little jJb gave me courage to enter the working world again. 
Another friend offered me a position as a leasing agent at an apartment 
property near my home. That was six years ago, and I am now the 
construction coordinator for the conversion of the property from rental units 
to condominiums. 
Getting back to work was one of the best things that 
Having a jJb gave me the opportunity to be with people 
happened to me. 
every day instead 
of brooding aJone at home over my problems. The salary I receive at work 
tells me that what I do is valuable and worthwhile and thus, I reason, so 
am L It gives me the courage and makes me feel more "normal". 
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(22) After my first year of employment, I was entitled to a week's 
vacation which I elected to spend at home (where else?). A well-meaning 
friend who knew I wouldn't be travelling to Tahiti loaned me some Ix>oks to 
occupy my time. By the time I finished reading them, I was so depressed I 
didn't know what to do. That week my father called me and told me he 
was going to file for divorce from my mother. I was ready to kill myself. 
(23) My good friend SJgge.t...od that instead of killing myself I should sit 
down and make as list of all the places I thought I might be able to get 
some help and call them. So, I dried my eyes and did just that. 
One of the places I called was the Mental Health Authority. I had seen 
advertisements on television and I thought they might be able to refer me 
to someone or to treat me themselves. I find what I am about to relate is 
comical now, but at the time it was a very frustating experience. I had 
already determined that not traveling was my biggest problem and that in 
order to get help I had to traveL It was a "Catch 22" situation. If I 
could travel to get help then I wouldn't need to get help. As I explained 
it to various people I spoke with by phone at the Mental Health Authority, 
"If I could come to you, I wouldn't need to come to you." I fell. like some 
kind of nut saying that, but then I figured they were used to dealing with 
huts. Wrong. I called expecting someone to say they had heard of a 
problem similar to mine and that if they couldn't help me, then they might 
refer me to someone who could. When someone finally did talk to me, she 
said she was sorry but there was no way I could be helped by them unless I 
could get get there (which, may I remind you is my problem). Nothing else. 
No referraL 
Another place I called on my list of places to get help was Baylor College 
of Medicine, Psychology Department. The man whom I spoke with on the 
phone was very kind, not at all shocked or surprised by what I told him 
about myself. He said he would see what he could do and someone would 
return my call. 
That was on Friday. On Monday, Larry E.Beutler, Ph.D. called me. I 
understand from him that I became a note on a bulletin board which 
intrigued him. 
I had to accept certain conditions before he would take me on as a patient. 
He requested that we meet somewhere other than my home (my sister had 
an apartment nearby and agreed to let me use it every Monday at 6.00 
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p.m.); I had to have someone else present - not in the same room during 
our :neetings, but at the same abode (this was to protect both of us, and 
my good friend agreed to spend an hour of his time each week that way); 
am he had to charge me a little bit more than his regular fee to make up 
for traveling time and expenses. 
(24) As I waited for Larry to arrive for the first meeting, I was telling 
myself that I wanted to get well, that I wanted to cooperate, only please 
(fOwers that be?) don' t let him have a mustache am a goatee. Guess what. 
Oh welL.. That was almost five years ago. (25) In those five years, I have 
had my greatest successes and my greatest failures. Neither were achieved 
easily; I had to work hard at both. 
My progress has been rather irregular. Some things Larry and I try work, 
am others don't (just exactly like life - isn't that strange?) (26) One of the 
most successful techniques for me is hypnosis. It is a state of total 
relaxation and, as Larry has told me, I cannot have a relaxed body and a 
tensed mind at the same time. For me, hypnosis is better than any 
tranquilizer or sedative I have ever taken because I feel I can control it. 
Larry made a tape for me and thus I was able to practice hypnosis at home 
as well as at our meetings until I was able to hypnotize myself. 
I use hypnosis to give myself a break from the tension which I a1s:> create 
myself. In combination with other techniques, I have used hypnosis to 
travel outside my territory more comfortably, to be the maid of honor in my 
sister's wedding, to have surgery several times, to cope with ordinary 
situations which I perceive as threateniing (ie., a thunderstorm) and with 
extraordinary situations such as two 1al:ge fires (really!) where I work. 
In some ways, hypnosis is a retreat for me. I just relax and let feelings 
wash over me while I float along. I can function fine but in a relaxed 
state. The magic of it appeals to me. It is not a cure-all for me, because 
if it were my problem would be solved. It is one of the many tools or aids 
Larry has introduced to help me cope with being agoraphobic. (27) When 
we first started meeting, I was an absolutely miserable being. Larry started 
right there, working to help me accept myself as I was right then and 
moving forward from there. 
(28) Another tool I have foum helpful is physical exercise. It gives me a 
sense of contrci4 of power (those two statements are really s:>mething 
coming from oomeone who managed to graduate from high s:::hool without 
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setting a sneaj(er in a gym class - and that t=k some fancy footwork on 
my part - and who t=K fol'e dancing to meet college physical education 
requirements). Starting with the four simple excercises and the bycicling I 
did when I was homebound, I have enlarged my repertoire to become an 
avid wal'eer, on-agairl-d:f-again pgger, tennis player, and swimmer. I have 
even taken ballet and exercise classes. None of these activities (except 
swimming) were especially enjJyable at fust. NOW, I look forward to even 
pgging. Somehow stretching and straining and loosening my body does the 
same for my mind (is exercise a form of hypnosis). Larry recently 
prescribed that I start pgging or solo dancing again at least three times a 
weeK. I have, and it does make a difference in my general mental attitude. 
It's doing something. 
(29) Obviously, being able to talk and consult with Larry is a help to me. 
He provides me with an opportunity to try out different points of view, 
different emotions, different approaches to my problem. (30) I look upon 
Larry in several different ways. He is a mental therapist who helps to 
exercise my injured emotions in the same way a physical therapist exercises 
an injured body. He is a consultant to whom I can bring my questions and 
comments. He is a resource person who can suggest books or tapes or 
observations on agoraphobia. (31) He is a teacher who assigns me lessons. 
(32) He is a student who, with me, is learning about me. (33) Most 
important he is a friend who accepts me as I am. He neither approves nor 
disapproves of me; he just lets me be. 
(34) Reading and studying about agoraphobia and general psychology are yet 
other tools I use. I feel that even when I am not making physical progress 
(enlarging my territory), I am making mental progress by reading and 
studying about coping. 
(35) Some people collect stamps or matchbook covers or coins. I have 
become a collector of information on agoraphobia. Each piece of 
information helps me to understand my illness and myself a bit more. 
Collecting and reading the information is one way of coping with it. I then 
must face it, accept it. In some ways, agoraphobia is easy to ignore. I 
have reached the point where I can pretent I am not agoraphobic. I have a 
jJb which I have held for six years, I now live in my own apartment, I 
shop in the stores in the area and have everything else delivered. I could 
let that be my life, and rometimes I do. But if I continue to read about 
agoraphobia, to talk about it, study it, and think about it, then I am facing 
it. In fact, I have developed an interest in my illness. My tendency is to 
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shrink from it. Instead I am attempting to embrace it mentally, and 
sporadicaJly I ern brace it physically by J?Utting myself in situations which 
create anxiety for me. A. lot of times, something I have read inspires me 
to try once again. 
(36) Two other aids I employ are Valium and a notecard. I have a bottle 
of Valium in my purse and carry it wherever I go. It is like a lot of ex-
smokers I know who still carry an unopened package with them to remind 
them that they can have a cigarette any time they want one. The 
prescr.iption for Valium is over two years old (my physician assures me they 
are still good). I think that if I get in a situation that I think is 
unbearable, I can always take a Valium and, if worse came to worse, I 
could take them alL You know, I have been through rome rocky times but 
never have taken a one. I know I would never take one and yet they are 
there if I want one. 
(37) The note card has ten ru1es for coping with panic typed on it which I 
found in my reading. I kept it in my billfold and pull it out and read it 
when the going gets rough for me. Reading those ru1es is like rome kind of 
signal for me to relax, to let the feelings come without fighting them or 
running away. I recently had to have rome minor =gery done in my 
doctor's office, and I was in the midst of a full-blown panic attack over it. 
Plus, I had to wait over two hours before he could see me. I wanted to 
run away, but instead I pulled out that card and kept reading it over. I 
even carried it into the examining room and kept it clutched in my sweaty 
palms during the entire procedure. I know that I got myself through that 
and that the card is not magic, but it helped. 
(38) Another thing to do for myself is talk to myself. I use this tool in 
several ways. Larry first suggested that I sit in front of a mirror and 
debate a question with myself, taking as many sides of the question as I 
could. He alro suggested that I tape-record some of these encounters. 
Listening to these tapes is a revelation. At first, I was extremely se1f-
conscicus about it. Then I began to feel more at ease with the various 
aspects of my personality that emerged. 
I then began to realize that I talk to myself quite often. For example, 
when I say "RUN!" then I say to myself, "Why don't you wait five more 
minutes?" Myself says, "Okay, but I am leaving in five minutes. ''I have 
stayed literally hours that way. I alro say things like, "Lynne, there are 
nine million Chinese who don't give a damn about what is happening to you, 
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ro why should you?" And, "A hundred years from now this won't make any 
difference, 9:) just ccx:>l it". And," An hour from now this will all be over 
9:) stick it out". And, "Think how good you will feel about yourself if you 
do this and how badly you will feel about yourself if you run away". 
(39) Writing about agoraphobia or writing about a specific problem I am 
having is helpfuL It is a distillation process. My e motions are 9:)metimes 
so db--torted that I cannot determine, for example, why I am angry or at 
whom. By sitting down at my typewriter, which becomes rather an 
automatic writer for me, I can distill my jumbled feelings to the pure 
emotion and then deal with it. 
(40) Most of the hindrances to my progress have been inside me. I am 
both my =se and my salvation. I hear Larry's observations of me as 
criticism. Or I hear those observations as a command to change, and I 
become very frustrated when I don't change. 
(41) I have a problem with motivation. If going places and doing things 
were reward enough in themselves then I would probably try hamer to get 
t.'1ere. I think I am distinctly not self-motivated. I require an outside 
incentive. I am working on that though. 
(42) I have difficulty making decisions. I constantly second guess myself. 
I want some direction from outside, 9:)me reassurance that I am doing welL 
I ... ;asted a lot of time with therapists and counselors I didn't like - the egg 
psychiatrist, Dr.G. - simply because I thought whether I like them or not as 
peo!=Jle didn't matter. But it does. I like Larry as a person. 
I tend to unrealiistically divide my life into two parts: my life and my 
meetings with Larry. My meetings with Larry are just as much a part of 
my life and just as real as anything else. In real life, I spend time with 
peo;>le I like. So it stands to reaoon that therapy would be much better 
and more productive if it were done between two people who liked each 
other. 
I al.9:J feel that Lary cares about me. Some of the other therapists were 
.<ir.d of impersonaL Whether this is true or not, I feel that if I all of a 
sudden stopped going to see Larry, that he would call me and encourage me 
;:0 come back and try again. I say that, whether it is true or not doesn't 
illat:t.er because that's the way I feeL There have been times when I tock a 
nreak for a month or concelled appointments on a regular basis, and yet I 
'lave always returned. As I said earlier, the others made no attempt to 
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find out why I really quit going to the sessions or to encourage me, ever so 
gently, to return. 
Rapport was an overused word among educators when I was a teacher, and I 
hestitate to use it even once more. But that is what Larry and I have 
achieved because of the kinds of people we are and through many hours of 
roth j:>yful and heart-wrenching work. 
(43) I want to define agoraphobia again in the way I tell others in 
conversation ai:xJut me. I am basically a quiet, horne-body type. I enj:>y 
being alone, and I amuse myself fairly well. I am better on a one-to-one 
basis with people than I am with a crowd. Agoraphobia is a distortion of 
that. It is an emotional distortion or dysfunction. It is like looking in one 
of those funny mirrors at the fair and seeing yourself all fat and wavy. 
You are still basically there, but what you see is distorted. If you met 
me at work or in a situation where I felt comfortable, you wow never 
believe that all the foregoing is true ai:xJut me. But it is. As my dad 
always says, "That's part of my charm." 
(44) I have mentioned earlier that a very good friend gave me a bicycle 
for Christmas, and a very good friend hired me as an employee at a 
swimming pooL and a very good friend suggested I make a list of places to 
get help instead of killing myself, and a very good friend gave up an hour 
of his time a week to sit by himself while I met with Larry. That very 
good friend has stood by me through the past ten years. He has taken me 
on drives, he has held my hand, he has rej:>iced with me. I am fortunate to 
have such a friend. 
I talk ai:xJut what I accomplished, and I have corne a long way from where I 
started. No one else cow have done it except me; but like the people 
who accept the Academy A ward, I have not done it alone. I may win the 
award for the leading role, but the suppoting cast - Larry, my friend, c0-
workers, my family - deserve awards, too. I am living proof that you are 
not alone, and there is someone out there who can help you if you just look 
hard and long enough. 
I am not cured. I have more hard work ahead of me. But, then doesn't 
everyone? "Lynne stanley, TIllS IS YOUR LIFE!" 
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Subj=ct 2: Bill 
(l) I am 45, male. Divorced, remarried, 6 children - 2 hers and 4 mine. (2) 
My experiences in therapy bridge more than half of my life. The first 
when I was 18 in college, and the last terminated a few months ago. 
I have teen asked to write about the "therapeutic experience" and its 
influence on my life . It's a difficu1J: assignment, and I find it difficult to 
tegin. Do you want to know about all of my therapists? Hell, I don't 
rememter much about most of them! How many? Nine - more or less. 
Were there any mileposts? Not until recently. 
(3) I feel that a brief history is in order, and I will keep it brief. Deep 
south background. (4) Dominant mother, passive and often distant father 
(no homosexuality is not my problem though I have had two post-adolescent 
experiences, and I have wondered and occasionally worried about i t over the 
years). (5) Withdrawn and isolated childhood, few friends, sense of 
alienation, exceptionally "bright". (6) Considered myself ugly and 
uninteresting as far back as I can rememter. Was told by mother that I 
was just that through adolescence. (7) Erratic, given to extremes of mood 
(manic-depressive?). (8) Became adventurous early in life to escape. Took 
off for Alaska to fly bush in early 20's (after B.A.). Wandered about the 
wor:ld some. (9) Married the first time at 27. aO) Wrote. Worked. (ll) 
Went back to school for Ph.D. Made it through. Q2) Went into business 
where I had lots of highs and lows. Big house. Lousy marriage. Divorce. 
Bankruptcy. (13) Midle aged hippy. Love. Marriage. (14) Where I am 
now is a Slccessful businessman again, but determined to stay resonably 
sane and maintain a sense of proportion and balance in the world in which I 
live. 
(15) What has therapy done for, to with against me during this time? As I 
said, the fist time was in college. I knew I was fucked-up, but not &Ire 
why. I made a few "s..ricide attempts" (16) (in quotes because I knew 
even at the time that they were phony). Thus, therapy. A kindly old man 
who sat quietly, read rome of my poetry, said little, and was, I suspect, as 
bored as was L (17) His contribution to my life was, at test, that I didn't 
pretend s.llcide anymore - but I thought about it a lot - a hell of lot-and 
talked about it occasionally when I was in deep depressions. (18) That 
man was the rort, though, who gives therapy a bad name (to me, at least). I 
really wanted to work at it, but he was bored, boring, and plain 
disinterested. I gave up. 
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(19) The next expenence was a few years into a crazy marriage that 
managed to limp along for more than 14 years. (20) Many of my peers 
have admired me during my life, and in many instances envied me. I could 
never understand why. I decided to give therapy another shot. Why did I 
always feel so badly about myself? Why were all my choices so limited, 
and all bad (depression?)? Why could I never do anything right? Why 
couldn't I be a "success" and maintain? What the hell. maybe a shrink 
could help me find the way. No, that's not what I wanted. Maybe a 
therapist could show me the way. I checked around and chose one. (21) 
What a bummer. A one visit trip. A mental crook. I walked out before 
the session was finished and didn't go back. I'd heard those platitudes and 
the shit from Sunday School on. "If you do the right things everything will 
be O.K." 
(22) Meanwhile the marriage '.vent through ups and downs and I went along 
for t.'1e ride. It was poorly put together vehicle in the best of 
circumstances, and riding on the roller coaster was too much for the lousy 
construction to stand. It really started falling apart. We finally agreed on 
something. "Let's try marriage conseling." (23) Another inept therapist. 
But I think he really wanted to help. The problem with him, in retrospect, 
was that he let his two crazy patients control the therapy. , He conJdn't or 
wouldn't offer any direction, and was obviously overwhelmed by the complex 
and deepseated hostilities, hurts and irrationalities. Two people babbling at 
each other. He gave up after a couple of months and suggested an 
"excpetionaliy good " psychiatrist. 
(24) We went together for a few sessions, then separately. Interesting bit 
- I guess we were beth really bering because the quack literally slept 
through most of our sessions. Complete, on occasion, with snoring. He was 
totally unresponsive to our problems, and our stumbling attempts to make 
some sense of the mess we were in. (25) Prescribed antidepressants for her 
and suggested she accept her "proper role" as a wife and mother. Basically 
ignored me. 
(26) By now determined, I tried another psychiatrist. She gave up. 
Ac::ually he wasn't bad. A cross between Norman Vincent Peale, Buddah, 
and KierKeggard. At least he responded. More pat answere. "You aren't 
listening to her." Shit, man I want somecne to listen to me! What about 
where I am? But it sounded authentic, and we got another paste j:lb on 
the creaky old marriage machine. (27) I got little or nothing for me. 
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(28) Finally the marriage collapsed. Divorce and bankruptcy within six 
months of each other. She got the kids, though I wanted them desperately. 
Atout as total a failure as anyone could be. Soon back into therapy. 
(29) And it couldn't have been better. 
'rhis is an experience that really helped, and the contrast between it and 
what had happened before was like the proverbial difference between day 
and night. It took time Qt years). It wasn't a bed or roses, but it worked. 
(30) Actually this experience consisted of working with two separate 
therapists. (31) The first was one of the most gentle men I have ever 
met. (32) And the other a considerate, challenging, and responsive woman. 
(33) Prior to begining this purney I spent a lot of time thinking about what 
I wanted to accomplish, where I thought I \vas, and where I wanted to be. 
I had evolved an image which seemed to best describe how I saw my life, 
and an extension of that image which described where I wanted to go. My 
life and situation at the time appeared to me to be a gigantic mass of 
tangled rope - all sizes, colors, lengths, and materials. Each piece of this 
rope represents a single facet of my pers::lnality, environment and 
expenence. There, were thousands. I defined my problems as a feeling of 
near hopelessness in trying to untangle the rope and make some sense of 
things. I felt that in order to do this one needed to be able to take each 
length of rope and be able to trace it from begining to end. I couldn't do 
this, and the result, in my mind at the time, was that I was stymied and 
basically immobilized. What I thought I wanted (no, really wanted) was to 
seperate the labyrinth and lay all of the pieces neatly in rows, side by side, 
then connect them into a "practical" useful, continuous, single rope, albeit 
varied and irregular. 
(34) The gentle man worked patiently with me, moving though a variety of 
excercises which we worked out, session after session. He listened, and he 
responded. He asked questions and listened to my responses. He suggested 
excercise and helped me begin to gain some insights into me. If he had a 
mapr, identifiable faulJ: it was in letting me control too often, to go off on 
apparently meaningless flights which pretended to have a destination, but 
were, in reality, ways in which I was avoiding dealing with some basic 
problems. Such a small faulJ: when I consider that he gained my respect 
and my attention and guided me into an even greater determination to work 
things out. 
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(35) There were, in all of our sessions, no great moments of insight. (36) 
But there were many small steps which he helped me to see as such. He 
helped me find a path through a sometimes chaotic, always transiticnal 
period of my life. (37) I think now, again in retrcspect, that he was 
perhaps less than satisfied with his dealings with me. In fact, it was for 
me as perfect a begining as I can imagine. I needed that and would 
probably have responded very badly to a firmer approach. I suspect that I 
would have viewed a more controlling person as another combatant whom I 
had to outwit. Someone el.92 to whom I had to prove my intellectual 
superiority while I continued to come apart inside. (38) He gained my 
confidence and helped me to become more confiden"- (39) He worked 
sKillfully, remembering what had gone on in previous sessions, refering to my 
obviously contradictory feelings, and moving slowly along. 
(40) When, after a few months of therapy, he toJd me he would be leaving 
the city but would line me up with another therapist I had mixed emoticns. 
In a way I felt a sense of deserticn, but it was not strong. I knew that I 
wanted to go on, but was worried about the posible new therapist (after so 
many negative experiences, I had to believe that the norm was about third 
grade leve]). When I received word that my new therapist was to be a 
woman, my internal resposes was mixed. On the one hand I was, an am, a 
firm, adamant mpporter of female equality, but on the other I questioned 
how a woman could possibly deal with .!!!Y problems - male's problems. 
Would she be prejudiced by my frequent resort to profanity? Could I 
discuss sexual feelings, fantasies and problems that a man faces in business 
(as though a woman in business or a profession doen't have all of the same 
problems - in spades!)? 
(41) The fist session was an airing of these feelings and the decisicn to 
glve it a try. Used to the soft, gentle moving around that had been the 
pattern till now, we continued along that way for a few sessions. Much of 
these initial meetings was a recapitulaticn of what had happened before. 
But it didn't seem to be working. I remember well the pivotal session -
primarily bullshit. We both chatted amiably about irrelevant matters, then I 
got up to leave and said something like, ''1 enj::lyed the visit." I wasn't 
looking forward to going back again, but I knew that I had work to do. 
Evidently we were both aware of the drifting because in our next meeting 
we addressed the problem. From that time on I made, with her help, the 
most significant strides toward mental health in my life. We worked 
together for almost a year after that. 
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(42) She became more and more confident and challenged me to deeper and 
deeper levels of insight - often with the opening of long ignored sores and 
hurts which had been festering well below the surface. (43) She took 
control and let me know that she knew when 1 was playing a game (often 
\vhen even 1 was not aware of it). (44) She contradicted many of my 
concepts of the stereotypical therapist. She talked a lot. She related 
experiences. She treated me as a peer. (45) She helped me dig into areas 
of myself that were not pleasant. 
(46) 
being 
More and more during these months 1 had a greater sense of well 
- of being well. So many things were happening. My relationship 
with my new wife was getting better and better. My sense of balance and 
perspective with the children was improving. 1 was making enormous strides 
in my comeback from bankruptcy. 1 was examining my relationships with 
friends and acquaintances. 1 was developing a feeling of confidence, I could 
see alternatives and make decisions. 
(47) Then one day in a session during which I was feeling parti.cu1arly good 
I said oomething that I had, to the best of my recollection, never even 
dared think before. I said something like, " I really am doing a great job 
in this new proj=ct!?" She picked up on it and pointed it out. My usual 
mode of thought and expression was quiet different. When things were ' 
going badly I would feel and say, "1 really fucked that up", but when I was 
doing well it was, " It worked itself out" never, ''1 worked it out". Now 1 
had felt it and said it! That was one of the most significant days of my 
life. I should have marked the date and proclaimed it a personal holiday. 
From that point, I was on the road to termination - though I didn't think of 
it in those terms. 
(48) There were many other matters to deal with, and we began to work on 
a SJ.pport system for this new self-=ncept. Later I began to talk about 
termination. I was ready to try my new wings (to be trite), but there was 
still the naggging doubts about my ability to make it without the weekly 
:eeding. 
rhe last session was short. I cried, but it was a healthy cry and one of 
;:hanks. I told her about the knotted rope image, but now I knew that I 
:::auld never lay the various ropes out side by side, nor would I want to. 
rhe ropes are knotted and tangled because that's the way my life and 
:elationships have developed, and like macrame, the whole can be viewed as 
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a design - pleasing to s::Jme and forbidding and hopeless to others. I expect 
that I will be in therapy again from time to time. I will use it when I feel 
the need for it. I have four basic observations in rereading this. 
L (49) Too many therapb-ts, in my experience, assume a condescending 
attitude which establishes yet another barrier for the patient. Little or no 
worK can be done until I have proved my intelJectual equality at least (and 
usual superiority), and by that time the whole experience has been strained 
beyond recovery. 
2. (50) When I sought therapeutic help I was in pain - a pain much deeper 
and inexplicable than mere physical hurting (though it often manifest itself 
in physical hurting). Too often in my experience the therapist either didn't 
care or confused the maintenance of obj=ctivity with aloof detachment. 
Maybe therapists need more training in "chairside" manner. 
3. (51) It would have been most helpful if, s::Jmewhere along the way, 
someone had offered me a diagnosis - had said, "You know, one of the 
symptoms of depression is the feeling that you have no alternatives, or that 
all of your alternatives are negative". That would have provided me s::Jme 
basis for emotional and intellectual thought and, perhaps, action. 
4. (52) I often had the feeling t.\)at a lot of the mystical double-talk 
mumbo-jumbo that s::J many 
gross lack of competency. 
therapists blabber was just a cover-up for a 
The therapist was just stumbling around trying 
to find his way at the expense of my time and effort. I still belive this to 
have been the case. I am not certain that I have done my assigned task in 
this. If so, and if it's helpful to another pers::ln, s::J much the better. If 
not, at least it has been helpful to me. 
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SUbject 3: Janet 
(l) I grew up in the home of a minister/teacher, (2) the youngest of three 
children. My brother is eleven and my sister seven years older than 1, ro 
by the age of twelve, I was the only child at home. (3) My parents were 
married in 1933, and their whole approach to life was molded by the Great 
Depression. Even after they were f airly comfortable financially, their 
attitudes toward material possessions remained, "use it up, wear it out, 
make do, or do without. (4) This was very difficult for me to accept, 
particu1arly in high school. when I felt that having clothes like my 
classmates would make me more readily accepted as part of the group. (5) 
I gained recognition by being "smart", and that wasn't very satisfying. 
(6) My father was the absolute authority in our home. A court from which 
there was no appeaL 
or try to manipulate 
(7) My choice was to accept the situation as it was 
it to get what I wanted. (8) I learned very early 
that in order to even get heard during a disagreement with my father I had 
to be able to present my side of the argument loogically, rationally, 
intellectually, and without visible emotion. (9) Feelings were never 
discussed, never verbalized, and never a factor in reaching a decision. I 
learned to regard anger as cold silence in my father and as tears in my 
mother. "Getting upset" put me in a one-down position, arid I did 
everything I could to avoid that. aD) It was impossible for me to please 
my father and very easy for me to disappoint him. In his effort to make 
me constantly strive to do my best, he made me feel as though nothing I 
did was good enough. 
<ill My mother was the model. of submissive wife who would never confront 
my father directly, rut usually managed to get what she wanted by behind-
the-s::enes manipulation. 02) I learned to be devious from her, and I 
learned to lie and manipulate with a guileless expression. 03) When I was 
thirteen, my mother began having periods of illness. It wasn't until I was 
sixteen that my parents told me she was going through menopause, and it 
wasn't until she had a hysterectomy when I was eighteen, that they finally 
told me the details and just how ill she had beeen. So for five years I 
took care of both my mother and father without really knowing why. (14) 
My mother is not a perron who handles illness gracefully, and my father did 
noe lower his expectatiDns as to housekeeping even though I had the 
demands of school which my mother did not have while she kept house. 
Since she did not feel badly all of the time, I was constantly having to step 
into the middle of a chore and finish it. More difficult than the work was 
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not bebg able to choose \Vhen I \Vould do it. She \Vould start the laundry 
and not be able to finish it, and I \Vould be faced \Vith cooking dinner and 
f:ini.shing the laundry when I got home from s:::hooL It made no difference 
if I had a test or project due the next day. The thing that annoyed me 
the most \Vas not getting credit for all the cleaning, shopping and cooking, 
and then my mother \Vould come out at the last moment to play hostess. I 
\Vas expected to fade into the background, keep everything running 
smoothly, anticipate the needs of both my mother and the guests, 00 that no 
one would realize that my mother \Vas not doing anything. US) All of my 
anger and r esentment became focused on my mother. (16) Since I had no 
experience or model for expressing my anger and thereby getting rid of it, I 
turned it on myself and became more and more depressed. 
Q7) By the time I was 18 I was having severe anxiety attacks, although at 
the time I didn't know what was happening to me. It seemed that for no 
reason I would occasionally be overwhelmed with stomach cramps, a cohl 
sweat, and uncontrollable shaking. This never happened around my parents, 
and since I \Vas embarrassed and scared, (lB) I never talked to anyone 
about it. 
(19) Almost without exception, the only times I got the emotional support I 
needed from my parents \Vere \Vhen I was ilL This \Vas quite reinforcing, 
and it took many years after I had left my parents' home for me to 
acknowledge my behaviour pattern of "getting sick" when I needed 
emotional support - (20) and even longer to develop other \Vays of getting 
what I needed. (21) One of the hardest discriminations for me to make 
was seeing that the need for financial support was different from the ned 
for emotional support. 
(22) While I \Vas in high school. I spent a lot of time talking to a minister 
about the problems I was having \Vith my parents, but I never got over my 
fear that oomething I said \Vould get back to my father. This perpetuated 
my habit of previewing everything in my mind before actually saying or 
doing it. 
(23) I married at 19, and the marriage was a disaster from the beginning. 
It took a year for me to decide that no matter what price I had to pay for 
the failure of my marriage, I could no longer maintain it, and I filed for 
divorce. 
(24) The price was high. I had cut myself off from almost all support, both 
emotional and financiaL (25) Part of my feelings came out of my own 
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shame at the failure I was and the mess I had made of my life. (26) 
Another part of my feelings was a reflection of my parents' attitudes and 
obvious disappointment. Divorce was not an acceptable alternative in 
solving problems, and since I was unable to talk to my parents about what I 
had been going through, they saw no reason why I had not been able to 
work things out. (27) One of the turning points in my relationship with my 
parents was when my first husband died following surgery for a brain tumor. 
This provided my parents with a reason, and therefore they could begin to 
believe what I had told them about his irrational behavior and violence. 
(28) But that was after two years of ever deepining depression. 
(29) 'The only thing I '"as sure of immediately after my divorce was that I 
was not going to go back to living with my parents. (30) My anxiety and 
depression nearly paralyzed me. (31) I was unable to hold a :pb. (32) and 
there was no one I felt I could turn to for help. (33) I began drinking 
haevily (34) and went through several brief, physical relationships that 
didn't help but (35) alEc increased my feelings of guilt and worthlessness. 
(36) I was dependent on anybody who could pay for something I needed and 
constantly (37) compromised myself in order to survive. I found out it 
was a lot easier to get someone to buy me a drink than a sandwich; (38) 
the liquor numbed my feelings and gave me an excuse for my .behavior. 
(39) During this time I started seeing a psychiatrist. I didn't trust the idea 
of psychiatry. As miserable as I was, I feared that change would destroy 
the things in me which I valued. I saw no hope for gaining anything and 
did not believe I could survive if I lost anything else. (40) The psychiatrist 
was a patient man. At the beginning of my treatment, my father was paying 
him. My father became quite provoked when the doctor told him that I had 
a "neurotic guilt complex" and stopped paying him. I only learned of this 
several months later when I discovered that the doctor had been seeing me 
without charge. The doctor expressed enough interest in me that I kept 
going back every week, and having that one expectation (all I had to do 
was show up) that I could meet, kept me from committing suicide. (41) In 
spite of the fact that I was later quite angry at other things he did in the 
course of my treatment, I had to admit that staying alive was a positive 
gain. 
(42) About a year after starting with this doctor, he asked me to take a 
pers:mality test for him. When the results came back, we went over them 
together. He asked me to explain every "key" question the computer had 
puJled out. Although he tried to make me feel that the test was biased 
-118-
and not accurate, the results were 9:) negative and ro official-J=king that 
it further undermined my self-confidence and reconfirmed my fear of "go.ing 
crazy". (43) The other th.ing that he did that was damag.ing to me was to 
prescribe a hypnotic sedative when I compJained of having nightmares. He 
continued to approve refills of the prescription long after I stopped seeing 
him, and I became quite dependent on the drug. (44) Although I wasn't able 
to verbalise it at the time, I felt that my dreams were terribly "bad" if he 
put me on medicine that either kept me from dreaming or kept me from 
remembering what I dreamed. (45) I don't recall anything dramatic about 
leaving treatment with him. I think I just got bored and quit going. Since 
I didn't resolve any problems or come to any better understanding of myself 
during the two years I saw him, I can say with rome assurance that I didn't 
leave therapy to avoid dealing with specific issues. (46) I was nearly as 
qepressed at the end of two years as I had been at the beg.inn.ing, (47) but 
I had fgured out that I cou1d survive. 
(48) About a year after I stopped seeing the psychiatrist, I started dating 
my present husband. (49) He was .in therapy at a clinic that later became a 
community mental health centre. I read every book he had by mcdern 
psychologists and psychiatrists - Lowen, Laing, Harris, Bach, Gocdman, Jung, 
Perls, May - and three months later I applied at the centre. I was still 
, 
depressed, but I believed that there was a way out of my morass. 
(50) The first thing I did after I got into treatment at the clinic was to get 
off all the medication I had been taking. (51) I wou1d have been depressed 
without the medication, but it added to the problem and prevented me from 
finding any solution. 
(52) I also changed pbs and went back to school - made changes faster 
than I cou1d conrolidate them. (53) My husband was "ahead" of me .in 
therapy and gave me constant rupport and encouragement. I don't think I 
cou1d have continued treatment during the hard times if it hadn't been for 
his understanding and willingness to tolerate me "trying my w.ings." (54) 
However, since he had been through what I was facing, there were times 
when it seemed like I was ".in therapy" every day instead of once a week. 
(55) I learned about three different k.inds of therapeutic techniques over the 
five years I was .in treatment at the centre. All of them helped me to 
rome extent.. (56) The first one I was .intrcduced to, and the one that had 
the most profound effect on me, was Gestalt Therapy. 
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It took me a long time and a lot of practice to get much out of "talking to 
chairs", but rome aspects of Gestalt Therapy had immediate, benefecial 
results. The catch words of Gestalt were like handles on a lifeboat to me. 
Concepts like "here and now" and "what do you feel?" and "flow with it" 
were like a foreign language to me -a language spoken by "strangers in a 
strange land". A land that both frightened and fascinated me. It is said 
that when a perron is totally immersed in a foreign language that one of 
the signs is beginning to think and dream in that language. (57) As it 
turned out, "dreaming in Gestalt" was the most singularly important thing 
that happened to me in my therapy experience. 
I had always had a vibrant dream life, and, for the first time, I was able to 
accept my dreams as an existential statement - they were no longer 
shameful or frightening or morbid, but a treasure map leading me to the 
riches of my Self. Sometimes the clues were obscure, but they were always 
there, luring me forward in an exploration that was seldom what I expected, 
often unpleasant, but never unsatisfying. 
(58) The dreams I worked on in the group always brought me a greater 
understanding of where I was at the moment, and most of them related to 
how I had gotten there. (59) In one dream I was escaping from a building 
along air conditioning ducts that were at an angle and I kept slipping, 
almost falling off. My therapist had me pretend to be the ducts and then 
talk to them. Finally, in frustration, I said, "You aren't supporting me like 
you shouJd." At that moment in time, my feelings related to my 
expectations of my husband which I didn't feel he was meeting. That was 
enough for me to know then. Later the same dream gave me insight into 
the kind of support I needed, and my fear of losing what I needed to 
survive. 
(60) For years I had seen myself as a fragmented perron and had been 
terrified to let go of the scraps of "sanity" that I thought I had. Slowly 
the Biblical injunction that one must die to be born again had meaning. I 
had to let go of my sanity - if only for a few brief moments - to find the 
parts of me that I had lost. I had to learn that every thought and feeling 
I had were mine - to accept them, then to own them, and finally to repice 
in having them. (61) My dreams led me unerringly into one conflict after 
another. Littler by little I worked through ambiguous feelings about my 
parents, conflicting expectations of my husband, restraints I had placed on 
myself. (62) My terrors lost their power when exposed to my group-friends. 
I found that nothing is as shameful in the telling as in the hiding. 
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(63) As I played the roles and parts of my dreams, I learned to accept my 
feeliJ1gs without judging them. I was so full of "shoulds" and "oughts" -
parental injunctions and judgements - that I almost couldn't function for 
worrying. My husband used to complain that I wasn't spontaneous - but 
how could I be spontaneous if I had to figure out what I ought to do in 
every situation? I had to learn that my feelings were just feelings; that 
anger couldn't kill. Knowing how I felt truly gave me control over my 
actions, whereas not knowing left me at the mercy of overwhelming 
emotions. 
(64) During my first year in therapy, my therapist also introduced me to 
Transactional Analysis (T A). The biggest advantage to T A is an easily 
understood language. It is clear what Berne (1961) and Harris (1967) meant 
by Parent-Adult-Child terminology. while Gestalt therapy opened upon my 
"child" feelings - both the o.k. kid and the not-o.k. kid - T A taught me 
how to express those feelings in an adult mode. Understanding the basic 
T A definitions let me l=k at my relationships with other people and to 
figure out what they were doing and how I was reacting that got us at 
cross-purposes. 
I was having a lot of difficulty getting along with one of my bosses at this 
time. I decided to put our interactions into a T A framework. I realised 
that we both bounced back and forth between our parent and not-o.k. kid 
ego states, and did so in perfect counterpoint. One day I went to his 
office determined that no matter what he said or did, I was going to "stay 
in my adult". The results were fantastic. within a week all the 
relationships within the office were smooth and mellow, and this boss and I 
developed a friendship that went well beyond a good working relationship. I 
also learned a lesson that has served me well in every pb I've had since 
then. 
(65) After this majJr ruccess, I decided to put all I had learned about 
trusting my feelings and acting out of an adult position into relating to my 
father. The first disagreement we had after I had determined that I did 
not have to react to him as a not-o.k. kid was neady a disaster. The 
strain left me physically exhausted. I maintained my position, however, and 
every small indication that our relationship was changing for the better 
encouraged me to purrue it a little further. Along the way I had some 
insights into my feelings about my father that helped me when I doubted 
that Changing our relationship was worth the effort. Once when I had 
anticipated a conflict (which never materialised) and had been working on it 
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in group one evening, I wasn't getting very far talking to my father in the 
e mpty chair, when my therapist sat down in the chair holding a foJded mat 
in front of him. (66) He told me to "hit my father". I really fought with 
my avoidance (67) and finally struck the mat. I was gritting my teeth, 
punching at the mat, when tears started running down my cheeks, and I 
realised that while I was hitting the mat away from me with the right hand, 
I was pulling it towards me with my left hand. My anger and my longing 
were inseparable. 
(68) Years later, after working to develop an open and adult realtionship 
with my father, all of my defences di.s=olved, and I crawled into his lap li'<e 
a helpless two-year-cld and, crying, told him that my husband and I had 
separated. I had doubted his love; I had hated him for the way he made 
me be to please him; but as he rocked me and comforted me, I knew I 
could never doubt his intentions, and I cried for all the years of our 
igncrance. 
(69) We still have disagreements, and situations come up that trigger oJd 
bitter feelings in me, but I usually am aware of what is happening and can 
let the feelings pass without acting on them. It has been hard for me to 
accept my father as he is. My expectations of who he should be cloud our 
relationship, and I don't know if rn ever resolve that conflict. 
(70) When my husband and I reconciled, my parents were the first to know 
and share our "Py. They had changed over the years too, and were able to 
accept us both for the people we were. I feel quite close to both of my 
parents now, and writing this has been difficult for me. (71) It is 
unpleasant for me to go back in my thoughts and feelings to the anger and 
bitterness of my childhood. It makes me uncomfortable to realise that after 
all these years and all the changes, I still act out of my need to be 
different from them. 
(72) I changed from a male to a female therapist, still at the clinic, and 
both the one I left and the one I went to were experimenting with 
"bioenergetic" techniques. I have strongly mixed feelings about this method 
of therapy. (73) The good things I got from it are easy to see. It helped 
me to use my body to express my feelings - particularly anger, which was 
very difficult for me. I became aware of my body and gained a great deal 
of confidence about my appearance. The breathing exercises and relaxation 
techniques led me to a feeling that is difficult to describe, of being 
centered within myself. I don't think, however, that any of this would ahve 
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been poS>ible without the years of Gestalt work that preceded. My "l::eing 
in my head" was my weakness, but it was also my strength, and affective 
expression without cognitive understanding is useless to me. If I had not 
come to a complete acceptance of the Gestalt position that feelings are 
just feelings and are not good or bad, I would have never allowed myself to 
express my anger, fear, and OClITOW in a bioenergetic setting. 
(74) I think one of the dangers that a therapist should avoid is becoming 
too closely involved with his patients in a oocial way. And I think this is 
more likely to happen to the more dedicated and sensitive therapist. I was 
particula.dy close to my first therapist - he had dinner with my husband and 
me almost every week after· group. I was flattered by his attention, and I 
honestly think he found us to be interesting people. We were both excited 
about therapy and read the same books he did. And we l=ked up to him 
as a guide and mentor. The closeness of our oocial relationship, however, 
grew to the point that he "eased up" on me in groups and didn't really push 
me when a shove would have been beneficial He came to trust my insights 
into other people, and I moved into the role of oort of "junicr" therapist in 
my group. This caused two majJr problems - one because I became more 
interested in l=king at other people than at myself which significantly 
slowed down my progress in dealing with my own problems, and, two, it set 
me apart from the group in a way that was not helpful since one of my 
biggest problems was in relating to other people as an equaL 
(75) For the most part my years at the clinic were good for me. I learned 
to identify my feelings and trust what I felt. I learned to express my 
feelings in a way that was both acceptable and got me what I needed. (76) 
When my husband and I moved to a larger city for the opportunities it 
offered in :pbs and schooling, we were fairly well able to make it on our 
own. We still missed having OClmeone to talk to and the community of 
friends we had developed, but our relationship was such that we could work 
out our differences and function in our new location. 
(77) Then one morning I left the house to walk to .the bus stop as I did 
every morning to go to work, and a man ran up behind me, attacked me, 
and raped me in our neighbor's front yard. No one word can describe the 
experience, although devastating probably comes closest. (78) When I was 
as.-ced if I wanted to :Pin a therapy group of other women who had been 
raped, I accepted. (79) I had known the feelings of fear and helplessness, 
but: never with such intensity. And for the first time in my life, I've had 
to learn to live with my blinding rage. 
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(80) The greatest insight for me relating to this experience is the discovery 
that there are many ways of being "raped". Every experience I have had of 
being used against my will., although there were not the sexual implications, 
had the same affective components. The fear I felt was a magni5cation of 
every time I had been afraid. My feelings of anxiety and anger opened old 
wounds that I thought had healed. (81) I questioned my my entire way of 
living, trying to figure out why this had happened to me. So, added to my 
terror were tormenting feelings of selhl.oubt. 
(82) It has been six months now since I was attacked, and it is still very 
difficult to write about it. (83) Particu1arly when I am alone in the house, 
the fear and anxiety swell up in my chest and I get up and pace the fl=r 
trying to release some of the tension. (84) I have worked through most of 
my doubts about myself and have arrived at some convictions about how I 
believe I wouJd act if I am ever threatened in that way again. (85) I take 
great comfort from knowing that even this horrible experience has not been 
without posi.tive slde effects. My husband and I have become much closer. 
Our surviving this extreme disruption in our lives by sharing our feelings 
about what happened and the ways in which we reacted to it has deepened 
our understanding and commitment. (86) My co-workers have been very 
uncierstanding and supportive, which has been important to me in rebuilding 
my sense of self-€Steem. (87) And the therapy group has been very good 
for me. I have come to appreciate how much strength is generated in a 
group of pecple who are willing to relate on the most intimate leveL I am 
aware that it is very important to me to have a group of pecpl.e to whom I 
can relate in this way. I know that it doesn't have to be a large group, 
and I know that it doesn't have to be a "therapy" group, but I hope I never 
again underestimate my need for friends with whom I can share both my -py 
and my sorrow and fear. 
(88) Looking back over the time I have spent in therapy, the best analogy I 
can think of to describe my experiences is that of a chick trying to break 
out of his egg. (89) I reached the point where my "egg" was cramped 
instead of cozy, stifling instead of secure. (90) My therapists gave me the 
tools to break the shell, (91) the encouragement to lock around in my brand 
new, scary, enormous world, (92) and the often-repeated statement that I 
had done i t myself. 
(93) I did a lot of chirping and ran around exploring my new environment. 
After a while, however, I made the inevitable and discouraging discovery 
that all I had been "born" into was a larger "egg". (94) And the whole 
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process of change started over again. I was anxious, tried to shore up my 
defences, convincing myself that what I had found in my new way of living 
was really all there was, all I needed. But the feeling that there was more 
persisted, and the frustration and curiosity in me built to the point where I 
looked for new tools and chipped away at my new "shell". I don't know 
how many times I went through this during my years of therapy, but I am 
finally at the point of accepting the limits of the "egg" I live in, and the 
changes have become modifications instead of "breaking out" experiences 
(95) I was 20 years old when I first saw a psychiatrist, and now r m 31. I 
feel like rve been a long time on the road of self-€Xpl.oration. The 
differences in the way I feel now and how I felt a few years ago, is that I 
no longer want the road to end. I hope that I continue to grow in self-
awareness, self-contentment, and self-esteem. 
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Subj=ct 4: Denis 
(1) contrary to what I initially imagined, psychotherapy did not change my 
life in any dramatic fashion. I certainly did not suddenly become a new or 
different permn, not to myself at any rate. (2) Perhaps others noticed 
changes in me, and although they never verba1ised it, I could sense that in 
the way they sometimes related to me that they did not view me in the 
same light as before. 
(3) When I say that I did not change while in therapy that is not strictly 
correct. In a way I did change to something that I already knew, that I 
was somehow already familiar with and almost as if I was continuing 
something that I had left off experiencing a long time ago. This feeling of 
familiarity with something that was within me felt correct, guiding and as 
how things should be. (4) With this experience came a sense of solidness 
within and which somehow allowed me to be more relaxed, fl.exibl.e, fhrid 
and open. Gradually over time I felt this loosening up, physically and 
emotionally. (5) For example, for years I had been trying to learn how to 
type but found that because my fingers were so rigid my speed was slower 
than a snail's. (6) A year after starting therapy I again attempted to learn 
and now find that typing is easy and I can maintain a speed, with all 
fingers, as fast as my wife who spent R70-{)0 to learn the same thing. (7) 
Also, I found it difficult to cry previously. crying for me was difficult, 
not because I did not want to, was shy or embarassed, but because it in 
fact was quite painful; I literally had to &I\leeze the tears out - it was as 
if something tight around me was holding the tears back - it was an effort 
to cry. (8) With time in therapy there was a gradual loosening up and one 
day I was able to report to my therapist that on the way home from the 
previous session the tears freely flowed when I was thinking about 
something sad. 
(9) And furthermore, in the expression of my feelings there has also been a 
change from rigidity (10) to an openness or flexibility. (11) Previously I 
found it difficult to express any emotion with any genuineness at all - any 
emotion was more what I had learned to express in this or that situation. 
(12) As psychotherapy proceeded I found myself expressing genuine emotion 
more often, but it was usually all one-sided, just one pure emotion of quite 
fierce intensity, but now towards the end I find that for the same obj=ct I 
can express two emotions, or three, depending on the situation, and they 
can be conflicting. (13) The beauty of all this is that I don't have to be 
thinking of or about the feeling, "what is this", "should I be feeling this", 
-126-
"is it right", "am I feeling enough?" These questions seem to come up less 
and less frequently as time goes on and I seem to have more and more time 
to experience the emotions than I had before without continually worrying 
about them. 
(14) But it is not as good as I have described all the time - often I feel 
the way I used to before therapy, (15) tight, uncertain, stiff, constricted -
the robot man - (16) sometimes I feel between the two, sort of half and 
half. (l7) But I now know that I can be the other, the solid, SITe, loose 
and open way as well, (18) which is what I was somewhere way back before 
things went wrong for me. (19) I now know that only time and living will 
increasingly bring me back to that distant way of existence, and that is my 
faith - that possibility is there - I have experienced it, in therapy first and 
outside thereafter. (20) And if you ask, how has psychotherapy affected my 
life - well, all I have described up to now is your answer - but most of all 
- it has allowed me to risk, to dare, to reach out, to be me -in the faith 
that even though the outcome is not guaranteed it will work out, somehow I 
will find an answer (21) - and that has led me to again feel alive, 
experience living, given a reality to my existence, (22) which up to prior 
entering therapy was increasingly becoming a fraud, an empty existence, a 
black hole of endless night with no stars by which I cculd chart my way 
, 
out - in reality - a death within with a painted shell outside. (23) In a 
nutshell, psychotherapy has put the life back into my living, and the living 
back into my life, and it goes forward imperfectly - and that is fine. 
(24) That I have been able to write this, realise and conceptualise this, with 
some vigour and py as you probably sense as you read the script, is 
testimony to how psyhotherapy has affected my life. (25) Furthermore, it 
has given me a base from which to start - the rest is up to me. 
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